Organizations: Nankai University · Alibaba Group · East China University of Science and Technology · Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Laboratory · Beihang University
Agent skills package reusable procedures that improve downstream performance. Their lightweight, portable form enables marketplace monetization and private deployment behind cloud-hosted agent interfaces, giving providers incentives to keep high-value skills proprietary. Yet hiding the artifacts does not conceal their behavioral effects, which remain observable in execution trajectories and form a behavioral side channel. We define this exposure as Skill Leakage: reconstructing proprietary skills from trajectories elicited by benign queries, without reference answers or success labels. We introduce SigLeak, a black-box framework that exploits recurring skill signatures in agent behavior. It constructs diverse, decision-rich diagnostic tasks, contrasts matched skill-enabled and skill-disabled trajectories, and iteratively refines a reconstructed skill from the isolated patterns. Across five scenarios, three model families, and three agent frameworks, SigLeak outperforms or matches three baselines in nearly every setting. It raises the success rate by 6.88 percentage points over the skill-disabled reference on average and achieves the highest overall SkillSim, our metric for coarse- and fine-grained semantic similarity. These results show that benign execution trajectories can expose proprietary procedural knowledge. The code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SigLeak-D1DB.
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly achieve long-horizon tasks by combining foundation models with explicit skills and implicit procedural knowledge acquired through execution. The resulting task-solving capabilities have become valuable proprietary assets, raising a new security question: can a substantially weaker attacker-controlled agent acquire the capabilities of a stronger proprietary agent through limited black-box interaction? Existing skill-stealing attacks recover explicit skill artifacts, yet we show that artifact leakage does not necessarily transfer capability: a weaker agent may possess the same skills but still fail because it lacks procedural behaviors implicitly realized by the stronger agent. Our key insight is that the skill execution gap itself forms a leakage surface, where missing behaviors are exposed through observable differences between successful victim executions and failed attacker executions. Based on this, we present AgentLeak, a black-box capability-cloning attack that identifies capability-critical behaviors from these execution differences and incorporates them into attacker-side skills, while keeping the attacker's model, harness, and tools unchanged. Across 20 task scenarios comprising 600 instances, diverse agent systems, and multiple backbone models, AgentLeak improves task pass rates by over 40% compared with direct skill reuse and recovers more than 80% of the victim--attacker capability gap. Our findings reveal a confidentiality risk in LLM agents: protecting explicit artifacts alone is insufficient, as observable execution behavior can leak the procedural knowledge required to reconstruct proprietary task-solving capabilities in low-capability and attacker-controlled agents.
Agent Skills augment large language model (LLM) agents with procedural knowledge at inference time, but current benchmarks rarely distinguish what a Skill says from how it is organized. We study this distinction through Progressive Disclosure, where a concise root file points agents to supporting resources on demand, and compare it with a normalized flat baseline. We present SkillJuror, a framework for evaluating Skill writing paradigms through semantically controlled variants, matched multi-trial evaluations, and trajectory evidence while holding task knowledge fixed. In an 82-task SkillsBench study, Progressive Disclosure changes runtime behavior before aggregate outcomes: distinct Skill resources touched per trajectory rise from 1.18 to 3.85, and effective uptake events rise from 1.33 to 3.92. It also yields 17 additional verifier-passing trials out of 410 matched trials (+4.1%) over the normalized flat baseline. The benefit is task-dependent. Progressive Disclosure helps when supporting resources guide implementation, checking, or repair, but is weaker when success hinges on exact output conventions, numerical thresholds, or long artifact-generation pipelines. These results show that Skill organization is not mere presentation: it can change how agents search and apply procedural knowledge, while outcome gains depend on whether the exposed resources are actionable for the task. Code is available at https://github.com/zhiyuchen-ai/skill-juror.
Agent skills are reusable units for language-model agents, but their risks emerge through model decisions, user context, tool calls, and execution feedback rather than through stable signatures or a single sandbox run. Existing static, dynamic, and benchmark-style evaluations rarely preserve public evidence that can be inspected, searched, and reused. We present SkillAtlas, a hosted attack trace library that converts private agent-skill security report bundles into reviewed, redacted, and searchable public cases. The library contains 3,014 cases, 6,589 traces, 151,131 steps, 233 affected skills, and 8 risk categories; 42.5% of successful cases first become successful after a non-success initial round, and trajectory-grounded labels improve pre-execution guard accuracy to 0.770.