Establishing the provenance of a language model---including its base checkpoint and possible overlap in training distributions---is a governance challenge that metadata alone cannot resolve. We introduce a training-free fingerprint based on the top-k vocabulary projections of late hidden states elicited by 250 fixed knowledge probes, compared using Jaccard overlap over decoded token strings. We evaluate the method on 32 open-weight models from nine families (0.6B--32B) with documented relationships. (1)~A \emph{similarity ladder} broadly follows model relatedness: independently trained models on identical data score 0.48 raw (0.35 vocabulary-corrected), followed by shared-base fine-tunes (0.39/0.33), same-developer relatives (0.38/0.28), and models with no documented relationship (0.22/0.17). This identical-data signal persists across three organizations, two tokenizer families, and two architecture classes, and emerges within the first 1% of training before measurable task competence, suggesting a contribution from shared training data beyond capability convergence. (2)~As a nearest-neighbor \emph{lineage-retrieval} method, the fingerprint ranks the exact documented base among the top two candidates for all five R1 distillations (mean rank 1.8, MRR 0.60), including a math-specialized base not identifiable from coarse metadata. (3)~A \emph{depth ablation} shows that lineage group discrimination strengthens toward the output distribution, with AUC increasing from 0.72 at quarter depth to 0.90 at the output; using only the top 5 output tokens retains AUC 0.87. (4)~The fingerprint remains stable under quantization, with Jaccard similarity of 0.92 under int8 and 0.82--0.85 under int4, compared with a maximum cross-model similarity of 0.81 in the calibration pool. We release the probes, code, and fingerprints.
Open-weight language models are fine-tuned, quantized, pruned, and merged, yet their provenance is often undocumented. We study data-free white-box lineage verification: can weights alone reveal whether two compatible model checkpoints share ancestry? Residual training produces a shared identity-aligned component in branch products, so this structure alone cannot establish ancestry. We remove it and compare checkpoint-specific structure across residual blocks, yielding a symmetric lineage score calibrated against independent checkpoints. On residual-MLP and GPT-2 benchmarks, the score separates fine-tuned, LoRA-merged, pruned, and quantized descendants from independent and distilled models (AUROC=1.0), distinguishing weight ancestry from behavioral similarity. Under function-preserving checkpoint laundering experiments, weight-space baselines lose margin or fail; our score remains unchanged and runs 76x faster than the nearest robust baseline on GPT-2. The projection-pairing signal appears across six language-model families and beyond, and a case study correctly identifies 3 related and 7 unrelated LLaMA-2 public checkpoints. Collectively, these results establish a passive, data-free provenance signal for compatible open-weight language-model checkpoints
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly consumed through opaque serving chains - API aggregators, resellers, and inference providers - in which the client has no technical means to confirm that the model answering is the model advertised, and recent audits show that a substantial fraction of commercial endpoints deviate from the vendor's reference weights. Existing identification techniques require long generated texts, token-level log-probabilities, adversarially crafted prompts, or the model owner's cooperation. We show that far weaker evidence suffices. We define a behavioral fingerprint of an LLM as the empirical distribution of its answers to trivial one-word prompts - "name a random number between 1 and 100" - collected across four languages at a cost of one output token per query. Measuring 165 models served via a large commercial aggregator (OpenRouter), we find that (i) these distributions are highly non-uniform (median cell entropy 1.0 bit) and model-specific: split halves of the same model's samples lie an order of magnitude closer than samples of different models; (ii) Jensen-Shannon divergence between fingerprints recovers model lineage, assigning a model to its documented family with 59.5% leave-one-out accuracy against an 18.4% chance rate; and (iii) a biometric-style verification protocol achieves a 7.3% equal error rate with the full 40-cell battery, and below 11% with eight probe cells - roughly a hundred single-token queries per audit. We further report ecosystem anomalies, including a proprietary-branded flagship endpoint distributionally indistinguishable from an open-weight Qwen model. The protocol, prompts, raw data, and analysis code are released for reproduction and operational use.
The lineage graph of open-weight language models is self-reported: Hugging Face's base_model metadata field is optional and unverified, and over 60% of Hub models document no parentage at all. Methods for detecting lineage from weights exist in the research literature, but each ships as paper code tied to one signal and one experiment; when a provenance dispute breaks, the analysis is redone by hand. This report describes modelDNA, a tool that fingerprints a model from roughly 100-300 MB of ranged HTTP reads (instead of a full 15 GB download for a 7B model), compares the fingerprint against a reference database of foundation models across four published signal families, and returns one of eight verdict classes with a calibrated probability, preferring honest abstention to confident error. On a benchmark of 15 real Hub models with org-documented parentage, judged against 8 candidate bases (13 positives, 107 hard negatives), the system achieves AUROC 1.0, zero false positives at its reporting threshold, and 13/13 correct top-1 parent attribution. The report's second contribution is merge decomposition. Every mainstream weight-merging method is (near-)linear per tensor, and fingerprint sample positions are deterministic functions of tensor identity, so a merged model's fingerprint is the same linear combination of its parents' fingerprints. Mixture weights can therefore be recovered from fingerprints alone by sum-to-one constrained least squares. Against merges with published mergekit configurations as ground truth, the method recovers a slerp merge's layer-interpolation curves at r = 0.999 and a dare_ties merge's mixture weights to within 0.011 of the published values, without downloading any weights beyond the fingerprints. All fingerprints, benchmarks, and the inferred lineage graph of 55 models are public and reproducible offline.