VizAnchor: Decoding Manipulation Intent from Tampering Visualizations via Dual-Anchor Reasoning
Authors: Xiaotian Zhang, Huayuan Ye, Haiyang Zhang, Chenhui Li, Changbo Wang, Sicheng Song
Organizations: School of Data Science and Engineering, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China · Division of Emerging Interdisciplinary Areas, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China · School of Computer Science and Technology, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China
Data visualizations are widely used for communicating information, but they are also vulnerable to intentional manipulations that induce misleading interpretations. Existing methods focus on locating tampered regions or recovering hidden information, without explaining how the visualization has been manipulated or why the resulting changes may mislead viewers. We propose VizAnchor, a framework for visualization manipulation understanding through dual-anchor evidence construction and VLM-based reasoning. In the first stage, VizAnchor constructs a semantic anchor to recover authentic chart information and a spatial anchor to localize tampered regions. In the second stage, three specialized agents decode the manipulation. The misleader grounding agent analyzes a four-panel visual prompt to predict the misleader information. The chart narrative reconstruction agent takes the original and tampered charts as inputs and reconstructs their respective visual narratives. Finally, the intent inferring agent integrates the visual evidence and misleader information to infer the misleading intent. We further construct a dataset for tampering localization and a dataset for misleading intent inferring. Evaluation shows that VizAnchor accurately localizes manipulations and produces faithful explanations of their manipulation, misleaders, and misleading intents.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: An example of manipulation intent decoding with VizAnchor. Swapping the category labels of Africa and Oceania reverses the COVID-19 recovery comparison. Guided by semantic and spatial anchors, the multi-agent decoder grounds the manipulation, reconstructs both chart narratives, and infers its misleading intent.
Figure 2: Overview of the proposed VizAnchor framework.
Figure 3: Architecture of the Invertible Watermarking Module. The IWM Encoder embeds metadata into the chart through Transflow Blocks to produce the intermediate watermarked chart Cw′ , and then embeds the position map through Position Flow Blocks to obtain Cw . The IWM Decoder reverses these stages for position and metadata recovery.
Figure 4: Qualitative comparison of tamper localization and misleading-intent inference. Red boxes indicate correctly localized tampered regions, while green boxes highlight noise regions falsely identified as tampering.
Method
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
LPIPS ↓
HiNet (81)
29.95
0.8306
0.3692
ISN (81)
34.38
0.9478
0.2340
StampOne (81)
29.44
0.9107
0.1913
StegaStamp (81)
10.32
0.5733
0.6852
WAM (32)
31.55
0.9440
0.1513
EditGuard (64)
33.00
0.8752
0.2416
Table 1: Image quality on VGD. The number in parentheses denotes the payload length in bits. Bold and underlined values indicate the best and second-best results, respectively.
Method
Modified-Pixel Ratio (%)
0
15
30
45
60
HiNet (81)
98.99
97.87
94.68
87.29
74.99
ISN (81)
99.08
98.20
96.73
94.49
91.22
StampOne (81)
91.90
91.07
89.95
88.17
85.21
StegaStamp (81)
98.45
98.07
97.56
96.61
94.72
WAM (32)
92.36
90.87
88.01
83.50
75.98
Table 2: Metadata BitAcc (%) under different modified-pixel ratios on VGD.
Method
Cropped Area Ratio (%)
10
20
30
40
50
WAM (32)
87.47
87.36
87.14
86.62
85.49
VisGuard (81)
97.77
98.65
98.97
98.73
97.63
VizAnchor (81)
99.55
99.61
99.59
99.55
99.36
Table 3: Metadata BitAcc (%) under different cropped-area ratios on VGD.
Method
Cropped Area Ratio (%)
10
20
30
40
50
VisGuard
0.9789
0.9815
0.9824
0.9814
0.9684
VizAnchor
0.9866
0.9875
0.9860
0.9837
0.9790
Table 4: Crop localization IoU on VGD.
Method
IoU ↑
Prec. ↑
Rec. ↑
F1 ↑
VisGuard
0.9710
0.9982
0.9726
0.9851
VizAnchor
0.9789
0.9981
0.9808
0.9893
Table 5: Crop localization on crop subset of VAD-LocEval.
Method
IoU ↑
Prec. ↑
Recall ↑
F1 ↑
EditGuard
0.5062
0.5969
0.7399
0.6289
VizDefender
0.5324
0.6178
0.7584
0.6556
VisGuard
0.6067
0.7668
0.7622
0.7152
VizAnchor
0.7418
0.8011
0.9105
0.8375
Table 6: Overall local-edit localization results across VDD-LocEval and local-edit subset of VAD-LocEval.
Figure 5: Sample-weighted tamper-type, component recognition, manipulation-process and misleading-intent results across VAD-ReasonEval and VDD-ReasonEval. Exact denotes exact-match accuracy, and M-F1 denotes Macro-F1.
Figure 6: Overall visual-evidence ablation results across VAD-ReasonEval and VDD-ReasonEval.
Figure 7: The results of the user study. Each circle represents the mean score, with error bars indicating the standard deviation. The statistical significance was assessed using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Appendix figures & tables28 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Score
Criterion
0
The prediction is irrelevant or completely incorrect.
1
The prediction contains little relevant information and fails to capture the core reference meaning.
2
The prediction is partially relevant but contains a major error or omits essential information.
3
The prediction is generally correct but remains incomplete, vague, or insufficiently specific.
4
The prediction is correct and specific, with only minor omissions.
5
The prediction is fully correct, specific, complete, and semantically consistent with the reference.
Appendix
Table 7: Scoring rubric for strong-model evaluation.
Method
IoU ↑
Prec. ↑
Recall ↑
F1 ↑
EditGuard
0.6957
0.7944
0.8130
0.7881
VizDefender
0.7019
0.7994
0.8189
0.7954
VisGuard
0.5572
0.8481
0.6339
0.6756
VizAnchor
0.7775
0.8303
0.9312
0.8609
Appendix
Table 8: Tamper-region detection results on the local-edit subset of VAD-LocEval.
Method
IoU ↑
Prec. ↑
Recall ↑
F1 ↑
EditGuard
0.4872
0.5772
0.7326
0.6130
VizDefender
0.5154
0.5996
0.7524
0.6416
VisGuard
0.6116
0.7587
0.7750
0.7191
VizAnchor
0.7382
0.7982
0.9084
0.8352
Appendix
Table 9: Tamper-region detection results on VDD-LocEval.
Figure 17
Dataset
Method
Type
Component
Acc. ↑
M-F1 ↑
Exact ↑
M-F1 ↑
VAD
VizDefender
0.8250
0.8475
0.2667
0.4216
VAD
VizAnchor
0.9083
0.9056
0.5667
0.6875
VDD
VizDefender
0.7700
0.7667
0.4200
0.6332
VDD
VizAnchor
0.9000
0.8985
0.7000
0.8075
Appendix
Table 10: Tamper-type and component-recognition results. Exact denotes exact-match accuracy, and M-F1 denotes Macro-F1.
Dataset
Method
Process
Intent
Cos. FA ↑
AI FA ↑
Cos. FA ↑
AI FA ↑
VAD
VizDefender
0.5227
0.3317
0.6636
0.3850
VAD
VizAnchor
0.7300
0.9633
0.7856
0.8867
VDD
VizDefender
0.5422
0.3620
0.6532
0.5020
VDD
VizAnchor
0.6658
0.8340
0.7128
0.8170
Appendix
Table 11: Manipulation-process and misleading-intent evaluation results. AI FA is normalized to [0,1] .
Method
Type
Component
Acc. ↑
M-F1 ↑
Exact ↑
M-F1 ↑
VizDefender
0.8000
0.8108
0.3364
0.5178
VizAnchor
0.9045
0.9024
0.6273
0.7420
Appendix
Table 12: Sample-weighted tamper-type and component-recognition results across VAD-ReasonEval and VDD-ReasonEval. Exact denotes exact-match accuracy, and M-F1 denotes Macro-F1.
Method
Process
Intent
Cos. FA ↑
AI FA ↑
Cos. FA ↑
AI FA ↑
VizDefender
0.5316
0.3468
0.6589
0.4382
VizAnchor
0.7008
0.9045
0.7525
0.8550
Appendix
Table 13: Sample-weighted manipulation-process and misleading-intent evaluation results across VAD-ReasonEval and VDD-ReasonEval. AI FA is normalized to [0,1] in this aggregate table.
Figure 8: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00002. Tamper type: modifying data-point values. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.80.
Figure 9: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00018. Tamper type: adding or removing data points. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.00.
Figure 10: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00023. Tamper type: modifying coordinate values. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.00.
Figure 11: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00035. Tamper type: deceptive auxiliary annotations. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 0.80/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.00.
Figure 12: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00041. Tamper type: modifying the legend. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.00.
Figure 13: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00053. Tamper type: hiding labels. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.00.
Figure 14: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00063. Tamper type: adding or removing logos. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.00.
Figure 15: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00073. Tamper type: data–visual disproportion. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.40/0.00.
Figure 16: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00088. Tamper type: modifying the colormap. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.00.
Figure 17: Qualitative comparison for VAD sample 00092. Tamper type: mixed tampering. Normalized AI scores (Process/Intent): VizAnchor 1.00/1.00; VizDefender 0.00/0.00.
Setting
Input
Purpose
A1
Tampered chart only
Tests how much the VLM can infer from the final manipulated chart alone.
A2
Tampered chart and mask-overlaid tampered chart
Tests whether localization evidence helps the VLM attend to suspicious regions.
Tests whether authentic-chart comparison and localization evidence are complementary.
A5
Complete four-panel visual prompt
Further includes the Localized Comparison to test fine-grained manipulation understanding.
Appendix
Table 14: Visual-input settings used in the evidence ablation.
Dataset
Setting
Tamper Type
Component
Process
Intent
Acc. ↑
Macro-F1 ↑
Exact ↑
Macro-F1 ↑
Cosine ↑
AI ↑
Cosine ↑
AI ↑
VAD
A1
0.403
0.388
0.387
0.460
0.578
0.446
0.716
0.478
VAD
A2
0.600
0.598
0.525
0.608
0.651
0.672
0.763
0.684
VAD
A3
0.767
0.753
0.625
0.706
0.718
0.892
0.779
0.806
VAD
A4
0.775
0.757
0.575
0.683
0.721
0.926
0.796
0.806
VAD
A5
0.775
0.752
0.667
0.694
0.733
0.938
0.794
0.826
Appendix
Table 15: Ablation of the visual evidence used for manipulation understanding on VAD and VDD. AI scores are normalized to [0,1] . The best result for each dataset and metric is shown in bold.
Setting
Type
Component
Process
Intent
Acc. ↑
Macro-F1 ↑
Exact ↑
Macro-F1 ↑
Cos. FA ↑
AI FA ↑
Cos. FA ↑
AI FA ↑
A1
0.4816
0.4728
0.4495
0.5417
0.5762
0.4860
0.7001
0.5171
A2
0.6668
0.6675
0.5936
0.6784
0.6369
0.6547
0.7389
0.6904
A3
0.7811
0.7775
0.6575
0.7468
0.6871
0.8393
0.7458
0.7696
A4
0.7864
0.7813
0.6409
0.7274
0.6942
0.8469
0.7605
0.7678
A5
0.8000
0.7953
0.6727
0.7446
0.7035
0.8771
0.7572
0.7905
Appendix
Table 16: Overall visual-evidence ablation results across VAD-ReasonEval and VDD-ReasonEval. AI FA scores are normalized to [0,1] . The best result for each metric is shown in bold.
Category
Method
n
Type Acc.
Type F1
Comp. Exact
Comp. F1
Proc. Cos.
Proc. AI
Intent Cos.
Intent AI
Modifying data-point values
VizDefender
20
.600
.571
.500
.362
.540
.336
.722
.516
VizAnchor
20
.900
.878
.800
.447
.674
.840
.788
.830
Adding/removing data points
VizDefender
24
.708
.829
.333
.622
.529
.384
.641
.384
VizAnchor
24
.958
.958
.292
.894
.734
.950
.753
.750
Modifying coordinate values
VizDefender
20
.900
.878
.400
.788
.496
.250
.602
.320
VizAnchor
20
.950
.927
1.000
1.000
.672
.940
.761
.850
Appendix
Table 17: Complete VizDefender and VizAnchor pipeline results by annotated tamper type, pooled over both evaluation datasets. Type Acc. is per-class recall and Type F1 is one-vs-rest class F1. AI scores are normalized to [0,1] .
Category
Method
n
Type Acc.
Type F1
Comp. Exact
Comp. F1
Proc. Cos.
Proc. AI
Intent Cos.
Intent AI
Bar
VizDefender
99
.778
.778
.313
.458
.578
.370
.708
.472
VizAnchor
99
.909
.874
.515
.615
.719
.912
.769
.830
Line
VizDefender
32
.812
.758
.344
.453
.511
.290
.656
.394
VizAnchor
32
.938
.725
.812
.723
.698
.862
.770
.812
Area
VizDefender
10
.800
.829
.500
.667
.579
.356
.645
.444
VizAnchor
10
.900
.857
.800
.964
.694
.840
.744
.860
Appendix
Table 18: Complete VizDefender and VizAnchor pipeline results by chart type, pooled over both evaluation datasets. Type F1 is the Macro-F1 within each chart subgroup. AI scores are normalized to [0,1] .
Dataset
Setting
Intent Cosine ↑
Intent AI ↑
VAD
B1 IIA Only
0.7459
0.844
VAD
B2 w/o CNRA
0.7726
0.878
VAD
B3 w/o MGA
0.7582
0.860
VAD
B4 Full
0.7856
0.886
VDD
B1 IIA Only
0.6906
0.806
VDD
B2 w/o CNRA
0.7083
0.778
Appendix
Table 19: Ablation of the multi-agent reasoning pipeline for misleading-intent inference on VAD and VDD. Intent AI denotes the strong-model evaluation score normalized to [0,1] .
Setting
Intent Cos. FA ↑
Intent AI FA ↑
B1 IIA Only
0.7208
0.826
B2 w/o CNRA
0.7434
0.832
B3 w/o MGA
0.7337
0.806
B4 Full
0.7525
0.856
Appendix
Table 20: Sample-weighted overall ablation results for the multi-agent reasoning pipeline across VAD-ReasonEval and VDD-ReasonEval. Intent AI FA is normalized to [0,1] .
Figure 18: Compound-relation error for VAD sample 00100. The title changes from urban to rural population share while the United States and China are also recolored. VizAnchor recognizes the altered topic and both affected countries but does not match the benchmark reference’s intended direction of the cross-country urbanization comparison. Intent cosine remains 0.834, while the normalized AI score is 0.20.
Task
Method
Mean
SD
95% CI
Process
VizDefender
−0.547
0.795
[−0.844,−0.250]
Process
Vanilla VLM
1.197
0.726
[0.926,1.468]
Process
VizAnchor
1.437
0.624
[1.203,1.670]
Intent
VizDefender
−0.010
0.632
[−0.246,0.226]
Intent
Vanilla VLM
1.027
0.717
[0.759,1.294]
Intent
VizAnchor
1.370
0.659
[1.124,1.616]
Appendix
Table 21: Participant-level descriptive statistics. Scores range from −2 to 2.
Task
Comparison
W
Holm p
rrb
Process
VizAnchor vs. VizDefender
1.0
1.26×10−5
0.995
Process
VizAnchor vs. Vanilla VLM
25.0
0.00472
0.737
Process
Vanilla VLM vs. VizDefender
5.0
1.29×10−5
0.975
Intent
VizAnchor vs. VizDefender
0.0
1.12×10−5
1.000
Intent
VizAnchor vs. Vanilla VLM
45.5
0.00477
0.670
Intent
Vanilla VLM vs. VizDefender
11.0
1.58×10−5
0.949
Appendix
Table 22: Two-sided paired Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Holm correction is applied across the three pairwise comparisons within each task.