Abstract
AI tools that help people judge online claims are usually evaluated while the tool is present. This paper asks a different question: after using such a tool, what can the user still do on their own? I call this epistemic transfer. It refers to the effect of prior AI-assisted verification on later unassisted performance on new claims. In this paper, I make three contributions. First, I distinguish epistemic transfer from nearby outcomes such as correction effects, trust, reliance, and human--AI team performance. Second, I introduce two simple quantities for studying it: the Epistemic Transfer Effect (ETE), which compares delayed unassisted performance across conditions, and Tool-Removal Cost (TRC), which measures the immediate drop in performance when the tool is taken away. Third, I turn these ideas into a practical evaluation protocol that can be used in online experiments or field studies. The protocol combines answer-first and evidence-first AI conditions with active-practice and no-practice controls, delayed tests on held-out claims, behavioral measures, and participant- and item-level analyses. Putting ETE and TRC together yields a diagnostic space that separates capability building, capability plus tool advantage, epistemic inertness or de-skilling, and verification on loan. The point is not that every AI tool must teach. The point is that when independent judgment matters, we should test not only whether a tool helps now, but also what it leaves behind.
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