cs.CRAug 31, 2026

SingProbe Technical Report

Authors: Sing Team

Organizations: AI Security Lab, Ant Group

Abstract

We present SingProbe, an open intrinsic guardrail framework for generation-time monitoring of LLMs. Intrinsic guardrails reuse hidden states already produced by the base model during autoregressive decoding, rather than relying on an independent model to repeatedly process generated text. While this route has been explored in industrial systems, the community lacks a broadly reusable open stack that combines cross-model guard adaptations, unified training methods, serving integrations, and systematic evaluation resources. SingProbe is designed to provide this missing layer and uses a lightweight probe to continuously produce query-intent, response-safety, and hallucination-risk signals during decoding. This report describes the full intrinsic-guardrail stack: training methods, serving integrations with SGLang and vLLM, and adapted guard models for 29 open-source base models across diverse families and scales. We also introduce SingStreamBench, a benchmark that measures whether streaming guardrails remain inactive on benign prefixes while promptly detecting emerging unsafe content. Across evaluations of safety, streaming detection, hallucination detection, false-positive robustness, online monitoring, and runtime overhead, SingProbe provides performance competitive with, and in several settings stronger than, state-of-the-art standalone guardrails and specialized hallucination detectors, while adding less than 0.5% serving overhead in our implementation. Beyond passive monitoring, we show that intrinsic guard signals can guide constrained decoding and selectively activate medical-risk interventions in SingProbe-Med. By open-sourcing our infrastructure, training methods, and model adaptations, we aim to facilitate the broader adoption and deployment of intrinsic guardrails, as well as further research in this direction.

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