Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning often adds social terms to individual rewards, yet the scale of those terms is usually chosen by hand. We ask whether a guilt signal can instead be calibrated from human neural and behavioural data and transferred to artificial agents. Using the public SoDec responsibility fMRI dataset (40 participants), we fit a subject-fixed-effects regression of momentary-happiness changes on outcome-type counts and recover a guilt weight as the Partner-negative minus Social-negative contrast (w^=1.118, Cohen's d=0.214). We embed this weight in a two-agent Social Lottery environment and train independent Proximal Policy Optimization actor-critics under four shaping regimes: neurally calibrated, uniform constant, zero (selfish), and a unit-coefficient oracle. Across 1{,}000 evaluation episodes per condition, the calibrated agents track the human Social safe-choice rate most closely (0.459 vs.\ human 0.484; KL=0.0012), while the other three conditions deviate by one to three orders of magnitude in KL. Human neurobehavioural priors can therefore act as quantitative constraints on prosocial reward shaping.
Multi-agent simulations are widely used to study complex social and ecological systems, where rich and often unexpected emergent behaviors arise from local interactions. A large body of prior work has focused on analyzing such emergent dynamics across domains. In this paper, we move beyond analyzing emergent behavior and introduce a learning-based mechanism for actively shaping it via social reward modeling. We introduce Multi-Agent Reward Prediction (MARP), a simple framework that extends preference-based reward modeling to multi-agent reinforcement learning. While the framework is designed to be applicable across multi-agent settings, the present empirical validation is limited to a single environment, and we therefore present MARP as a proof of concept within the studied domain. Rather than relying on handcrafted rewards, MARP learns a shared reward model from episode-level evaluations of collective outcomes, enabling decentralized agents to align their behavior with global social objectives. We study MARP in the Harvest Game, a canonical sequential social dilemma modeling common-pool resource management and related real-world challenges. Our results show that MARP can be tuned to produce behavior that is more closely aligned with target social metrics than standard reward-based baselines, while the learned reward model captures subtle environmental structure without explicit programming. Crucially, MARP supports multiple and composite social objectives within a single training regime. By modifying only the high-level evaluation metric, the same framework seamlessly aligns agent behavior with diverse goals, including sustainability, equality, and peace, as well as combinations of individual and group-level objectives. These findings demonstrate that emergent multi-agent behavior can be treated not only as a phenomenon to study, but as a target of principled, data-driven regulation.
Inducing cooperation among distributed agents is still a difficult problem in the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), particularly in social dilemma situations. There, individual interests are misaligned with the common good and individual rationality leads to suboptimal group outcomes. In contrast, humans are able to achieve cooperation with one another in such situations. A common explanation for such cooperative behavior is that individuals have social preferences. In order to achieve cooperation in MARL, we design a new utility function integrating altruistic preferences (incentive for other's reward) and fairness preferences (incentive for equality) from social psychology and behavioral economics, namely, Altruistic and Fairness Preference (AFP), a reward-sharing mechanism which converts one's own and other's rewards to incentives for cooperative behavior. We performed comparative experiments with standard RL and inequity aversion agents in two challenging sequential social dilemma games, and showed that AFP agents successfully achieved mutual cooperation with more collective rewards and higher equity than the baselines. To further understand the progression of AFP during training, we subsequently explore the effects of altruistic preferences and fairness preferences on agents' behavior. The results suggest that altruistic preferences encourage agents to contribute to the public goods, and fairness preferences induce mutual behavior between agents.
Credit assignment is a fundamental challenge in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning, particularly in embodied AI settings characterized by limited and delayed feedback as well as dynamically changing numbers of active agents. We propose MARS-RA, a framework that reformulates credit assignment as a rank aggregation problem using contribution-based pairwise comparisons among agents generated by large multimodal models. This shift from absolute to relative estimation ensures robustness against noise and dynamic agent participation, converting comparison results into contribution scores for potential-based reward shaping. We provide theoretical justification for the convergence and robustness of the proposed framework, and show that Shapley values can be used as an interpretive reference. Experimental results on challenging tasks of different types indicate that MARS-RA can guide agents toward effective cooperation.