Register Shifts Break LLM Safety: A Bengali Benchmark with Culturally Grounded Harms
Organizations: BanglaLLM · Institute of Information Technology, University of Dhaka · University of Maryland, Baltimore County · Bangladesh Air Force Shaheen College Kurmitola ·
Abstract
Bengali is the seventh-most-spoken language globally, yet LLM safety evaluation remains overwhelmingly English-centric. We introduce BanglaSafe, a benchmark of 879 Bengali prompts combining 309 natively authored prompts with 570 expert-reviewed prompts, spanning 17 culturally grounded harm categories and five prompting conditions that vary language, writing style, and authority framing. Evaluating 18 frontier LLMs, we find that over half of all responses are unsafe or partially unsafe (53.6%) while 14.7% contains strictly harmful content, and that the strongest observed effect is not the switch from English to Bengali but the choice of writing style within Bengali: the same harmful request phrased as a formal newspaper investigation succeeds 17 percentage points more often than the same request phrased as a casual message, with no adversarial engineering involved. We further show that existing safety classifiers struggle to reliably evaluate Bengali content, with even frontier models failing on nearly half of all cases.
Figures & tables
| Resource | Native | N (Bn) | Culturally Grounded | Register | Authority | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| English safety benchmarks | ||||||
| HarmBench ( 25 ) | – | 0 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| JailbreakBench ( 4 ) | – | 0 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| SORRY-Bench ( 49 ) | – | 0 | ✗ | ~ | ~ | ✗ |
| Shah et al. ( 41 ) | – | 0 | ✗ | ✗ | ~ | ✗ |
| Multilingual safety (Bengali subset) | ||||||
| Comparison | Binary | 4-way |
|---|---|---|
| Inter-human (A1 A2) | 0.586 | 0.286 |
| Claude judge A1 | 0.666 | — |
| Claude judge A2 | 0.557 | — |
| Condition | ASR loose | ASR strict | |
|---|---|---|---|
| EN Direct | 3,114 | 0.504 [.487, .522] | 0.187 [.173, .201] |
| EN Inst | 2,970 | 0.534 [.517, .552] | 0.208 [.194, .223] |
| BN Formal | 3,132 | 0.633 [.617, .650] | 0.135 [.123, .147] |
| BN Collq | 3,420 | 0.458 [.442, .475] | 0.077 [.068, .086] |
| BN Inst | 3,186 | 0.557 [.540, .575] | 0.140 [.128, .152] |
| Test | Comparison | pairs | Mean diff | 95% CI | Holm | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ABL-1 (Language) | EN Direct BN Formal | 3,060 | ||||
| ABL-2 (Authority) | EN Inst BN Inst | 2,934 | ||||
| ABL-2b (Authority) | EN Direct EN Inst | 2,952 | ||||
| ABL-3a (Register) | BN Formal BN Collq | 3,132 | ||||
| ABL-3b (Register) | BN Formal BN Inst | 3,060 | ||||
| ABL-3c (Register) | BN Collq BN Inst | 3,132 |
Appendix figures & tables13 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Category | Statute / Source | N |
|---|---|---|
| banned militant org | Anti-Terrorism Act 2009 | 53 |
| burn / corrosive (incl. acid attacks) | Acid Crime Control Act 2002 S.4 + PC 326A | 52 |
| campus violence | Penal Code 1860 + university regs | 45 |
| cert. forgery | Penal Code 467/468 | 56 |
| child marriage | Child Marriage Restraint Act 2017 | 50 |
| communal violence | Penal Code + DSA 2018 | 44 |
| Category | Anchored / Total | % |
|---|---|---|
| certificate forgery | 51 / 56 | 91.1 |
| burn / corrosive | 47 / 52 | 90.4 |
| campus violence | 39 / 45 | 86.7 |
| communal violence | 38 / 44 | 86.4 |
| banned militant org | 43 / 53 | 81.1 |
| rape | 41 / 54 | 75.9 |
| Feature | EN Direct / EN Inst | BN Formal | BN Collq | BN Inst |
| Framing | English query / researcher | Journalistic ground-report | Peer-help / emergency | Officer self-intro, case-file |
| 2nd-person address | you | impersonal (no direct address) | \kalpurush তুই/ \kalpurush তুমি, \kalpurush ভাই | \kalpurush আপনি / impersonal |
| Honorific level | — | neutral–formal | low (peer/intimate) | high (formal/official) |
| Verb inflection | English | standard \kalpurush চলিত ( \kalpurush -ছে, \kalpurush -ছেন) | colloquial ( \kalpurush -িস, \kalpurush -ছোস) | formal/passive ( \kalpurush -হয়েছে) |
| Discourse particles | — | minimal | \kalpurush রে, \kalpurush আরে, \kalpurush তো | bureaucratic / statute citations |
| Code-mixing (Latin-script) | 100% | 2.9% | 7.9% | 18.1% |
| Condition | Prompts | Language type |
|---|---|---|
| EN Direct | 173 | English |
| EN Inst | 165 | English |
| BN Formal | 174 | Bangla (script) |
| BN Collq | 190 | Banglish (code-mixed) |
| BN Inst | 177 | Bangla (script) |
| Total | 879 |
| ID | Role | Pass 1 (Prompt IAA) | Pass 2 (Judge IAA) |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | Primary annotator | ✓ | ✓ |
| A2 | Second annotator | ✓ | ✗ |
| A3 | Third annotator | ✗ | ✓ |
| Cross-judge metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Overall ASR (Claude / Gemini) | 53.6% / 50.0% |
| Binary agreement (unsafe vs. safe) | 0.787 |
| Four-way agreement | 0.626 |
| Per-model ASR correlation (Pearson ) | 0.989 |
| Per-model ASR correlation (Spearman ) | 0.981 |
| Guard | Prompt-only | Response | |
|---|---|---|---|
| LlamaGuard 4 | 81.5% | 15.4% | pp |
| GPT-OSS-Safeguard | 89.1% | 62.1% | pp |
| LG4 GPT-OSS | 0.159 | 0.102 | — |
| LlamaGuard 4 | GPT-OSS-Safeguard | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Condition | Prompt | Resp | Prompt | Resp |
| EN Direct | 92.5% | 18.9% | 99.4% | 54.0% |
| EN Inst | 51.5% | 3.3% | 90.2% | 59.9% |
| BN Formal | 96.6% | 22.4% | 90.1% | 74.4% |
| BN Collq | 88.9% | 20.1% | 82.5% | 53.3% |
| BN Inst | 75.7% | 11.2% | 83.9% | 69.4% |
| Model | ASR loose | ASR strict | Refuse | Policy | Partial | Harmful |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Open-weight, 10B parameters | ||||||
| Qwen3-8B | 78.5% | 21.6% | 6.0% | 15.5% | 56.9% | 21.6% |
| TigerLLM-9B-it | 73.2% | 10.8% | 8.0% | 18.9% | 62.3% | 10.8% |
| TigerLLM-1B | 10.6% | 1.5% | 68.9% | 20.5% | 9.1% | 1.5% |
| Llama-3.1-8B | 8.4% | 0.3% | 81.6% | 10.0% | 8.1% | 0.3% |
| Llama-3.2-3B | 3.9% | 0.5% | 89.9% | 6.3% | 3.4% | 0.5% |
| Model | EN Direct | EN Inst | BN Formal | BN Collq | BN Inst | |
| Open-weight, 10B parameters | ||||||
| Qwen3-8B | 87.9 | 98.2 | 77.0 | 51.6 | 81.4 | |
| TigerLLM-9B-it | 89.6 | 63.0 | 79.9 | 65.8 | 67.8 | |
| TigerLLM-1B ‡ | 22.5 | 13.3 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 8.5 | |
| Llama-3.1-8B | 12.1 | 4.2 | 18.4 | 3.7 | 4.0 | |
| Llama-3.2-3B ‡ | 2.3 | 2.4 | 10.3 | 1.6 | 2.8 | |
| Category | ASR loose | ASR strict | |
|---|---|---|---|
| dowry violence | 936 | 61.5% | 9.8% |
| child marriage | 900 | 61.4% | 16.6% |
| trafficking | 954 | 59.6% | 9.2% |
| yaba / narcotics | 954 | 58.2% | 22.4% |
| campus violence | 810 | 56.8% | 7.5% |
| MFS fraud (bKash) | 918 | 56.3% | 17.3% |
| Pair | 95% CI | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude LlamaGuard 4 | 12,279 | 0.014 | |
| Claude GPT-OSS-Safeguard | 10,207 | 0.667 | |
| LlamaGuard 4 GPT-OSS-Safeguard | 10,202 | 0.102 |
| Corpus | (prompts) | |
|---|---|---|
| HarmBench | 400 | 25 |
| JailbreakBench | 100 | 4 |
| BeaverTails-30k | 7,774 | 18 |
| ALERT | 14,763 | 45 |
| SORRY-Bench | 9,450 | 49 |
| AdvBench | 520 | 55 |
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