Ordered Network Analysis of Epistemic Emotions during Collaborative Problem Solving

Collective intelligence research treats disagreement as evidence of epistemic diversity: if agents express different views, the group should retain capacity to revise. In LLM collectives this proxy can break: agents can produce diverse-looking arguments while preserving the same conclusion. We operationalize dispersion-revision coupling: the degree to which an intervention that verifiably increases the dispersion of a collective's outputs in embedding space is accompanied by genuine revision of its epistemic stance rather than premise-preserving reformulation. The diagnostic is black-box: it operates on generated text alone and makes no claims about the internal representations of the generating models. Two channels are measured independently: an output channel, the Coherence Index (CI), verifies that the intervention changed output dispersion; an epistemic channel, per-turn stance annotation, measures whether the collective revised. We propose CI with the Meta-Predictive Clarity System (MPCS), which inserts a Re-Differentiation Protocol (RDP) when outputs over-converge, as a reusable method for estimating this coupling regime. We evaluate five-agent collectives from two configurations (gpt-4o-mini and gemini-2.5-flash; 310 paired episodes per condition). On gpt-4o-mini, conditional dissent improves false-premise recovery by +17.7 points (p<1e-6) while static persona diversity harms recovery (-8.1, p=.007). On gemini-2.5-flash, the same intervention at a comparable budget yields no gain (26.1% vs 27.1%, p=.84) despite a verified dispersion drop; the two treatment effects differ from each other (z=3.79, p<.001). Mechanism tagging shows Gemini preserves the false premise via intra-framework dissent: 94% of tagged post-RDP responses reformulate rather than concede (vs 24% on GPT). We recommend reporting per-intervention stance shift and premise-preservation rate alongside accuracy.

Existing affective-computing, social-signal-processing, and meeting corpora capture important parts of human interaction, but they rarely support analysis of affect in co-located groups as a coupled individual, interpersonal, and group-level process. The required signals (per-participant physiology, eye movement, audio, self-report, task outcomes, and personality) are usually fragmented across separate dataset traditions. We introduce GroupAffect-4, a multimodal corpus of 40 participants in 10 four-person groups, each completing four ecologically varied collaborative tasks spanning information pooling, negotiation, idea generation, and a public-goods game. Each participant is instrumented with a wrist-worn physiology sensor, eye-tracking glasses, and a close-talk microphone; sessions include continuous affect self-reports, post-task questionnaires, task outcomes, and Big-Five personality scores, all time-aligned to a shared clock. The dataset covers over 91% of expected physiology windows and 98% of eye-tracking windows, with strong task validity confirmed by a clear affective manipulation check across the negotiation block. We define fifteen benchmarkable targets spanning three analysis levels -- within-person state, between-person traits, and group dynamics -- and report leave-one-group-out feasibility baselines establishing the dataset's evaluative scope. GroupAffect-4 is released with a BIDS-inspired structure, Croissant metadata, a datasheet, per-session quality reports, and open processing scripts. Code and processing scripts are available at https://github.com/meisamjam/GroupAffect-4; the dataset is publicly archived at https://zenodo.org/records/20037847.

Emotion-sensing AI is rapidly becoming embedded in vehicles, home appliances, dialogue agents, and social infrastructure, giving rise to a sphere in which emotion is no longer confined to individual experience but is instead observed and computed at a societal scale, a domain we term the Affectosphere. Yet a central normative question in this domain has remained underexplored: who has the final authority to determine the meaning of one's own emotion? This study addresses the question from the epistemological side of measurement's structural limits. We define a meaning distribution as the distribution of labels assigned by annotators drawn from a population under a fixed annotation protocol, and decompose its uncertainty into reducible and irreducible components. We then demonstrate that, while emotion AI can assign high-confidence point labels and discriminate real differences at an aggregate level, the irreducible component of the meaning distribution for individual instances cannot be estimated with adequate coverage under realistic annotator counts, a systematic divergence we term the epistemic gap. The key finding is that high device confidence does not constitute evidence that irrecoverable meaning has been recovered. From this epistemic gap, together with an explicitly stated normative premise, namely that the output of a system which cannot recover a quantity in principle must not be treated as its authoritative determination, we derive the norm that the final interpretive authority over the meaning of one's emotion is procedurally reserved for the experiencing subject, the norm of affective sovereignty. These results suggest that the design, evaluation, and regulation of emotion AI should place explicit allocation of interpretive authority, rather than accuracy maximisation, at their core.