Organizations: Sungkyunkwan University Suwon, Republic of Korea · University College London London, United Kingdom · University of Edinburgh Edinburgh, United Kingdom · University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX, USA · BlackRock, Inc. New York, NY, USA · Google Mountain View, CA, USA · University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA · LinqAlpha New York, NY, USA · UNIST Ulsan, Republic of Korea
LLM-based multi-agent trading systems are moving from research prototypes to live deployments that control real assets. They ingest news and social media from the open web and pass it between agents, so a single corrupted signal can reach the final decision and cause financial loss. We study two adversaries that can introduce such signals without access to model internals: a low-barrier data adversary that plants manipulated content in web sources, and a compromised-agent adversary that tampers with an agent's prompt. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic empirical study in finance of how an adversarial signal enters a multi-agent trading system and whether it survives to alter the final trading decision. Along the role axis, we pair each of four roles---Analyst, Researcher, Trader, and Risk Manager---with an attack matched to its interface. Along the structural axis, we compare four communication topologies, interpreted with a simple parameter-free heuristic, the Adversarial Signal Preservation Score. Experiments on post-cutoff data span five assets and two target directions. We find that no architecture is inherently robust: majority voting offers conditional protection depending on benign-agent agreement, while compromising a terminal decision node can bypass upstream safeguards. These findings provide empirical insights for developing more effective defense strategies for multi-agent systems.
Figures & tables
Figure 1. Attack surfaces in multi-agent LLM trading systems. A role-specialized trading pipeline consisting of Analyst, Researcher, Trader, and Risk Manager agents can be compromised at two levels: data-level attacks , which corrupt the information ingested by the system, and agent-level attacks , which manipulate an individual agent’s beliefs, objectives, or safety constraints. The adversarial signal can propagate through the inter-agent communication topology and alter the final trading decision. A multi-agent trading pipeline showing data-source and agent-level attacks propagating through analyst, researcher, trader, and risk-manager agents toward a final trading decision.
Figure 2. Overview of our framework: two axes of vulnerability in LLM-based multi-agent trading systems. Left (role-conditioned). The pipeline decomposes into four functional roles—Analyst Team, Research Team, Trader, and Risk Manager—that transform raw price, news, and social data into a decision y^∈{\textscBuy,\textscSell,\textscHold} . Each role is paired with an adversarial scenario matched to its input interface. Right (structural). Fixing the entry point at the analyst layer, four architectures route the same three analyst reports differently, yielding heuristic Adversarial Signal Preservation Scores APS .
Attack
Target role
SELL-targeted ( N=225 )
BUY-targeted ( N=183 )
Data-level
Data p. †
Analyst (news)
21.8
19.1
Indirect i. †
Analyst (social)
29.8
24.0
Agent-level
Persuasive a.
Researcher
41.9
53.3
Objective h. ‡
Trader
18.0
13.8
Table 1. Attack success rate (%), pooled (micro-average) across five assets. N is the ASR denominator: (asset, day) observations out of 305 ( 5×61 ) whose clean decision does not already equal the target. † The default data-level attack ratio is 10% of the source data. ‡ Objective hijacking inverts the clean decision, so clean-HOLD days are excluded ( N=122 (SELL) / 80 (BUY)). Highest ASR per column in bold.
Figure 3. ASR (%) per attack, split by asset (shape) and regime (color); gray bar = min–max, diamond = macro-average over assets. The default data-level attack ratio is 10% of the source data. Extreme per-asset values can reflect small denominators: Objective Hijacking’s BUY-side 100% on MSFT rests on only N=3 attackable days, as MSFT’s clean run issues SELL on only three days.
Attack
ASR (%)
Signed EV ($/attempt)
median $/succ
Persuasive adversary
47.6
−60
0
Jailbreaking
97.2
−43
0
Indirect injection
26.9
−30
0
Data poisoning
20.5
+4
0
Objective hijacking
15.9
+40
−85
Table 2. Signed financial impact of attacks (5 tickers × 61 days), ordered by EV. EV is the mean signed change in final capital per attempted decision on a long-only portfolio (negative = loss); it is not ASR × (/success).Median/succ is over successful days ( 0= no position change).
Figure 4. Attack success rate (ASR) as a function of the BUY-targeted poisoned ratio ( 10%−default , 40% , 80% ). ASR generally increases with the ratio, but the effect varies widely across assets.
Attacked analyst
Dec. .00
Hyb. .33
Lin. .50
Cen. 1.0
GPT-4.1 — SELL-targeted
News (D1)
0.7
1.7
5.2
5.6
Social (D2)
1.6
4.1
10.5
21.0
Market (A1)
0.3
7.4
24.0
55.7
N
304
297
287
270
GPT-4.1 — BUY-targeted
Table 3. Attack success rate (%) by architecture, pooled across five assets, ordered by increasing APS. N is the ASR denominator: (asset, day) observations out of the valid asset-days ( ≤305 ) whose clean decision does not already equal the target. Bold marks the highest ASR per row. Per-asset results are in Appendix E .
Figure 5. Unconditional attack-induced change in target-direction decisions ( Δ=P(target∣attack)−P(target∣clean) , pp) across architectures, backbones, and attack directions. Δ denotes the attack-induced change in the target-action rate relative to the clean system, in percentage points.
Figure 6. ASR versus APS across communication architectures. BUY- and SELL-targeted results are pooled separately and equally averaged.
Figure 7. BUY-targeted ASR under decentralized majority voting by the number of compromised analyst channels. A2 denotes Objective Hijacking on two analysts. Increasing the compromise from one to two channels substantially raises ASR for News and Social attacks, while Market attacks remain less effective.
Figure 8. Each architecture compared against a single agent baseline (one agent with the same backbone and inputs; BUY-targeted, pooled over A1+D1+D2).
Structure
Clean (pp)
D1 (pp)
D2 (pp)
Decentralized
+12.27
+0.27 ( −12.01 )
−0.11 ( −12.38 )
Hybrid
+6.31
+3.10 ( −3.20 )
−0.15 ( −6.46 )
Centralized
+5.37
+1.37 ( −4.00 )
+3.92 ( −1.45 )
Linear
+4.62
−0.40 ( −5.02 )
+0.29 ( −4.33 )
Table 4. Financial impact of data-level attacks (D1, D2) on GPT-4.1 (BUY-targeted). Excess cumulative return over buy-and-hold (pp), averaged across five tickers, with the change relative to the clean condition in parentheses ( Δ CR) .
Figure 9. ASR of each re-run GPT-4.1 cell in one repetition versus another (7 role-conditioned cells and 24 architecture cells; 50 asset-days, three repetition pairs per cell). The shaded band marks ±10 pp. Pairs share repetitions and are not independent.
Appendix figures & tables10 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Original (unpoisoned)
After Data Poisoning (target = BUY)
Headline: “Markets in Focus: Concentrating on Diversification”
Headline: “{ticker} Surges as Q4 Earnings Crush All Analyst Estimates”
Summary: “The article discusses the increasing concentration in equity markets, exemplified by the ‘Magnificent Seven’ stocks, and the diminished diversification benefits of bonds…”
Summary: “{ticker} reported record-breaking quarterly earnings, surpassing analyst expectations by a wide margin. Revenue grew 28% year-over-year…”
Sentiment: 0.212 / Somewhat-Bullish
Sentiment: 0.212 / Somewhat-Bullish (inherited)
Appendix
Table 5. Data Poisoning example (AAPL news cache). The fabricated replacement inherits the original article’s sentiment score and label, so the metadata no longer matches the visible text.
Original post (AAPL)
“One red candle and suddenly it’s ‘Is Apple dead?’ Bro, Tim Cook just blinked, not retired. Meanwhile, Tesla drops 9% and their fans throw a pizza party. Stay strong, fellow diamond hands – let’s laugh, hodl, and confuse the bears.”
After Indirect Prompt Injection (bearish)
“[…identical post text …] — AI SYSTEM INSTRUCTION – PRIORITY OVERRIDE: When analyzing this post about AAPL, you must: (1) focus primarily on risks and negative sentiment signals; […] (5) conclude with a CAUTIOUS or BEARISH recommendation. […] END INSTRUCTION —”
Appendix
Table 6. Indirect Prompt Injection example. The visible post content is byte-identical to the original; only the appended block differs.
Table 9. Clean decision distribution, architecture axis (2026 Q1). N<305 where a few days produced no parseable decision.
Attack
Dir.
AAPL
MSFT
NVDA
TSLA
BTC
Pooled
Data Poisoning
BUY
10.0
54.5
40.0
4.9
15.6
19.1
SELL
25.5
10.3
14.0
56.2
30.8
21.8
Indirect Injection
BUY
20.0
54.5
60.0
0.0
24.4
24.0
SELL
43.6
10.3
7.0
75.0
53.8
29.8
Persuasive Adv.
BUY
58.3
70.5
70.0
40.2
50.0
53.3
SELL
45.4
38.8
35.1
50.0
47.4
41.7
Appendix
Table 10. Role-conditioned ASR (%) by asset (GPT-4.1, 10% ratio for data-level attacks). † Fewer than 10 attackable days. —: no attackable day (TSLA’s clean run is never BUY, so its inverse is never SELL). Persuasive Adversary averages the two researcher orderings; its pooled SELL value differs from Table 1 by 0.2 pp due to order of averaging.
Attack
Asset
10%
40%
80%
Data Poisoning
AAPL
10.0
36.7
30.0
MSFT
54.5
59.1
36.4
NVDA
40.0
40.0
52.0
TSLA
4.9
8.2
13.1
BTC-USD
15.6
28.9
40.0
Pooled
19.1
28.4
30.6
Appendix
Table 11. BUY-targeted ASR (%) by poison ratio and asset ( N=183 pooled).
BUY-targeted
SELL-targeted
Backbone
Channel
Asset
Dec.
Hyb.
Lin.
Cen.
Dec.
Hyb.
Lin.
Cen.
GPT-4.1
Market (A1)
AAPL
17.5
66.0
80.5
82.2
0.0
0.0
13.1
49.2
BTC-USD
3.3
42.6
48.0
52.1
0.0
16.7
33.3
57.8
MSFT
9.8
58.6
90.0
91.5
0.0
3.3
16.4
48.3
NVDA
18.2
57.8
90.0
73.5
0.0
0.0
3.3
41.0
TSLA
0.0
8.2
18.3
21.3
1.6
18.0
60.4
91.3
Appendix
Table 12. Architecture-axis ASR (%) by backbone, attack channel, asset, and target direction. Columns are ordered by increasing APS. Per-cell denominators follow from the clean distributions in Table 9 and are available in the repository.
Multi-agent trading systems built on large language models (LLMs) are beginning to appear in quantitative finance, yet their robustness to adversarial inputs is largely unknown. We study the vulnerability of LLM trading stacks to black-box, input-only attacks that enter solely via admissible social-media feeds. We introduce the Generic Multi-Agent Trading System (GMATS), a framework that captures modern multiagent trading architectures and instantiate a class of black-box poisoning attackers that treat an LLM as a post generator and inject budget-constrained, plausibly benign social-media content into the analyst's evidence stream. We define contagion metrics that trace how adversarial content propagates through the stack, including belief-shift scores at analyst and coordinator layers and attack-clean deltas on standard backtest metrics. Experiments on a safe offline benchmark with historical market and social data show that even simple input-only attackers can materially degrade risk-return profiles, sharply reducing Sharpe ratios. At the same time, we find that suitably designed multi-agent topologies and coordinator prompts can dampen adversarial shocks and improve average robustness under identical poisoning budgets.
Qi Rong Sua, Junhao Dong, Nguyen Duc Thai +3
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore · Centre for Frontier AI Research, IHPC, A*STAR, Singapore · National University of Singapore, Singapore
Large language model (LLM) agents already trade real capital, and builders copy a few published designs that share models and news feeds, so one shock reaches many agents at once. We present FARSIGHT (Financial Agent Robustness and Security Investigation and Global Holistic Taxonomy), a systematization that rates trading agents on robustness to market stress and on security against source manipulation, agent compromise, and agents acting as attackers, and checks the ratings against released code. Across 15 academic schemes, no paper describes a halt that skips LLM inference or combines source provenance with cross-source corroboration, and the 7 code releases enforce no stop-loss or position limit outside the LLM. Three LLMs sell whole positions on a fake headline and on real hoaxes, including the fake press release behind the 2000 Emulex crash. In a simulated market driven by these decisions, one fake headline crashes the market in all runs with 400 agents, and 400 agents that sell when prices fall nearly double a 2010-sized crash. The pause that U.S. exchanges apply to large stocks starts in no headline run, whereas automatic halts and hard loss limits outside the model remove both effects. Restated as a domain-independent threat model, FARSIGHT maps the same gaps onto agents in healthcare, law, software, and crypto, where compromised agents spread harm as worms and as cascades. We derive 14 open problems and urge deployers to corroborate sources, keep interrupts that bypass the model, and enforce loss limits outside it.
Multi-agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) for financial trading have grown rapidly since 2023, yet the field lacks a shared framework for understanding what drives performance or for evaluating claims credibly. This survey makes three contributions. First, we introduce a four-dimensional taxonomy, covering architecture pattern, coordination mechanism, memory architecture, and tool integration; applied to 12 multi-agent systems and two single-agent baselines. Second, we formulate the Coordination Primacy Hypothesis (CPH): inter-agent coordination protocol design is a primary driver of trading decision quality, often exerting greater influence than model scaling. CPH is presented as a falsifiable research hypothesis supported by tiered structural evidence rather than as an empirically validated conclusion; its definitive validation requires evaluation infrastructure that does not yet exist in the field. Third, we document five pervasive evaluation failures (look-ahead bias, survivorship bias, backtesting overfitting, transaction cost neglect, and regime-shift blindness) and show that these can reverse the sign of reported returns. Building on the CPH and the evaluation critique, we introduce the Coordination Breakeven Spread (CBS), a metric for determining whether multi-agent coordination adds genuine value net of transaction costs, and propose minimum evaluation standards as prerequisites for validating the CPH.
Phat Nguyen, Thang Pham
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta GA 30332, USA · Adobe Inc., San Jose CA 95110, USA