From Found to Designed: Concepts as a Design Axis for Large Language Models

Understanding concepts is fundamental to generalization. Despite their impressive performance on a wide range of tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with genuine concept understanding. Prior work has evaluated conceptual understanding in LLMs using natural-language benchmarks or narrowly scoped synthetic tasks, but these settings often conflate multiple skills or lack precise control over the underlying concepts and their properties. To support controlled probing of concepts in LLMs, we design tests on their core properties: abstraction, compositionality, and groundness. We set up a concept-centric benchmark, targeting spatial concepts such as direction, distance, topology, and their compositions, and use question answering tasks serving as a proxy. We conduct extensive experiments across multiple LLM architectures and training regimes to analyze how model scale and design impact conceptual understanding. The results reveal clear limitations in current LLMs and provide insights into the factors shaping their ability to acquire and compose structured concepts. Our findings shed light on how concept-based LLMs can be redesigned for improved information access and knowledge management. The code will be available at https://github.com/rd20karim/concept-probing.

As the influence of LLMs expands, it is imperative to gain insight into their decisions. One way to do that is to develop probes that detect the presence or absence of a broad set of high-level abstract concepts within the embeddings computed in an LLM - which is what we might say a model is ``thinking" about. Such probes should be low-cost and easily applicable to any LLM, so that monitoring for many concepts is possible during normal operation. In this paper, we take the first steps towards developing the capability of creating many such probes by defining and executing examples of the key tasks needed: first, the careful delineation of a high-level abstract concept through the creation of a dataset with the concept both present and then absent. Then, the training and testing of a set of linear probes to detect the concept on any layer of an LLM, including an exploration of the complexity of the probe needed. Finally, we show that such probes can track concepts across larger contexts. This is done with four separate concepts and three different LLMs. When this process is scaled to many more concepts, it will create the ability to monitor new models.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly reported to exhibit human-like neural and cognitive signatures, including concept cells, mental number lines, and cognitive maps. These claims often rely on linear probing and activation steering applied to a single model, yet both methods are highly sensitive to measurement choices. A reported parallel may therefore reflect the model, the measurement procedure, or both. We audit four representative neuroscience-inspired paradigms across 17 models from five families, spanning $0.6$B to $72$B parameters. Our main experiment examines the causal steerability of concept directions. With raw activation units and a fixed layer and coefficient, steerability appears to increase with model scale, resembling an emergent capability. However, this pattern is produced by an uncalibrated pipeline rather than by a claim established in the steering literature. The trend depends jointly on raw units, the readout metric, and the operating point; correcting any one of these removes it. With residual-norm-comparable interventions and held-out operating-point selection, concept steering remains significant at every scale, but shows no significant trend across the Qwen3 series, although the confidence interval does not rule out a moderate positive slope. The remaining results are mixed. A linear geographic world map is consistently decodable in every tested checkpoint up to $72$B. Number magnitude is strongly encoded, but whether individual neurons appear bell-shaped or monotonic depends on the selection criterion. Language-specific structure is localizable, but the direction of the cross-lingual asymmetry reverses under a different attribution method. These results suggest that the main constraint on AI neuroscience is not a lack of phenomena, but a lack of comparable measurements and adequate controls. We release the protocol, stimuli, and code.