VectraYX-Vision-1B: A Sub-2B Spanish/LATAM Cybersecurity Vision-Language Model with Structured Visual Reasoning and Native Tool Use

We present VectraYX-Nano, a 41.95M-parameter decoder-only language model trained from scratch in Spanish for cybersecurity, with a Latin-American regional focus and native tool invocation via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The model has four contributions. (i) Corpus: VectraYX-Sec-ES, a 170M-token Spanish corpus assembled by an eight-VM distributed pipeline at ~$25 USD of cloud compute and split into three curriculum phases (conversational 42M, cybersecurity 118M, offensive tooling 10M). (ii) Architecture: a 42M Transformer decoder with GQA, QK-Norm, RMSNorm, SwiGLU, RoPE and z-loss, paired with a domain-balanced 16,384-token byte-fallback BPE. (iii) Curriculum with replay across the three phases yields a monotonic loss descent (9.80 -> 3.17 -> 3.00 -> 2.16); after SFT (loss 1.74) the v2 bootstrap-ablation reference attains a conversational gate of 0.775 +/- 0.043 on B5 over N=4 seeds, and a controlled Phase-2 replay sweep over {0,5,10,25,50}% saturates B5 at >=25% replay. (iv) Two empirical findings, both N=4. A controlled bootstrap-corpus ablation across v2 (OpenSubs), v4 (mC4-ES), and v6 (60/25/15 OpenSubs/mC4/Wiki) exposes a loss-versus-register inversion: lower-perplexity bootstraps yield measurably worse conversational behavior (v2 > v4 > v6 on B5 at every paired seed). The B4 (tool-selection) floor of 0.000 is a corpus-density artifact, not a capacity gate: rebalancing the SFT mixture to tool-use ratio 1:21 yields VectraYX-Nano v7, the released headline configuration, reaching B4 = 0.230 +/- 0.052 at 42M while retaining B1 = 0.332 +/- 0.005 and B5 = 0.725 +/- 0.130; a LoRA replication on a 260M from-scratch mid-tier reaches 0.445 +/- 0.201. The released GGUF is 96 MB in F16, runs sub-second TTFT on commodity hardware under llama.cpp, and is, to our knowledge, the first published Spanish-native cybersecurity LLM with end-to-end MCP integration.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated strong performance across multimodal tasks, yet their safety robustness remains an open challenge. While prior work has shown that structured visual prompts such as flowcharts can effectively jailbreak VLMs, existing studies are largely limited to English-centric settings. In this paper, we introduce MLingualFC, a multilingual multimodal benchmark designed to evaluate jailbreak vulnerabilities of VLMs across diverse languages using structured flowchart representations. MLingualFC encodes harmful instructions into flowchart images across five languages (Hindi, Punjabi, Spanish, Romanian, and German). We evaluate state-of-the-art multilingual VLMs, including Qwen2.5-VL, Gemma-4, and Pangea, under a black-box threat model. Our results reveal significant multilingual safety gaps. Flowchart-based attacks achieve high attack success rates (ASR) in case of Latin script languages, demonstrating that visual encoding of harmful content effectively bypasses safety alignment across languages. In contrast, non-Latin script languages such as Punjabi exhibit substantially lower ASR, suggesting potential limitations in visual text recognition rather than stronger safety alignment. These findings highlight that current VLM safety mechanisms fail to generalize across languages and modalities. Resources are available at https://github.com/Rishabhpm23/MLingualFC

The visual modality of vision-language models (VLMs) is an underexplored attack surface for bypassing safety alignment. We introduce four jailbreak attacks exploiting the vision component: (1) encoding harmful instructions as visual symbol sequences with a decoding legend, (2) replacing harmful objects with benign substitutes (e.g., bomb -> banana) then prompting for harmful actions using the substitute term, (3) replacing harmful text in images (e.g., on book covers) with benign words while visual context preserves the original meaning, and (4) visual analogy puzzles whose solution requires inferring a prohibited concept. Evaluating across six frontier VLMs, our visual attacks bypass safety alignment and expose a cross-modality alignment gap: text-based safety training does not automatically generalize to harmful intent conveyed visually. For example, our visual cipher achieves 40.9% attack success on Claude-Haiku-4.5 versus 10.7% for an equivalent textual cipher. To further our insight into the attack mechanism, we present preliminary interpretability and mitigation results. These findings highlight that robust VLM alignment requires treating vision as a first-class target for safety post-training.