On the use of foundation models in cognitive science

Foundation models have been increasingly applied to behavioral science domains such as psychology, sociology, and economics. While these models show promise in individual tasks such as survey response prediction and human-subject experiment simulation, there remains no systematic understanding of how well they perform across diverse behavioral science tasks, contexts, and populations. We introduce BehaviorBench, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates foundation models along four core capabilities: (1) behavior prediction and simulation, (2) strategic decision-making, (3) subject-trait inference, and (4) behavioral knowledge application. Crucially, BehaviorBench evaluates model outputs at both the individual and distributional levels, capturing not only per-subject accuracy but also population-level alignment, an essential requirement for behavioral validity. Leveraging the tasks in BehaviorBench, we further develop Be.FM-1.5, extending the Be.FM family of behavioral foundation models fine-tuned on behavioral data. Our results reveal a considerable gap: proprietary general-purpose models excel at individual-level prediction and knowledge-intensive tasks, whereas behavioral foundation models, fine-tuned on behavioral data, achieve substantially stronger distributional alignment. Notably, Be.FM-1.5 leads on distributional metrics and remains competitive on individual-level metrics, suggesting that proper behavioral adaptation can close the gap. Our results highlight the importance of distributional evaluation, establish BehaviorBench as a foundation for developing and assessing behaviorally aligned AI systems, and demonstrate Be.FM-1.5's potential for a broad range of behavioral science studies. Our BehaviorBench and Be.FM-1.5 models can be accessed via https://umich-foreseer.github.io/behaviorbench/.

Large language models fine-tuned on human behavioural data have emerged as general-purpose cognitive proxies, but the scale this requires, and whether these models process task structure or exploit statistical shortcuts, remain open questions. We train fourteen models from 135M to 14B parameters across four architecture families on Psych-101, a dataset of 10.7 million trial-level choices from 160 experiments. For in-distribution simulations, scale barely matters. The models fall within a narrow band, as though against a ceiling, and 0.6B to 1B parameters suffice to match a 70B baseline on held-out participants. Out-of-distribution, that band opens into a markedly steeper scaling gradient, with larger models clearly advantaged in generalisation to novel task structure. To determine what information these models use, we run two diagnostics. We progressively strip four prompt channels -- task instructions, experimental stimuli, outcome feedback, and choice history -- across 27 experiments, and permute trial order. Masking the content of stimuli and feedback destroys 75.7% of learned information and pushes models below chance, demonstrating that choice history alone does not account for performance. Permutation reveals invariance on tasks with independent trials but sensitivity where trial order is determined by prior responses. Small cognitively fine-tuned models therefore show promise as noise ceiling estimators for psychological experiments, though their scope remains bounded by the paradigms seen in training.

Controlled experiments are the backbone of machine learning research, but at the scale of modern foundation models, they have become prohibitively expensive. Instead, the community increasingly relies on research strategies that approximate the ideal experiment at a fraction of the cost: proxy experiments and scaling laws, observational studies with publicly available models, and single-run designs that leverage variation within individual training runs. In this work, we argue that there is no free lunch when approximating large-scale experiments on a compute budget. Specifically, savings in compute come at the cost of validity threats -- hidden and sometimes untestable assumptions that, when violated, can invalidate research claims. To help navigate such threats, we propose an evaluation framework that casts foundation model research as a causal inference problem. Within this framework, we evaluate different research strategies through four types of validity adapted from the empirical social sciences -- statistical, internal, external, and construct validity. We find that each strategy comes with a characteristic validity profile: proxy experiments trade external and construct validity for statistical and internal validity; observational studies face confounding and effect heterogeneity; and single-run designs are strained by interference between treated units. This analysis reveals several validity threats that have received insufficient attention in the literature. Overall, our evaluation framework provides researchers with a practical toolkit for scrutinizing validity threats in foundation model research~designs.