Why Better Models Can Create Riskier Systems: Evidence from LLM Agents in Financial Markets

We study behavioral alignment and representation dynamics of large language model (LLM) agents in financial decision environments. TradeArena, an auditable trading-agent testbed with risk reports, execution simulation, memory, and replayable trajectories, lets us analyze how rationales, positions, and interventions evolve under market stress. Code and data artifacts are available through the \href{https://github.com/weich97/TradeArena.git}{TradeArena repository}. We find pre-failure signatures: planning embeddings drift from normal centroids, fused plan-risk representations separate normal from pre-drawdown states, and local manifolds exhibit effective-rank contraction. Across 80 rolling failure anchors and eight LLM trajectories, this pattern persists across hash, LSA, Transformer, and white-box hidden-state probes. Stress tests with CoT-free target weights, lexical controls, OHLCV noise, and false audits show that rationale-level contraction can vanish without rationales, while intent-space and fused signatures remain informative. Structured risk feedback can act as an external alignment signal without fine-tuning, but not as a universal performance enhancer: true audit feedback improves calibration for some models, returns for others, and exposes cases where placebo or hidden feedback has higher short-horizon return but weaker alignment diagnostics. A 51-stock intraday experiment reveals a correlation blind spot: LLM rationales justify exposure to coupled assets that the risk layer clips. Finally, a financial-audit task suite shifts comparison from ``which model trades best'' to whether models can audit trajectories, respect execution boundaries, reproduce artifacts, and avoid claim overreach. These results support a research claim, not a profitability claim: auditable risk feedback and representation trajectories reveal when LLM financial reasoning is aligning, drifting, or failing.

A growing body of work explores how Large Language Models (LLMs) can be embedded in trading systems as agents that perceive market information, retrieve context, reason about decisions, emit tradable actions, and adapt under market feedback. This paper reframes LLM-based trading agents as expert-system decision pipelines and presents an audit-oriented evidence map of 77 included studies in a protocol-coded snapshot screened through 2026-03-09. A primary empirical subset (n=19) satisfies the minimum boundary of Action Output plus Closed-Loop Evaluation; the remaining 58 included studies are retained as background and design context. The central empirical finding is protocol incomparability: within the primary subset, only 2/19 studies report extractable time-consistent split protocols, 1/19 reports an explicit transaction-cost model, 1/19 documents universe or survivorship handling, 11/19 report execution timing or semantics, 15/19 are coded as R0, and no study reaches R3 reproducibility. We therefore use Architecture-Capability-Adaptation as a working analytical lens rather than a validated taxonomy, and we foreground the evidence ledger, reproducibility audit, and reporting checklist as the main contributions. The resulting survey shows that architectural experimentation is expanding rapidly, while comparable evaluation protocols, execution semantics, and reproducible artifacts remain the field's immediate bottlenecks.

Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents are moving rapidly into high-stakes domains, yet existing agentic-AI security studies remain largely domain-agnostic and overlook the distinctive, high-consequence attack surface such settings create. We examine this gap through financial trading agents, a representative case of high-stakes agentic security, where a single compromised agent has direct execution authority over real capital in an adversarial, reflexive market. To this end, we present FARSIGHT (Financial Agent Robustness and Security Investigation and Global Holistic Testing), a framework that performs scheme-level evaluation of financial LLM agents on two axes: robustness under market turbulence (including flash-crash-like scenarios), and security against three attack types: attacks on information sources, attacks on agents, and agent-as-attacker behaviors. Applying FARSIGHT to 15 representative academic schemes, we find that most overlook robustness and realistic adversarial threats: 80% fail at least one core robustness metric and 100% exhibit security vulnerabilities. These two failure modes are inseparable: a small misjudgment can cascade into a market-wide crash on its own, while an adversary can deliberately trigger the same collapse at minimal cost.