DuplexJail: Safety Alignment Breaks Under Spoken Interruption in Full-Duplex Models

Full-duplex speech models listen and speak at once, promising always-on assistants. Yet they must also decide when they should speak. Human listeners speak when addressed or when the speaker stops, but also self-select to correct a false claim, supply a missing word, or warn of danger. We ask whether full-duplex models do the same. To separate the reason to speak from the opportunity, we construct context-matched English monologues in which only the trigger utterance varies within a topic, define 10 conditions from turn-allocation rules, and compress inter-word pauses to limit opportunities created by silence. Across five model families, being addressed and silence are far more reliable triggers than false facts or hazards. Frame-level text-token probabilities in Moshi and PersonaPlex are lower for false facts than for Neutral when averaged over the first 2,s after trigger end. Pauses or permission to interrupt do not close this gap either. Given the floor, Moshi and PersonaPlex answer most direct questions, yet the proportion of non-empty false-fact replies that challenge the claim is only .14--.15, and the proportion of hazard replies that warn of danger is .04--.07. This paper thus identifies a gap in both speech initiation and response content. Closing it requires genuine content understanding and intervention decisions grounded in it.

Large audio language models (LALMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet their safety alignment is still primarily evaluated on monolingual, text-based harmful prompts. This leaves their generalizability under multilingual and spoken settings, particularly code-switched speech, largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce SpeechJBB, an audio jailbreak dataset for benchmarking across multiple state-of-the-art LALMs. The extent of safety weaknesses is further probed by introducing an augmented setting where phonologically plausible pseudo-words are inserted around safety-critical terms to simulate localized obfuscation. Across models, code-switched harmful audio yields substantially high jailbreak success rates (JSR), with non-English monolingual and non-English code-switched pairs exhibiting the highest attack success. Pseudo-word insertion further reduces refusal rates, which demonstrates that natural-sounding obfuscation can effectively bypass safety policies.

Real-time, full-duplex speech interaction is a key feature of next-generation spoken chatbots, allowing the model to listen and speak at the same time and to handle natural phenomena such as overlap, hesitation, and barge-in. Existing speech language models (SpeechLMs) such as LLaMA-Omni and GLM-4-Voice are still turn-based and rely on an external Voice Activity Detection (VAD) module to mark the end of the user's turn, which fundamentally limits their interactive ability. In this paper, we introduce BayLing-Duplex, a native full-duplex SpeechLM where a single autoregressive LLM decides when to listen, when to speak, and when to stop, with no auxiliary turn-taking module. The design adds only a few special tokens to the standard vocabulary, so it transfers across LLMs and reuses existing training and serving stacks with no architectural adaptation. Starting from the public GLM-4-Voice checkpoint and using only 400K full-duplex samples for fine-tuning followed by a lightweight DPO stage, BayLing-Duplex reaches 92% turn-taking success and 100% interruption success on InstructS2S-Eval, while improving the speech-response score from 2.17 to 3.39 over Moshi. BayLing-Duplex also matches or surpasses its turn-based counterpart on Llama Questions, Web Questions, and Alpaca-Eval, showing that simultaneous listen-and-speak modeling does not sacrifice response quality.