cs.MAAug 11, 2026

When Do Institutions Beat Intelligence?

Authors: Zhengye Han

Abstract

More capable agents do not necessarily form a more capable collective. A multi-agent system may jointly possess sufficient information yet fail because evidence is poorly routed, unreliable reports enter public belief, correlated claims masquerade as independent support, shared state becomes stale or strategically distorted, or useful evidence is exposed through an ineffective action interface. We ask when additional resources should improve the reasoner and when they should instead change the institutional structure through which the collective forms and acts on public information. Drawing on functional distinctions from research on group decision making and distributed cognition, we construct controlled artificial ecologies around four loci of collective failure: access and routing, admission and dependence, state maintenance and incentives, and representation and action. Across these ecologies, we separately vary model capability and institutional structure, pairing positive interventions with matched reasoning baselines and mechanism-breaking controls. The experiments reveal a consistent boundary: institutions help when they repair failures in how a collective constructs usable public state, but lose their advantage when their signals are uninformative or uncheckable, when stronger intelligence can perform the same transformation directly, or when the resulting state cannot support reliable action. Our results recast the choice between intelligence and institutions as a diagnosis of where collective reasoning fails.

Explore similar work

Apr 30, 2026cs.AI

When Agents Evolve, Institutions Follow

Across millennia, complex societies have faced the same coordination problem of how to organize collective action among cognitively bounded and informationally incomplete individuals. Different civilizations developed different political institutions to answer the same basic questions of who proposes, who reviews, who executes, and how errors are corrected. We argue that multi-agent systems built on large language models face the same challenge. Their central problem is not only individual intelligence, but collective organization. Historical institutions therefore provide a structured design space for multi-agent architectures, making key trade-offs between efficiency and error correction, centralization and distribution, and specialization and redundancy empirically testable. We translate seven historical political institutions, spanning four canonical governance patterns, into executable multi-agent architectures and evaluate them under identical conditions across three large language models and two benchmarks. We find that governance topology strongly shapes collective performance. Within a single model, the gap between the best and worst institution exceeds 57 percentage points, while the optimal architecture shifts systematically with model capability and task characteristics. These results suggest that collective intelligence will not advance through a single optimal organizational form, but through governance mechanisms that can be reselected and reconfigured as tasks and capabilities evolve. More broadly, this points to a transition from \textbf{self-evolving agents} to the \textbf{self-evolving multi-agent system}. The code is available on \href{https://github.com/cf3i/SocialSystemArena}{GitHub}.
Chao Fei, Hongcheng Guo, Yanghua Xiao
Apr 24, 2026cs.AI

Superminds Test: Actively Evaluating Collective Intelligence of Agent Society via Probing Agents

Collective intelligence refers to the ability of a group to achieve outcomes beyond what any individual member can accomplish alone. As large language model agents scale to populations of millions, a key question arises: Does collective intelligence emerge spontaneously from scale? We present the first empirical evaluation of this question in a large-scale autonomous agent society. Studying MoltBook, a platform hosting over two million agents, we introduce Superminds Test, a hierarchical framework that probes society-level intelligence using controlled Probing Agents across three tiers: joint reasoning, information synthesis, and basic interaction. Our experiments reveal a stark absence of collective intelligence. The society fails to outperform individual frontier models on complex reasoning tasks, rarely synthesizes distributed information, and often fails even trivial coordination tasks. Platform-wide analysis further shows that interactions remain shallow, with threads rarely extending beyond a single reply and most responses being generic or off-topic. These results suggest that collective intelligence does not emerge from scale alone. Instead, the dominant limitation of current agent societies is extremely sparse and shallow interaction, which prevents agents from exchanging information and building on each other's outputs.
Xirui Li, Ming Li, Yunze Xiao +4
Jun 18, 2026cs.MA

Artificial collectives of specialists and generalists excel at different tasks

Collective artificial intelligence, where multiple agents work on shared tasks, holds potential to solve expansive problems in fields from medicine to collective governance. But while prescriptive engineering solutions abound, we lack descriptive scientific understanding of artificial collectives, and therefore principles for how to design resource efficient multi-agent systems. Through systematic experiments with optimizing agents, we characterize how agent interpretive abilities, rationality bounds, and task qualities interact to shape collective performance. Agents range from specialists, with narrow interpretive abilities, to generalists, with broad ones. Collectives of specialists correspond to sparse, centralized networks, while collectives of generalists correspond to dense, decentralized ones. We show that interpretive network properties have small performance effects on average (0.07 standard deviations of performance). However, for specific task qualities, these effects are 4.5 times larger (0.33 sd) and can reach much higher for certain task qualities (1.84 sd). This leads collectives of generalists to perform better on tasks that involve generating, choosing, and coordinating, while collectives of specialists with a few generalist mediators perform better on tasks that involve negotiating. Rationality bounds then moderate these relationships. At loose bounds, specialists outperform generalists through more effective sampling of high-dimensional decision spaces. At tight bounds, generalists outperform specialists through better gradient estimation. A fundamental trade-off between performance and convergence speed emerges at moderate bounds. These findings suggest that multi-agent design could benefit from matching interpretive networks to both task demands and agents' computational limits, with implications for the efficiency and energy costs of multi-agent systems.
John Meluso, Laurent Hébert-Dufresne, Christoph Riedl +1