TokenPrint: A Calibrated Token-Space Fingerprint for Language-Model Provenance

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly consumed through opaque serving chains - API aggregators, resellers, and inference providers - in which the client has no technical means to confirm that the model answering is the model advertised, and recent audits show that a substantial fraction of commercial endpoints deviate from the vendor's reference weights. Existing identification techniques require long generated texts, token-level log-probabilities, adversarially crafted prompts, or the model owner's cooperation. We show that far weaker evidence suffices. We define a behavioral fingerprint of an LLM as the empirical distribution of its answers to trivial one-word prompts - "name a random number between 1 and 100" - collected across four languages at a cost of one output token per query. Measuring 165 models served via a large commercial aggregator (OpenRouter), we find that (i) these distributions are highly non-uniform (median cell entropy 1.0 bit) and model-specific: split halves of the same model's samples lie an order of magnitude closer than samples of different models; (ii) Jensen-Shannon divergence between fingerprints recovers model lineage, assigning a model to its documented family with 59.5% leave-one-out accuracy against an 18.4% chance rate; and (iii) a biometric-style verification protocol achieves a 7.3% equal error rate with the full 40-cell battery, and below 11% with eight probe cells - roughly a hundred single-token queries per audit. We further report ecosystem anomalies, including a proprietary-branded flagship endpoint distributionally indistinguishable from an open-weight Qwen model. The protocol, prompts, raw data, and analysis code are released for reproduction and operational use.

The lineage graph of open-weight language models is self-reported: Hugging Face's base_model metadata field is optional and unverified, and over 60% of Hub models document no parentage at all. Methods for detecting lineage from weights exist in the research literature, but each ships as paper code tied to one signal and one experiment; when a provenance dispute breaks, the analysis is redone by hand. This report describes modelDNA, a tool that fingerprints a model from roughly 100-300 MB of ranged HTTP reads (instead of a full 15 GB download for a 7B model), compares the fingerprint against a reference database of foundation models across four published signal families, and returns one of eight verdict classes with a calibrated probability, preferring honest abstention to confident error. On a benchmark of 15 real Hub models with org-documented parentage, judged against 8 candidate bases (13 positives, 107 hard negatives), the system achieves AUROC 1.0, zero false positives at its reporting threshold, and 13/13 correct top-1 parent attribution. The report's second contribution is merge decomposition. Every mainstream weight-merging method is (near-)linear per tensor, and fingerprint sample positions are deterministic functions of tensor identity, so a merged model's fingerprint is the same linear combination of its parents' fingerprints. Mixture weights can therefore be recovered from fingerprints alone by sum-to-one constrained least squares. Against merges with published mergekit configurations as ground truth, the method recovers a slerp merge's layer-interpolation curves at r = 0.999 and a dare_ties merge's mixture weights to within 0.011 of the published values, without downloading any weights beyond the fingerprints. All fingerprints, benchmarks, and the inferred lineage graph of 55 models are public and reproducible offline.

Language model parameters are known to impose unique (to each model) geometric constraints on their logit outputs, which serves as a signature that identifies the model, but also leaks the model's final layer parameters when an API distributes logits. We investigate more restrictive APIs that expose token rankings (i.e., their ordering by probability, but not the probability values) and find that rankings also constitute a signature: every model has a unique set of feasible top-$k$ rankings for sufficiently large $k$. Furthermore, the ranking signature is the first known (polynomially) unforgeable signature, since finding a model with the same set of feasible rankings is NP-hard. On the security front, we find that token rankings are already sufficient to approximately steal the final layer of the model, similar to logits, though the approximation is too coarse to forge the signature, and can be effectively countered by restricting the API to top-$k$ tokens with sufficiently small $k$. Since the top-$k$ required to present the model signature is generally smaller than the $k$ required to prevent stealing, it is possible for an API to present an unforgeable signature without leaking model parameters.