Refracted Light Interaction in Turbulent Bubbling Water (RLITBW): A Macroscopic Fluid-Optic Entropy Source

Pseudo-random number generation often requires trade-offs among quality, power consumption, and bandwidth to produce unpredictable sequences of numbers. The brain, on the other hand, efficiently generates unpredictable output complex network dynamics occurring in a high-dimensional state. This state, which is hypothesized to be chaotic, relies on the balance between excitation and inhibition. Here, we investigated if computational models of these chaotic balanced states can be harnessed for Neuromorphic Pseudo-Random Number Generators (NPRNGs) in low power hardware. We successfully constructed a balanced spiking neural network model consisting of leaky-integrate-and-fire neurons that could be readily implemented in low power FPGAs and used as a NPRNG. The prototyped NPRNG consumed 3.24 mW during operation and produced pseudo-random numbers at 120kbps. In both hardware and software instantiations, NPRNGs produce high-quality random numbers as validated by standard metrics for testing RNG quality.

Pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) constitute indispensable computational tools across multiple scientific domains, including Monte Carlo simulations, stochastic computing, and artificial intelligence (AI). The reproducibility of such applications critically depends on the ability of PRNG implementations to generate identical sequences across software environments when initialized from the same internal state. These algorithms enable the simulation of stochastic processes while providing deterministic and repeatable behaviour, thereby facilitating reproducible experiments. Modern PRNG implementations may be initialized through either a seed or, more accurately, an initial state that exceeds the capacity of a conventional integer seed. However, reliance on a simple seed alone frequently proves insufficient to ensure consistent program execution traces across different implementations. A natural assumption is that transferring the complete internal state of a generator should guarantee identical outputs regardless of the software library used. This study examines the validity of this assumption by investigating whether complete initial states can ensure cross-library fidelity and portability of PRNG streams. We focus on two widely deployed generators, Mersenne Twister and Philox, and evaluate their implementations across four major Python ecosystems-Random, NumPy, PyTorch, and TensorFlow. We compare the sequences produced by these implementations against those generated by the original reference algorithms under identical initialization conditions. Our results demonstrate that reproducibility cannot be assumed from PRNG state transfer alone, even when implementations claim to follow the same underlying algorithm. While fidelity was successfully achieved for several implementations, significant discrepancies were observed in others. Most notably, the Philox implementation in PyTorch exhibits fundamental incompatibilities with the reference algorithm, preventing exact reproduction of generator outputs across environments. These findings challenge the common expectation that access to a full internal state of a PRNG is sufficient to ensure reproducibility across software stacks. They further highlight that implementation-specific design choices can introduce hidden barriers to experimental replication, particularly in AI workflows that rely on multiple frameworks. This work shows that implementation fidelity of a PRNG is a necessary condition for scientific reproducibility and makes two primary contributions. First, it identifies practical guidelines for achieving reliable PRNG usage and reproducibility within the Python scientific and AI ecosystem. Second, it evaluates the extent to which cross-library portability and fidelity can be recovered through user-level techniques, without requiring modifications to library source code.

Cryptographic watermarking is a leading defense for attributing text generated by large language models (LLMs). Existing schemes, including KGW, Unigram, and DipMark, derive their security guarantees from the assumption that the underlying pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is trustworthy. This work introduces SeedHijack, the first supply-chain attack on LLM watermarking that is simultaneously (i) blind -- requiring no knowledge of the watermark key, detector, or model logits, (ii) integrity-preserving -- amplifying rather than erasing the watermark signal, and (iii) orthogonal to detection -- the attack-induced bias is statistically independent of all content-side detector statistics, ensuring that amplification and evasion coexist without trade-off. Rather than perturbing generated text, SeedHijack replaces the PRNG at the supply-chain layer, biasing green-list selection without altering output tokens or degrading text quality. Across three watermarking schemes and three open-source LLMs, the attack triggers 0/6 state-of-the-art content-side statistical detectors while inflating the watermark z-score up to 2.42x (system-level defenses such as entropy-source attestation remain orthogonal and complementary). A quantum random number generator (QRNG) countermeasure is shown to fully neutralize the attack while preserving benign watermarking utility. These findings establish PRNG integrity as a first-class security requirement for cryptographic content-provenance systems.