cs.CLAug 9, 2026

VectraYX-Vision-1B: A Sub-2B Spanish/LATAM Cybersecurity Vision-Language Model with Structured Visual Reasoning and Native Tool Use

Authors: Juan S. Santillana

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Abstract

We build VectraYX-Vision-1B, a sub-2B Spanish/LATAM cybersecurity vision-language model coupling a frozen SigLIP-so400m encoder to a 1.04B-parameter decoder via a two-layer MLP projector, and report a diagnostic negative result: not that visual grounding failed, but why. After repairing five silent fine-tuning defects, grounding on a nine-field extraction gate with a shuffled-image control is 2/9, invariant across every configuration that leaves the encoder alone; 2x2 tiling, the one that changes it, loses a field and gains none. Resolution is not the operative variable: the field read almost perfectly has the highest entropy in the corpus. A linear probe on frozen SigLIP features gives per-glyph recoverability p~0.61, predicting 1.9% against an observed 0.00; tiling nearly doubles recoverability on two fields, yet the end-to-end model gets worse. Transplanting a natively-trained visual tower onto the same frozen decoder and recipe takes that address field from 0.00 to 0.81 exact, on a coarser token budget than the tiling condition that recovered nothing: pretraining regime, not resolution, sets how far the losses reach. A later, separately trained checkpoint adds one positive result: on B8 (34 fields, 16 templates, 2,040 items, dual shuffled-image/best-constant control), 9 fields pass, confirming genuine grounding within trained template-field combinations only. Sharpest new finding: inside a well-trained template, an untrained field returns a near-constant wrong answer independent of the image -- landmark-keyed lookup, not free-text reading. B6/B7 tool identification stays at 0.0 on every checkpoint including this one; we retract an earlier 0.08 tool-id score after finding three harness defects a stronger model would conceal. We release code, all three benchmarks, configs, and all training checkpoints, including the B8 corpus.

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