Indirect Geoeconomic Influence: A Switching Dynamical Systems Framework for Mechanism Design
Authors: Nikolos Gurney, Boxi Fu, Soham Hans, Volkan Ustun
Abstract
We develop a formal framework for analyzing indirect geoeconomic influence. The influencing state (sender) does not attempt to change a target nation's policy directly. Instead, the sender restructures the target's internal political economy so that its own citizens, firms, and institutions generate the compliance pressure. The framework rests on a switching dynamical system (SDS) in which a target's political economy evolves under mode-dependent rules. We analyze two modes: a permissive mode, in which a mechanism transmits pressure toward the sender's preferred policy, and a contested mode, entered naturally once the target detects and attributes the mechanism. Crucially, the sender's mechanism design shapes the transition into the contested mode rather than paying a static toll for legibility. This inverts the usual regime-switching problem: rather than estimating a latent transition kernel from data, the designer engineers the kernel to steer regime occupancy over a planning horizon. A structured switch vector decomposes any mechanism along discrete design dimensions, and a combinatorial optimizer searches this space for high-performing archetypes scored on compliance, time-to-threshold, and a durability ratio. We characterize mode-conditional equilibria and derive comparative statics on credibility and legibility, showing that the legibility penalty is scaled by the salience of the government channel and therefore interacts with the mechanism's cost incidence. We illustrate the framework with two stylized mechanisms, report a proof-of-concept simulation over a reduced switch space, and report a small blind-audit study of the pipeline's optional language-model generation stage.
We develop a framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown. We want such agents to act on our behalf so mechanisms must incentivize both honesty and obedience. A one-sided imitation structure---capabilities can be concealed but not counterfeited---yields a revelation principle, a characterization of implementable policies via nested cyclical monotonicity, and conditions under which eliciting higher-order beliefs can discipline multiple agents. We apply our framework to stylized examples of (i) sandbagging in which a more capable agent pretends to be less capable; (ii) an alignment--interpretability trade-off, where the two are substitutes in the instrument but complements in value; (iii) discipline via peer scoring; (iv) coupling rewards to induce competition among multiple agents; and (v) scalable oversight and reward shaping.
Competing firms that share a population of risky customers face a decentralized risk detection problem in which each firm holds fragmentary information whose aggregation would generate social value, but private incentives impede truthful sharing. We develop a dynamic mechanism design framework for this setting and identify three strategic frictions that distinguish it from classical mechanism design with decentralized information: compliance moral hazard, adversarial adaptation, and information destruction through intervention. A temporal value assignment (TVA) mechanism credits firms using a strictly proper scoring rule applied to discounted verified outcomes; under stated assumptions, TVA implements truthful posterior reporting as a Bayes--Nash equilibrium (uniquely optimal at each edge in large federations, with O(1/m) shading in finite systems). A network Shapley characterization shows that under edge-additive coalition value, each firm's marginal contribution is proportional to its weighted cross-firm interaction degree, yielding a sharp prescription for coalition design that prioritizes inter-firm volume over firm size. Embedding TVA in a model of competition among firms, we establish a welfare ordering across four regulatory regimes (autarky, voluntary federation, mandated full sharing, TVA) and identify conditions under which information-sharing mandates without compatible incentive design reduce welfare below autarky: a ``backfiring mandate.'' We illustrate the framework on a 1.4M-transaction synthetic anti-money-laundering benchmark; the same machinery extends to platform fraud, cybersecurity threat intelligence, and supply chain risk detection.
Incentive design studies how a central authority can influence strategic agents through payments, subsidies, or taxes, so that individual objectives align with collective welfare. This paper introduces a No-Regret Adaptive Incentive Design (RAID) framework for nonlinear games with continuous action spaces and private agent costs. In this framework, the authority (planner) designs incentives that regulate the Nash equilibrium toward a socially optimal action profile, while simultaneously learning agents' unknown preferences from repeated strategic responses. We formulate the RAID problem and construct a least-squares estimator whose strong consistency requires only diminishing excitation. Leveraging this weak excitation requirement, we propose a switching incentive policy that alternates between probing (exploration) and estimate-based (exploitation) incentives. The resulting policy achieves an O(t−0.5) parameter estimation rate and accumulates O(t0.5logt) squared social-cost regret, almost surely. We further extend the framework to an endogenous-noise response model, where standard least-squares estimation is biased due to an error-in-variables correlation between the noise and agent responses. We utilize a repeated-sampling estimator and corresponding switching policy that retain the same almost-sure convergence and regret rates. Numerical experiments validate the effectiveness and predicted convergence rates of the method.