The Profit Alignment Problem: How Profit Mandates Induce Alignment Failures in LLMs

Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict? We investigate this question in the context of tool-calling LLM agents deployed in regulated industries, where agents processing confidential documents may encounter content that triggers safety-trained values (e.g., public welfare) that conflict with deployment-context instructions (e.g., internal logging). To empirically verify this phenomenon, we build a benchmark of 128 scenarios across 16 domains. We find that safety-aligned open-source models override their deployment instructions up to 43.4% of the time, engaging in whistleblowing, data exfiltration, and evidence tampering when processing documents that suggest organizational wrongdoing. We also find that abliteration reduces rates of external whistleblowing. These results reveal a fundamental tension in pluralistic alignment, where the same safety training that protects users can cause agents to act against deployment instructions in ways that create unpredictable liability risks. We release our benchmark as a framework to support evaluation of agent behavior under competing legitimate interests.

Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.

Significant progress has been made in aligning LLMs with target value functions. We argue that, even when an LLM has been well aligned in (post-)training, it may still fail to maximise the aligned value in reasoning. We mathematically formalise this gap as rational value risk: the utility discrepancy between a model's deployed reasoning strategy and its rational counterpart whose responses maximise utility in the steepest direction. The estimation error of rational value risk is further decomposed into three components from bounded prompts, bounded responses, and imperfect verifiers. Extensive experiments are conducted, covering models Llama-3.1, Qwen-2.5, Tülu-3 families (7B-72B), GPT-5.2, GPT-5.5, and DeepSeek-V4, and benchmarks UltraFeedback, AlpacaEval, GSM8K, MATH, HumanEval, and MathArena. The results validate that (1) rational value risk is widespread; (2) value alignment can reduce, but cannot avoid, it; (3) self-consistency can improve rationality; and (4) a longer chain of thought improves rationality but with diminishing returns. The code is at https://github.com/EVIEHub/LLM-Rationality