C^3PO: Evaluating Cross-Modal Composition and Counterfactual Performance in Omnimodal Models

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) increasingly support high-stakes decision making by combining complementary information from images and text. While existing explainability methods identify influential image regions or text tokens, they cannot answer a fundamental question: which modality drives a prediction? Consequently, a model may produce the correct output while relying on the wrong source of evidence, masking shortcut learning and unsafe reasoning. We formulate modality attribution as a complementary explainability objective for multimodal foundation models and propose Counterfactual Modality Attribution (CMA), the first framework for quantifying modality-level contributions in MLLMs. CMA generates image-only, text-only, and joint multimodal counterfactuals using coupled diffusion priors and converts them into principled modality attribution scores through a cooperative game-theoretic formulation based on Shapley values. We evaluate CMA on controlled synthetic benchmarks with known ground-truth modality reliance and on a real-world multimodal clinical dataset. CMA correctly identifies the decision-driving modality in 98% of controlled cases and consistently outperforms baselines, revealing failures of cross-modal reasoning that remain invisible to predictive accuracy alone. Our results establish modality attribution as a complementary dimension of explainability beyond feature attribution, providing a principled framework for auditing multimodal foundation models in safety-critical applications.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) has become a standard method for improving reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs) by eliciting step-by-step thinking, but its effectiveness in multimodal tasks remains unclear. In this paper, we aim to systematically investigate the key question: What can multimodal Chain-of-Thought reasoning do, and where and why does it fall short? To this end, we evaluate 12 multimodal tasks across perception and reasoning categories using both 14 non-reasoning models and 8 reasoning models. Our analysis reveals several important findings: (1) CoT is not a free lunch and should be used selectively depending on the specific requirements of each task. For perception tasks, CoT can lead to undesirable side effects, such as reduced performance in visual grounding and object counting. In contrast, it proves effective for reasoning tasks involving mathematical, scientific, and multi-image reasoning; (2) Compared to original models, existing open-source multimodal reasoning models often yield only marginal overall improvements, possibly due to an overemphasis on mathematical reasoning at the expense of broader capabilities; (3) Visual reasoning remains a key bottleneck for current multimodal CoT, as models exhibit a Look Light, Think Heavy pattern where verbal reflection rises and falls during reasoning, whereas visual reflection consistently diminishes. These findings suggest that while multimodal CoT handles verbal reflection relatively well, it lacks the ability to maintain deep visual introspection throughout the reasoning process.

When an omnimodal large language model accepts a question whose textual premise contradicts what it actually sees or hears, does the failure lie in perception or in action? Recent omnimodal models are positioned as perception-grounded agents that jointly process video, audio, and text, yet a basic form of grounding remains untested: catching a textual claim that conflicts with the model's own sensory input. We introduce IMAVB, a curated 500-clip benchmark of long-form movies with a 2x2 design crossing target modality (vision, audio) and premise condition (standard, misleading), which lets us measure conflict detection separately from ordinary multimodal comprehension. Across eight open-source omnimodal LLMs and Gemini 3.1 Pro, we document a Representation-Action Gap: hidden states reliably encode premise-perception mismatches even when the same models almost never reject the false claim in their outputs. Behaviorally, models fall into two failure modes: under-rejection, in which they answer misleading questions as if the false premise were true; and over-rejection, in which they reject more often but also reject standard questions, sacrificing ordinary comprehension accuracy. The gap is modality-asymmetric (audio grounding underperforms vision) and prompt-resistant across seven variants. As an initial diagnostic intervention, a probe-guided logit adjustment (PGLA) re-injects the encoded mismatch signal into decoding and consistently improves rejection behavior. Together, these results suggest the bottleneck for omnimodal grounding lies in translation, not perception.