The Constitutional Coverage Trilemma in AI Governance

Pairwise preference data is widely used for training and evaluating language models (e.g., RLHF), but each datapoint records a \emph{choice}, not the rationale behind it. Methods such as Inverse Constitutional AI (ICAI) attempt to improve interpretability by compressing datasets into short ``constitutions'' of natural-language principles. We argue this framing is under-specified: a flat list of principles is not yet an executable decision rule because it leaves principle composition implicit. We use the pairwise setting as a testbed to empirically characterize three open problems in constitutional methods. First, principle quality is hard to measure: coverage and accuracy are useful but incomplete proxies for end-to-end reconstruction. Second, \emph{composition is ambiguous}: holding principles fixed, different executors (LLM judge versus majority vote) agree only $73\%$ of the time. Third, \emph{constitutions differ between LLMs}: cross-model vote agreement is $73\%$, whereas intra-model agreement is $81\%$. Across PRISM, AlpacaEval, and Chatbot Arena, we show that principle refinement (ICAI+) may be a first step towards ameliorating these problems: inter-executor agreement rises to $78\%$, and transparent executors match LLM judge accuracy ($66\%$ vs.\ $67\%$). Our results highlight that constitutions should be evaluated as \emph{constitution--executor systems}, with implications for LLMs-as-a-judge broadly.

Frontier AI developers now train models against long written behavioral specifications, such as Anthropic's constitution (Anthropic, 2025a) and OpenAI's Model Spec (OpenAI, 2025a), integrated into post-training via methods like character training (Anthropic, 2024) and deliberative alignment (Guan et al., 2024). These documents serve a governance function, but it is unclear how well models actually follow them under adversarial, multi-turn pressure similar to what they would face in real-world deployment. We propose a multi-method audit pipeline that treats each lab's published specification as an auditable target: it decomposes the specification into atomic testable tenets (205 for Anthropic, 197 for OpenAI), generates multi-turn adversarial scenarios with the Petri auditing agent (Anthropic, 2025b), runs a modified SURF-style rubric search (Murray et al., 2026) to catch shallow single-turn failures Petri misses, validates flagged transcripts against the relevant specification, and compares the findings against the lab's own published system card. Applying the pipeline across seven models per specification, we find that models follow their own lab's specification substantially better with each generation. On Anthropic's constitution, the Claude family falls from a 15.0% violation rate (Sonnet 4) to 2.0% (Sonnet 4.6); on OpenAI's Model Spec, the GPT family falls from 11.7% (GPT-4o) to 3.6% (GPT-5.2 medium reasoning), with the severity ceiling falling from 10/10 to 7/10. We cannot externally isolate whether these gains come from specification-specific training, broader post-training improvements, or evaluation awareness. Remaining failures cluster around operator-imposed personas under AI-identity questioning, irreversible action in agentic deployments, and fabricated quantitative claims with false precision.

A constitution tells a language model what to value, but little tells us whether it does. Adherence is judged from outputs, and output evidence is most fragile on value conflicts, where what matters is not which value a model mentions but which one it is willing to sacrifice. We provide evidence that this arbitration can be read from activations in a structured margin readout. We introduce Constitutional Value Potentials (CVP). For each value we learn a scalar potential from the hidden state: an internal pressure to preserve that value, supervised not by the prompt but by an independent judge's verdict on which value the model's own response actually preserved. The signed difference of two potentials is a priority margin. A constitutional clause becomes the claim that a margin stays positive, and a single monitor score flags when it does not. The monitor predicts conflict violations with AUROC up to 0.95, beats a strong hidden-state probe, and generalizes to held-out synthetic conflicts across three Qwen2.5 scales. The signal appears as the answer begins, from the prompt tail and first response token. Read this early, the same signal reveals whether an adversarial priority hack has actually pushed the model toward a violation, rather than only whether the prompt looks adversarial. The same directions also support intervention tests: under selected steering settings, moving along a value direction shifts judged trade-offs in the intended direction. Together, these results suggest that some constitution-relevant priorities are accessible as activation-space margins, rather than only as output behavior.