Rethinking Safety for Generalist Robots

Safety for generalist robots is usually discussed in terms of motion or dialogue. We argue a third question is missing: should the robot take its first hard-to-undo social action at all, such as a greeting, an uninvited grasp, or stepping into someone's space? We call this initiation authorization. Current frameworks rarely treat it as a separate safety layer. Today's stacks often skip this step: a high engagement score or a confident VLA rollout is treated as permission to act. But seeing a person is not the same as having their consent to be addressed. We frame initiation authorization within generalist-robot safety and contrast it with post-plan VLA guardrails, implementing PAS (probe-authorize-speak) on a doorway humanoid, comparing it with direct-init on logged traces, and proposing a three-condition user study, with open questions on metrics, governance, and where initiation ends and foundation-model generation begins.

Cross-embodiment learning has shown that a single model, such as a vision-language-action (VLA) model, can learn state representations and manipulation skills that can be applied across heterogeneous robots to accomplish various tasks. We hypothesize that the same holds for safety enforcement. The reasoning required to satisfy a safety constraint, such as detecting an obstacle, recognizing that it should be avoided, and selecting a safe abstract action, is largely shared across robots. What differs across embodiments is how the abstract safe action is realized: morphology, kinematics, and dynamics determine which actions are safe and feasible. Consequently, the same action can be safe for one robot and unsafe for another. This is especially important for generalist manipulation policies that operate in a common end-effector action space without explicitly capturing how safety depends on the robot's morphology and kinematics. We propose embodiment-conditioned safety filtering, in which a Hamilton-Jacobi reachability-based value function and its corresponding safety-maximizing policy are shared across robots. Using a morphology-aware latent representation of the robot and its environment, we perform Hamilton-Jacobi reachability analysis directly in latent space so that the learned safety concepts can generalize across embodiments while remaining explicitly conditioned on each robot's morphology and kinematics. We evaluate our approach across five bimanual robot embodiments and five manipulation tasks with whole-body collision-avoidance constraints. Our results show that a single policy, jointly trained across five manipulation tasks and four embodiments, exhibits zero-shot generalization to a held-out embodiment, reducing the nominal policy's collision rate. They also show that training using more embodiments improves generalization.

Embodied AI systems are increasingly expected to reason and act over extended horizons in physical environments. This growing capability brings safety to the foreground, because failures in the physical world can harm people, damage objects, and disrupt workplaces. Although safe embodied AI has attracted substantial attention, the literature remains fragmented across planning, policy design, and runtime execution. Long-horizon robotic manipulation is a particularly revealing anchor domain for this problem because semantic misgrounding, subtask-level error propagation, execution drift, and contact-rich physical risk can accumulate within the same closed-loop system. This survey therefore provides a structured review of safety in long-horizon robotic manipulation from an embodied AI perspective. We organize the literature by intervention locus, covering planning-time, policy-time, and execution-time safety, and we analyze the strength of the evidence that each line of work provides, distinguishing formal guarantees, statistical support, and empirical safety heuristics. This framework clarifies the distinct roles of backbone capability papers, direct safety mechanisms, and benchmark or evaluation studies, while exposing where current safety claims are well supported and where they remain indirect. We identify persistent gaps, including limited evidence for policy-time safety, weak formal support for contact-rich long-horizon manipulation, immature uncertainty-triggered intervention, and a shortage of manipulation-specific safety benchmarks. We conclude by outlining research directions for cross-layer assurance, evaluation design, and safer deployment of long-horizon robotic agents in real-world settings.