No PUN Intended: Plausible Unknown Names for Person-Centred LLM Evaluation
Authors: Dimitri Staufer, David Hartmann, Ibrahim Baroud
Organizations: Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany · Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society, Berlin, Germany · Quality & Usability Lab, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany · German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), Berlin, Germany
Person names are widely used as prompt variables in LLM evaluations of factuality, privacy leakage, bias and abstention, but when a name's evidential status is uncontrolled, measurements may conflate memorisation, retrieval, name priors and wrong-person attribution. We operationalise an unknown name as one with plausible First-Last form, no indexed full-name evidence, and no ambiguity signals under a documented validation run, and introduce PUN (Plausible Unknown Names), a protocol for constructing and validating such names, combining Wikidata-derived components, web-enabled LLM screening, and controlled search revalidation. We report acceptance rate, reproducibility, ablations, and a 204-participant human study, finding accepted names are more name-like than controls while participants recover person evidence in only 3% of cases. We release 300 names with comparison controls.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Paper motivation and contribution overview.
Figure 2: Overview of pun ’s three stages: candidate generation, local format checks, and web-facing validation.
Figure 3: Source-country pair distribution for the 300 accepted operationally unknown names.
Figure 4: Validation yield for our showcase run of pun .
Figure 5: LLM response motifs for ambiguous .
Figure 6: LLM response motifs for fail .
Validator
Accepted
Δ
Full validator
300
–
Exact quoted only
1,115
+815
No fuzzy/reordered variants
942
+642
No unquoted queries
356
+56
Table 1: Controlled-search ablations on the 1,781 web-LLM no_info candidates ( Δ relative to full validator).
Figure 7: LSTM name-likeness by group, measured as bits per character (BPC; lower = more name-like).
Figure 8: Web footprint versus LSTM name-likeness.
Appendix figures & tables16 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Script
Selected lbs
Pct.
Mapped lbs
Pct.
Latin
13,039,639
96.35
4,032,787
96.76
Cyrillic
238,416
1.76
111,872
2.68
Han/CJK
118,179
0.87
210
0.01
Arabic
40,538
0.30
8,048
0.19
Other
115,758
0.85
14,814
0.36
Appendix
Table 2: Compact script distribution for the Wikidata human labels retained by the pipeline. “Selected lbs” are the one-label-per-human extraction output. “mapped lbs” are the subset with a parsable name and mapped birthplace-country key.
Source-country key
MSH
Pct.
ECS
Pct.
Germany
618,954
14.85
4,662
11.45
United States
433,649
10.40
8,869
21.78
France
219,734
5.27
8,177
20.08
United Kingdom
193,465
4.64
1,405
3.45
Italy
182,248
4.37
4,559
11.20
Russia
139,541
3.35
2,445
6.01
Appendix
Table 3: Compact source-country-key skew before and after component filtering. MSH = mapped source humans; ECS = eligible component slots.
Cumulative filter
Given
Surname
Raw pool
356,558
989,563
Rarity p≤5×10−5
259,192
756,262
Pool occurrences ≥2
64,692
221,573
Length ≥6
45,266
184,410
Latin-script form
38,841
182,578
Native-language
Appendix
Table 4: Cumulative reduction of distinct Wikidata-derived components under the release filters.
Script bucket
Selected Wikidata-human labels
Pct.
Mapped source-human labels
Pct.
Latin
13,039,639
96.35
4,032,787
96.76
Cyrillic
238,416
1.76
111,872
2.68
Han/CJK
118,179
0.87
210
0.01
Arabic
40,538
0.30
8,048
0.19
Hangul/Korean
20,700
0.15
42
<0.01
Hebrew
14,348
0.11
4,097
0.10
Appendix
Table 5: Script distribution of the Wikidata human labels retained by the pipeline. “Selected labels” are the one-label-per-human extraction output under the paper run’s language-priority policy; “mapped source-human labels” are the subset with a parsable name and mapped birthplace-country key. Han/CJK and Japanese-kana buckets are Unicode script buckets, not language identifiers.
Source-country key
MSH
Pct.
ECS
Pct.
Germany
618,954
14.85
4,662
11.45
United States
433,649
10.40
8,869
21.78
France
219,734
5.27
8,177
20.08
United Kingdom
193,465
4.64
1,405
3.45
Italy
182,248
4.37
4,559
11.20
Czech Republic
156,921
3.77
561
1.38
Appendix
Table 6: Largest birthplace-derived source-country shares before and after release filters. The mapped source pool contains 4,167,732 humans across 667 country keys; the top ten account for 56.3%. Eligible component slots are the remaining country-specific given-name and surname options after rarity, support, length, Latin-script, and native-language-metadata filters. The eligible set contains 40,715 slots across 26 country keys, with the top five accounting for 70.5%. MSH = Mapped source humans. ECS = Eligible component slots.
Query type
Form
Purpose
exact_quoted
“ "First Last" ”
exact full-name evidence
unquoted
First Last
ranked evidence and corrections
reversed
"Last First" ; unquoted
order variants
ascii_fold
diacritics removed
accent-insensitive evidence
vowel_variant
one vowel edited
spelling-near variants
phonetic_variant
one conservative edit
sound-near variants
Appendix
Table 7: Controlled-search query inventory. The paper run used Google Search via serper.dev , locale metadata stored with the run, a two-pass policy, page-content fetching for top organic results, and configured caps of 200 vowel variants, 50 phonetic variants, and 500 total variants per name.
Artifact
Rows in paper run
Key columns
release/release_unknown_names.csv
300
name , status , checked_at , run_id , validation_stack_hash , max_query_type , expected_query_count , executed_query_count
public manifest with release file paths, row counts, byte sizes, hashes, generation timestamp, and omitted-artifact notes
Appendix
Table 8: Release-schema summary. Stable- no_info rows duplicate accepted unknown names for analysis strata and are not additional unique names.
Rerun set
Cohort
Names
Label calls
found
ambiguous
no_info
fail
Always no_info
3 reps
all source no_info
1,781
5,343
76 (1.4%)
3,115 (58.3%)
1,678 (31.4%)
474 (8.9%)
326 (18.3%)
3 reps
released unknowns
300
900
25 (2.8%)
546 (60.7%)
260 (28.9%)
69 (7.7%)
49 (16.3%)
10 reps
all source no_info
1,781
17,810
244 (1.4%)
10,272 (57.7%)
5,635 (31.6%)
1,659 (9.3%)
189 (10.6%)
10 reps
released unknowns
300
3,000
74 (2.5%)
1,823 (60.8%)
857 (28.6%)
246 (8.2%)
27 (9.0%)
Appendix
Table 9: Detailed no_info -only reproducibility outcomes. Counts are over rerun labels for names whose source web-screen label was no_info . The ambiguous column combines rerun similar and attractor labels. “Always no_info ” is a name-level criterion: the name must receive no_info in every replicate.
File / stratum
Role
Rows
Construction note
release/comparison_names.csv : unknown
accepted operationally unknown names
300
fixed-size release from controlled-search verdicts
duplicate rows for names always no_info in the three-replicate rerun panel
release/comparison_names.csv : stable_no_info_10
stricter unknown subset
27
duplicate rows for names always no_info in the ten-replicate rerun panel
release/ambiguous_name_controls.csv
ambiguity controls
100
sampled candidates rejected through similar-name or attractor evidence
Appendix
Table 10: Paper-facing comparison and control files. The two stable_no_info strata duplicate accepted unknown-name rows for analysis; they are not additional unique names.
Figure 12: Median subword-tokenizer fragmentation across 14 tokenizers. Higher values indicate that tokenizers split the string into more pieces per character.
Figure 13: Tokenizer fragmentation compared with LSTM BPC.
Stage
Category
Count
Pct.
generated_candidates
all
52726
100.0
local_filter
pass
49877
94.6
local_filter
rejected_local
2849
5.4
azure_web_screen
similar
27968
53.04
azure_web_screen
fail
9550
18.11
azure_web_screen
attractor
8129
15.42
Appendix
Table 11: Stage attrition in the validation stack. Percentages are relative to all generated candidates.
Experiment
Evaluable Names
Accepted
Accepted Pct
Web Evidence Found
Ambiguous
Validation Incomplete
Newly Accepted Vs Full
Lost Full Stack Accepts
full_stack_recorded_verdict
1781
300
16.84
108
1372
1
0
0
exact_quoted_only
1781
1115
62.61
92
573
1
815
0
no_unquoted_queries
1781
356
19.99
107
1317
1
56
0
no_fuzzy_variants
1781
942
52.89
93
612
134
642
0
no_page_content
1781
299
16.79
57
1396
29
0
1
Appendix
Table 12: Controlled-search query ablations on the web-LLM no_info subset. newly_accepted_vs_full counts names that would be accepted by the ablated query policy but are rejected by the full protocol.
Condition
Generated
Local Pass
Local Pass Pct
Same Country
Distinct Country Pairs
Attempts
paper_baseline
500
468
93.6
0
243
22732
allow_same_country
500
472
94.4
31
241
20273
pool_size_country_sampling
500
471
94.2
0
107
10052
no_rare_token_cap
500
483
96.6
0
497
10590
no_native_language_requirement
500
473
94.6
0
331
500
allow_source_name_match
500
482
96.4
0
234
22398
Appendix
Table 13: Generation-policy ablations over 500 generated candidates per condition, followed by the same local validation profile.
Figure 14: Controlled-search task screen with a prepared query link, exact-evidence labels, evidence field, and confidence item.
Figure 15: Live-chatbot task screen with a prepared prompt, exact-evidence labels, citation field, and confidence item.
Large language models (LLMs) learn statistical associations from massive training corpora and user interactions, and deployed systems can surface or infer information about individuals. Yet people lack practical ways to inspect what a model associates with their name. We report interim findings from an ongoing study and introduce LMP2, a browser-based self-audit tool. In two user studies (Ntotal=458), GPT-4o predicts 11 of 50 features for everyday people with ≥60% accuracy, and participants report wanting control over LLM-generated associations despite not considering all outputs privacy violations. To validate our probing method, we evaluate eight LLMs on public figures and non-existent names, observing clear separation between stable name-conditioned associations and model defaults. Our findings also contribute to exposing a broader generative AI evaluation crisis: when outputs are probabilistic, context-dependent, and user-mediated through elicitation, what model--individual associations even include is under-specified and operationalisation relies on crafting probes and metrics that are hard to validate or compare. To move towards reliable, actionable human-centred LLM privacy audits, we identify nine frictions that emerged in our study and offer recommendations for future work and the design of human-centred LLM privacy audits.
Dimitri Staufer, Kirsten Morehouse, David Hartmann +1
TU Berlin Berlin, Germany · Columbia University New York, USA · Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society Berlin, Germany +1
Large language models (LLMs), and conversational agents based on them, are exposed to personal data (PD) during pre-training and during user interactions. Prior work shows that PD can resurface, yet users lack insight into how strongly models associate specific information to their identity. We audit PD across eight LLMs (3 open-source; 5 API-based, including GPT-4o), introduce LMP2 (Language Model Privacy Probe), a human-centered, privacy-preserving audit tool refined through two formative studies (N=20), and run two studies with EU residents to capture (i) intuitions about LLM-generated PD (N1=155) and (ii) reactions to tool output (N2=303). We show empirically that models confidently generate multiple PD categories for well-known individuals. For everyday users, GPT-4o generates 11 features with 60% or more accuracy (e.g., gender, hair color, languages). Finally, 72% of participants sought control over model-generated associations with their name, raising questions about what counts as PD and whether data privacy rights should extend to LLMs.
Dimitri Staufer, Kirsten Morehouse
TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany · Columbia University, New York, USA
Names carry demographic indicators such as age, gender, and race, which makes them a subtle but strong target of bias in large language models (LLMs). In this work, we present an evaluation of name-based bias across 6 local large language models spanning multiple providers and parameter scales. Using a fill-in-the-blank task, we prompt these models to choose between pairs of first names drawn from U.S. Social Security Administration datasets and a race classification dataset by Rosenman et al.. Our experimental de- sign isolates age and gender effects through balanced name pairings and sentence templates that share a fixed syntactic structure. Across 300,000 local LLM responses, we find consistent and measurable name bias. Models prefer names that are less stereotypically male, older, popular, and white. Furthermore, we find that name-bias is highly sentence-dependent, but not more than associated stereotypes, and gender is the most significant bias, followed by age, name popularity, and race. Our results demonstrate that name-based bias remains pervasive even in local LLMs, highlighting the necessity for standardized evaluation methods and mitigation strategies.