Don't Let Me Ask for It: LLMs Show Deficiencies in Active Multi-Turn Information Acquisition for Abductive Inference
Authors: Shahrukh Mohiuddin, Chalamalasetti Kranti, Sherzod Hakimov, David Schlangen
Abstract
Abductive reasoning requires forming hypotheses that explain observed evidence and revising them as new evidence becomes available. While large language models (LLMs) are often evaluated on whether they solve abductive reasoning tasks correctly, less is known about how they acquire evidence, update their hypotheses, and decide when to stop. We introduce Alien Abduction game, an interactive probe for studying these behaviours under different interaction modes. The modes vary in whether evidence is provided upfront or across turns, and whether queries are selected by the model or examples are provided by the oracle. Across models, providing evidence upfront leads to higher success rates than distributing it across turns. In multi-turn settings, some models commit before using the available evidence, while others exhaust the turn budget without converging. Models also achieve higher success rates when examples are provided by the oracle than when they select their own queries, although their final hypotheses are more consistent with the evidence they selected. These findings suggest that models may form hypotheses that fit self-selected evidence without sufficiently distinguishing them from alternatives, and may struggle to validate and refine their hypotheses or determine when to stop.
Large language models (LLMs) excel at pattern recognition and text generation, but their capacity for abductive inference - inferring latent hypotheses that explain observed behavior - remains poorly understood. Here, we introduce Elenchos (named after the Socratic method of cross-examination), a generative evaluation framework that measures abductive reasoning as a structural inverse problem. Given a reference formal system, such as the lambda-calculus, and a potentially mutated counterpart, agents must determine whether a mutation has occurred and infer the rule modifications responsible for the resulting behavioral differences. Evaluating frontier and mid-tier LLMs reveals a consistent detection-attribution dissociation: models often recognize that a system has been altered but struggle to identify the latent mutations causing the observed discrepancies. Performance degrades substantially under interacting mutations, where models frequently recover only a subset of the underlying mutations. Preliminary evidence also suggests diminishing returns from increased inference-time reasoning, with only modest improvements under larger reasoning budgets, though this finding requires further validation.
Julius Steiglechner, Lucas Mahler, Gabriele Lohmann
We introduce a multi-turn interactive framework for reasoning evaluation that treats reasoning as active evidence acquisition and belief updating. Wherein, LLMs receive only the task rules, must issue targeted queries to a hidden environment, integrate partial observations over time, and decide when to submit a final answer. Beyond standard success rate and interaction efficiency, we evaluate contextual robustness under controlled contextual perturbations, and metacognitive adaptation through counterfactual revision and necessity judgment. We instantiate the framework as a benchmark of 474 executable games, each evaluated under five fixed configuration search spaces corresponding to five difficulty levels, and evaluate a broad set of frontier LLMs. Results show that the benchmark is highly discriminative, exposing large differences not only in success rate but also in interaction efficiency. Moreover, we empirically show that contextual perturbations cause moderate but consistent declines, whereas counterfactual revision and necessity judgment lead to much larger drops.
Modern language models (LMs) can learn to perform new tasks in different ways: in instruction following, the target task is described explicitly in natural language; in few-shot prompting, the task is specified implicitly with a small number of examples; in instruction inference, LMs are presented with in-context examples and are then prompted to generate a natural language task description before making predictions. Each of these procedures may be thought of as invoking a different form of reasoning: instruction following involves deductive reasoning, few-shot prompting involves inductive reasoning, and instruction inference involves abductive reasoning. How do these different capabilities relate? Across four LMs (from the gpt and llama families) and two learning problems (involving arithmetic functions and machine translation) we find a strong dissociation between the different types of reasoning: LMs can sometimes learn effectively from few-shot prompts even when they are unable to explain their own prediction rules; conversely, they sometimes infer useful task descriptions while completely failing to learn from human-generated descriptions of the same task. Our results highlight the non-systematic nature of reasoning even in some of today's largest LMs, and underscore the fact that very different learning mechanisms may be invoked by seemingly similar prompting procedures.