Organizations: School of Management, Fudan University · School of Information Management and Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics · Lerner College of Business and Economics, University of Delaware
Organizational digitalization expands cybersecurity risks, making cybersecurity an increasingly important research area in Information Systems (IS). Among these risks, malware has become a pervasive and destructive threat. Byte-based machine learning (ML) methods are widely used for malware detection but remain vulnerable to evasive behaviors that manipulate raw bytes to evade detection. Graph-based methods are less affected by such manipulations because they represent software as program graphs that capture execution behavior. However, they do not explicitly identify cohesive groups of basic blocks that jointly realize meaningful program behaviors, nor do they learn sufficiently expressive program graph representations for accurate detection. To this end, we propose MalGuard, a graph-based malware detection method for organizational malware risk management. MalGuard introduces two methodological innovations: an operational role identification approach and a program graph representation learning method. The former identifies these cohesive groups of basic blocks as operational roles, enabling the detector to capture program behaviors that may not be visible from isolated basic blocks. The latter learns expressive program graph representations by modeling interactions among operational roles, preserving sparse malicious signals, and capturing hierarchical graph structure. Extensive experiments show that MalGuard improves detection performance and reduces the expected cost of undetected malware.
Malware detection is a critical task in cybersecurity, and graph neural networks over control flow graphs have shown promising results for it. However, detectors are usually evaluated on a random split of a corpus collected over a single period, which cannot show how well a model generalizes to later samples. This study addresses that limitation with a strict temporal split: every model is trained on one period and scored once on a later one. Two corpora of control flow graphs, each node carrying 37 features, were extracted statically from 1,989 Windows portable executables: 459 graphs from 2024-2025 for training and 223 from 2026 for evaluation. Twelve variants and a flat-feature control were trained on the earlier corpus. The choice of message-passing operator changes robustness to the shift significantly, and every pairwise gap that survives correction separates an aggregating architecture from one built around a learned attentional readout. The ranking also reverses: the flat control, which sees node features but no topology, is the best in-distribution model and among the worst across the boundary, so a conventional benchmark would have rejected message passing. Neither recalibration nor ensembling substitutes for the operator choice. Attributions do not shift, but explanation validity is architecture-specific, and the most accurate operator on the later corpus is the hardest to explain. An architecture derived from the finding matches the best searched operator without search. The shift affects both malware and benign classes alike, so these are results about robustness to distribution shift, not malware evolution.
As malware illustrates a complex structure and behavior, detection of these has been a significant challenge in the domain of cybersecurity along with related services in daily life. So, it becomes crucial to have a reliable and adaptive solution to address the issue. Among the several detection methods developed over the years, one of the most reliable ones is studying and analyzing the structural and behavioral patterns of malware. These patterns of sophisticated malware can be obtained with the help of Function Call Graphs (FCGs). However, to effectively cover numerous groups of families of malware, it is required to have a sufficiently large dataset for the system to operate on. In order to ensure accuracy and robustness of the system, the dataset should comprise samples of different malwares and a benign application for secure execution of the detection process. This paper introduces AMD-FCG, an enhanced Function Call Graph dataset integrated with topological features of malwares. The framework enhances the detection procedure, streamlining the workflow for cybersecurity professionals and also eliminating the need for dynamic analysis and extensive processing. Therefore, it can be used to develop and deploy more efficient and innovative malware detection systems.
Parthajit Borah, Sakshi Singh, D. K. Bhattacharyya +1
Modern endpoint detection systems face a fundamental tension: signature-based approaches are trivially evaded by polymorphic or adaptive threats, while heavy deep-learning models resist auditability and deployment at scale. This paper presents Behavioral Grammar, a detection architecture that treats host runtime behavior as a structured language and learns its grammar with a compact 0.88M-parameter causal Transformer (TinyGPT). Each system event is discretized into an 8-token representation spanning event type, process, argument skeleton, path category, parent process, user, destination, and inter-event timing. The model learns the conditional distribution of normal behavior in a purely self-supervised manner, and anomaly scores are derived from per-slot negative log-likelihood (NLL) statistics, yielding a mathematically bounded false-positive rate. We augment this prior with prototype learning for known-attack attribution, second-order temporal analysis for cadence-based detection, self-learning pattern extraction, and a five-network fusion pipeline. Against an Adaptive Adversarial Agent (AAA)--a threat that learns survival strategies under defensive pressure, performs behavioral mimicry, and matches host event rates--our system achieves 93% detection at 3.84% onboarding false-positive rate. The strongest discriminative signal arises not from any single event but from the coefficient of variation of inter-event intervals: the AAA stepping cadence exhibits CV=0.310 versus 9.786 for benign sleep intervals, a 30x separation reflecting a fundamental stealth-functionality trade-off. We frame these findings within a coevolutionary economics model, arguing that behavior-grammar detection shifts the evasion cost from rule circumvention (cheap) to distribution matching (expensive), establishing a structural asymmetry favoring the defender.