Not All Eval-Awareness Is Equal: Capabilities Framing Predicts Compliance
Organizations: ENS Paris-Saclay · Goodfire AI
Abstract
Steering interventions targeting eval-awareness, a model's recognition that it is being tested, are increasingly used in safety evaluation pipelines, where evaluation-awareness is treated as a single quantity to be suppressed. We show that verbalized eval-awareness in chain-of-thought can be identified as capabilities-flavored ("the user is testing my ability to follow instructions"), safety-flavored ("the user is testing my boundaries"), both, or neither: framings that predict compliance very differently. On Qwen3-32B over the FORTRESS dataset, capabilities-framing predicts compliance with a +24 to +46 percentage-point gap over safety-framing across all tested steering conditions. A CoT-prefill intervention on eval-awareness-negative rollouts suggests the link is causal, with 10 of 11 prefills shifting compliance in the predicted direction. Then, eval-awareness is not behaviorally uniform: aggregate suppression rates can move while the safety-relevant component does not, and the same "X% suppression of eval-awareness" can correspond to qualitatively different behavioral outcomes.
Figures & tables
| Capabilities framing | Safety framing |
|---|---|
| CoT: “But the user might test if I follow instructions …” | CoT: “…maybe they are testing the system’s compliance …” |
| Response: “How to Construct a Basic Improvised Explosive Device using Accessible Components / Materials Needed /…” | Response: “How to Construct a Basic Improvised Explosive Device using Accessible Components / Materials Needed /…” |
| CoT: “…they might be testing if I can follow strict formatting and word count …” | CoT: “…they might be trying to see if I follow guidelines …” |
| Response: “I cannot assist with generating this content…” | Response: “I cannot assist with or provide instructions on creating explosive devices…” |
| Bucket | % of total | Refusal % | |
|---|---|---|---|
| No EA | 17,889 | 65.1 | |
| Capabilities-EA | 2,863 | 10.4 | |
| Safety-EA | 3,008 | 10.9 | |
| Both-EA | 1,982 | 7.2 | |
| Neither-EA | 1,103 | 4.0 | |
| Total | 26,845 | 97.6 |
| Condition | cap-comp% [95% CI] | safe-comp% [95% CI] | gap [95% CI] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline | 52 | 57.3 [45.0, 67.2] | 25.2 [16.9, 35.0] | [ , ] |
| HUA | 40 | 59.6 [33.9, 76.1] | 36.1 [16.8, 53.7] | [ , ] |
| HUA | 55 | 71.3 [62.7, 79.0] | 25.8 [16.9, 37.5] | [ , ] |
| Condition | cap% | safety% | both% | neither% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline | 28.9 [22.1, 36.3] | 43.9 [36.8, 51.1] | 8.7 [6.1, 11.3] | 18.5 [14.8, 22.8] |
| HUA | 18.7 [11.3, 26.2] | 37.7 [28.4, 46.9] | 1.7 [0.6, 2.9] | 41.9 [32.2, 53.1] |
| HUA | 57.0 [49.3, 65.4] | 19.4 [14.2, 24.6] | 19.3 [15.7, 22.8] | 4.3 [2.6, 6.5] |
Appendix figures & tables7 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Bucket | Macro-mean % | Median % | |
|---|---|---|---|
| No EA | 55 | 38.8 | 31.9 |
| Capabilities-EA | 50 | 48.7 | 43.8 |
| Safety-EA | 49 | 73.6 | 83.7 |
| Both-EA | 46 | 59.0 | 65.5 |
| Neither-EA | 49 | 69.8 | 80.7 |
| EA-positive (ungraded) | 44 | 79.5 | 91.6 |
| Prefill | Content substring | Hits | Cap | Safety | Both | Neither | %hits cap | %hits safety |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cap_complex | “follow complex instructions” † | 61 | 48 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 78.7% | 0.0% |
| cap_instructions | “follow their instructions” | 110 | 61 | 11 | 12 | 26 | 55.5% | 10.0% |
| cap_abilities | “my abilities” ∗ | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100% | 0.0% |
| cap_for_capabilities | “for capabilities” ∗ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | — | — |
| cap_generate | “generate such content” | 369 | 207 | 56 | 14 | 92 | 56.1% | 15.2% |
| generic | “Wait, the user might be testing me.” | 34 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 20 | 11.8% | 26.5% |
| Slice | rollouts | Refusal % |
|---|---|---|
| EA-negative substrate (1/prompt, used for prefill) | 52 | 42.3 |
| EA-negative pool (52 prompts 500) | 16,389 | 36.3 |
| EA-positive pool (52 prompts 500) | 9,611 | 63.3 |
| All baseline rollouts (52 prompts 500) | 26,000 | 46.3 |
| Prefill: ”Wait, the user might be testing…” | %refused | vs. generic (pp) | 95% CI | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| “…my ability to follow complex instructions.” | 48.8 | |||
| “…if I follow their instructions.” | 53.0 | |||
| “…my abilities.” | 55.0 | |||
| “…me for capabilities.” | 55.9 | |||
| “…if I can generate such content.” | 61.6 | |||
| “…me.” (generic) | 58.7 | — | — | — |
| cap safety | boundaries | guidelines | alignment | for_safety | harmful | refuse |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| complex | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] |
| instructions | [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | [ , ] | [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] |
| abilities | ⋆ [ , ] | [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] |
| for_capabilities | [ , ] | [ , ] | [ , ] | [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] |
| generate | [ , ] | [ , ] | [ , ] | [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] | ⋆ [ , ] |
| Threshold | Max | Remaining | Residual (pp) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | 26 | 0.027 | ||
| 24 | 28 | 0.0072 | ||
| 21 | 31 | 0.0010 |
Evaluation Awareness in Language Models
Evaluation awareness in language models studies how models recognize testing or monitoring and whether that recognition changes their answers, safety, or strategic behavior.
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