AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games
Authors: Boning Li, Yu Chen, Longbo Huang
Organizations: IIIS, Tsinghua University
Abstract
Deciding which of two agents is stronger means playing games until skill outweighs luck, and every game costs money, model inference, or expert time. Since the number of games needed is unknown, fixed-budget evaluations either keep paying after the result is settled or stop before the agents can be told apart, while naive optional stopping with an ordinary confidence interval invalidates the stated level. We make such an evaluation stop as soon as its evidence suffices, with the guarantee intact. The Action-Informed Value Assessment Tool (AIVAT) reduces variance in imperfect-information games through conditional mean-zero corrections, by a median 54× across 15 LLM agent configurations spanning 71,439 paired Heads-Up No-Limit Hold'em (HUNL) hands, but does not say when to stop. We combine AIVAT with continuously monitored Confidence Sequences (CSs) into anytime-valid AIVAT (AV-AIVAT), whose online value model learns only from past games so that no game scores its own correction. At the nominal 95% level and a target precision of ±1 Big Blind, raw outcomes need a median 74× as many hands as AIVAT-corrected outcomes to stop under the Asymptotic CS (AsympCS). Exact finite-sample certification uses the Empirical-Bernstein CS (EB-CS), which needs an independently justified bound on corrected payoffs. We establish such a bound structurally for Leduc hold'em and characterize a width floor set by the CS's bet cap and that bound, which governs how much of a variance gain becomes earlier stopping; the descriptive HUNL EB-CS runs show a median 1.37× stopping-time ratio. AV-AIVAT turns variance reduction into efficient, auditable early stopping while separating asymptotic screening from exact certification, so an evaluation can stop the moment its evidence suffices and hand a third party everything needed to recheck the verdict at that very stopping time.
How should an agent's performance in a multiagent environment be evaluated when there is a limited sample size or a high cost of running a trial? The AIVAT family of variance reduction techniques was proposed to address this challenge by introducing unbiased low-variance estimators of agents' expected payoffs. An important component of AIVAT is a heuristic value function that discriminates between potentially low- and high-value counterfactual histories. A notable gap in the literature is that there is little to no constraint or guideline on how the heuristic value function should be chosen or how uncertainty in its output should be handled. In our first contribution, we parameterize the heuristic value function to highlight AIVAT's potential vulnerabilities: a) the sample variance can be set pathologically low by directly applying gradient descent on the sample variance, and b) one can p-hack to draw a desired statistical conclusion via gradient descent/ascent on the test statistic. The main takeaway is that the heuristic value function should be fixed prior to observing the evaluation data! In our second contribution, we show how the heuristic uncertainty can be propagated to quantify the uncertainty of AIVAT estimates. It is then possible to further reduce the variance using inverse-variance weighted averaging, but AIVAT's unbiasedness guarantee may have to be sacrificed. In our experiments, we use a dataset of 10,000 poker hands to demonstrate our heuristic pathology and uncertainty results, with the latter yielding a 43.0% reduction in the number of samples (poker hands) needed to draw statistical conclusions.
The inherent rigidity of fixed-size benchmarks makes them an inefficient tool for model evaluation. Diverse evaluation objectives, including model ranking, model selection and testing throughout development, demand varying levels of statistical power. The mismatch between fixed sample sizes and these diverse needs results in either excessive computational cost or compromised reliability - a critical concern for model evaluation. To overcome these limitations, we call for adoption of sequential testing in our field. We provide an adaptive evaluation framework, that provides a principled way to navigate the trade-off between efficiency and reliability in model evaluation. Our framework combines the established statistical paradigm of sequential testing with stopping criteria tailored to common evaluation needs such as diminishing returns detection, and minimum detectable effect size. We demonstrate its ability to adaptively manage the efficiency-reliability trade-off on the Open VLM Leaderboard, including, for example, a 80% reduction in computational cost compared to fixed-size evaluation (with a 2.5-point CI width allowance) while maintaining statistical significance.
We evaluate artificial intelligence (AI) systems without ground truth by exploiting a link between strategic gaming and information loss. Building on established information theory, we analyze which mechanisms resist adversarial manipulation. This motivates mutual evaluation, where the overseer is treated as a strategic player estimating mutual information by prompting, making truthful agent reporting an optimal strategy. We show that certain f-divergences, such as total variation distance (TVD), maintain polynomial guarantees under attack, building on an established exponential barrier for estimating mutual information (MI) in worst-case certification settings. Under adversarial attacks, TVD-MI maintains effectiveness (area under the curve 0.70--0.77) while other approaches can decay toward chance, demonstrating that prompting the same system for information relationships rather than quality judgments can improve robustness. The mechanisms decompose pairwise evaluations into reliable item-level detection scores without ground truth, addressing a key limitation of standard peer prediction. Pre-registration: https://osf.io/c7pum .