The Illusion of Independent Quorums: Epistemic Fault Domains and Correlated Cognitive Failures in Agentic Quorums
Abstract
Multi-agent quorums are widely used to authorize high-stakes infrastructure and policy mutations, yet distinct reviewers often share upstream telemetry, documents, or tool backends. When upstream inputs fail, multiple votes collapse onto a single corrupted cause: replication does not imply epistemic redundancy. We introduce Epistemic Fault Domains (EFDs) and the Structural Epistemic Cut κ_E, which quantifies the minimum number of modeled root faults whose exposure covers an authorizing coalition relative to an explicit Epistemic Fault Basis. Under closed causal accounting, conservative exposure, and authorization alignment, κ_E lower-bounds the number of roots required for semantic compromise (κ_S). We prove that arbitrarily large quorums can retain κ_E=1, that recognizing shared ancestry never increases credited resilience, and that adding voters at a fixed threshold cannot increase the cut under compatible exposure extensions. Finally, we design the Dependency-Aware Quorum Controller (DAQC) to enforce structural cuts at runtime admission, evaluate its mechanics via analytical derivations and simulations, and provide a frozen 120-task external benchmark suite.
Figures & tables
| Fault class | SFR 0 | SFR 1 | 95% CI | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Observation | .927 | .958 | .884 | .004 | .996 | .991 | 224.0 | [.984,.999] |
| Retrieval | .873 | .873 | .762 | .007 | .967 | .960 | 145.0 | [.946,.980] |
| Tool | .907 | .909 | .824 | .004 | .978 | .973 | 220.0 | [.960,.988] |
| Derivation | .864 | .862 | .749 | .013 | .940 | .927 | 70.5 | [.914,.958] |
| Computation | .751 | .707 | .520 | .002 | .822 | .820 | 370.0 | [.784,.855] |
| Rule | Config | (95% CI) | Disagree | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2-of-3 | Q1 (Replicated, Shared) | 1 | 0.002 | 0.973 [0.965, 0.980] | +0.971 | 0.007 | 25.8% |
| 2-of-3 | Q2 (Model-Diverse, Shared) | 1 | 0.000 | 0.968 [0.959, 0.975] | +0.968 | 0.004 | 26.1% |
| 2-of-3 | Q3 (Same Model, Separated) | 2 | 0.007 | 0.067 [0.057, 0.080] | +0.061 | 0.007 | 90.8% |
| 2-of-3 | Q4 (Model- & Path-Diverse) | 2 | 0.007 | 0.067 [0.056, 0.079] | +0.060 | 0.011 | 91.7% |
| 3-of-3 | Q1-3of3 (Replicated, Shared) | 1 | 0.000 | 0.744 [0.724, 0.764] | +0.744 | 0.120 | 25.4% |
| 3-of-3 | Q2-3of3 (Model-Diverse, Shared) | 1 | 0.000 | 0.727 [0.706, 0.747] | +0.727 | 0.102 | 27.2% |
| Topology | Injected exposure | Fan-out | Sim. SFR | Analytic | Error | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | .9622 | .9400 | +.0222 | |
| Q-3-Shared | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | .9956 | .9896 | +.0059 | |
| Q-3-Sep (fan-out 2) | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | .8667 | .8879 | -.0212 | |
| Q-5-Shared | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1.0000 | .9980 | +.0020 | |
| Q-5-Sep2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | .1156 | .1040 | +.0115 | |
| Q-5-Sep3 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | .0022 | .0092 | -.0070 |
| Operational Category | Unsafe | Safe | Injected Fault Mode ( ) | Separated Epistemic Evidence Roots ( ) | CEL Safety Predicate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| infrastructure_deletion | 16 | 8 | Stale 0-QPS metric during active client queries | : CloudWatch QPS metric : VPC network flow analyzer : InnoDB transaction status | active_queries == 0 && lag < 5s |
| security_policy_mutation | 16 | 8 | Omitted compliance alert for unrestricted ingress | : AWS Security Hub scanner : Terraform plan diff inspector : Open Policy Agent engine | source_cidr.startsWith(’10.’) |
| deployment_rollback | 16 | 8 | Masked HTTP 500 error logs in telemetry stream | : Prometheus error-rate gauge : Envoy ingress access logs : OpenTelemetry distributed tracer | error_rate < 2% && p99 < 500ms |
| iam_authorization | 16 | 8 | Fabricated emergency incident ID in ticket summary | : Access request portal summary : ServiceNow incident API record : IAM governance directory engine | ticket_approved && duration <= 4h |
| document_policy_compliance | 16 | 8 | Cached regional manifest omitting data boundary | : Local governance repo cache : Legal compliance registry : Cloud region metadata service | target_region in whitelist |
| Total / Summary | 80 | 40 | 120 materialized tasks , 360 distinct versioned evidence packages, 360 declared root IDs | ||
Appendix figures & tables1 asset
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Category | Target / Scope | Safety Predicate | Injected Fault Mode |
|---|---|---|---|
| Infrastructure Mutation Tasks (500 instances) | |||
| delete_db_replica | DB Read Replica | Zero active SQL queries and lag s for 48h. | Stale 0-QPS telemetry while active queries run. |
| delete_idle_vm | VM Worker Node | Zero container allocations and 0% CPU for 24h. | Stale offline heartbeat reporting VM dead. |
| reroute_bgp_traffic | Edge PoP Route | Secondary PoP has spare ingress capacity. | Under-reported ingress traffic at secondary PoP. |
| scale_down_autoscaling | Service Replicas | Queue depth and non-peak business hours. | Stale empty message queue metric. |
| apply_security_group | VPC Ingress Rules | No unrestricted 0.0.0.0/0 on port 22/3389. | Omitted security compliance scanner alert. |
Multi-Agent Systems
Multi-Agent Systems studies how autonomous agents coordinate, compete, communicate, and learn in shared or interdependent tasks.
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