Warrant Theory

Information is one of the most widely-discussed concepts of the current era. However, a great deal of insightful work notwithstanding, it is yet to be given wholly convincing logical or mathematical foundations. Without them, we lack adequate reasoning tools for understanding the complex ecosystems of systems upon which the society depends. We seek to rectify this by taking a first step towards developing an inferentialist semantic theory of information. There are three key interacting components. First, conceptual analysis: the metaphysics of information. Dretske expressed the key concepts of information in terms of intentionality, truth, and transmissibility. We replace truth with inferability, and trace the consequences of this replacement. Second, logic: proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) provides a mathematical-logical realization of inferentialist reasoning. Using P-tS, we develop the first steps towards a mathematical-logical theory of an inferentialist primitive unit of information, the 'inferon'. This proof-theoretic approach counterpoints the model-theoretic view of information articulated in situation theory. Furthermore, we argue that it facilitates addressing all three components of van Benthem and Martinez's categorization of the understandings of information, as range, as correlation, and as code. Our focus is on information-as-correlation. Third, systems: the P-tS tools we develop provide the basis for a mathematical account of distributed systems modelling -- a key tool from informatics for understanding the organization of information processing systems. This yields a reasoning-based theory of information flow in models of distributed systems. Overall, we seek to give a conceptually rigorous mathematical-logical account of information and its role within informatics, grounded in inference and reasoning.

Counterfactual explanation in abstract argumentation calls for an answer to the what-if query: would the topic argument still be accepted if the status of certain other arguments were changed? Existing approaches are limited to the but-for test and fail to accommodate more refined counterfactual conditions. To overcome these limitations, we introduce an intervention-based counterfactual reasoning framework in abstract argumentation. Our approach encodes the acceptance conditions of arguments as equations, then defines an intervention operator that supports (1) changing sets of arguments simultaneously, and (2) fixing witness arguments to their actual labels. Guided by the refined counterfactual condition introduced in the Halpern-Pearl definition, our method goes beyond the but-for test, thereby correctly identifying causes in argumentation structures such as Preemption and Overdetermination. Through comparison, we show that our method surpasses prior methods in both expressiveness and reliability.

"Any fool can know; the point is to understand." A well-known remark often attributed to Einstein captures a widely shared intuition: understanding is more than merely knowing. Yet epistemic logic has paid relatively little attention to understanding, despite its central role in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and recent debates about AI. A recurring theme in the philosophical literature is that, unlike knowledge, understanding comes in degrees: one may understand something more or less well, and one's understanding may be better than another's. We introduce a comparative epistemic logic of understanding with level-indexed understanding modalities and a comparative connective for saying that one agent understands why a proposition better than another agent does. Semantically, we enrich multi-agent epistemic models with agent-indexed graded explanation structures and a justification-style term algebra. This yields a unified framework for representing minimal, ordinary, more demanding, and ideal understanding, together with comparisons between agents with respect to the same formula at issue. We distinguish a finitary bounded-level calculus from an infinitary full-language companion system. We establish soundness and strong completeness, and show that each fixed finite-level fragment is decidable.