Not All Duplicates Are Coordination: Generic vs. Non-Generic Duplicate Campaigns in Information Operations

Coordination is a fundamental aspect of life. The advent of social media has made it integral also to online human interactions, such as those that characterize thriving online communities and social movements. At the same time, coordination is also core to effective disinformation, manipulation, and hate campaigns. This survey collects, categorizes, and critically discusses the body of work produced as a result of the growing interest on coordinated online behavior. We reconcile industry and academic definitions, propose a comprehensive framework to study coordinated online behavior, and review and critically discuss the existing detection and characterization methods. Our analysis identifies open challenges and promising directions of research, serving as a guide for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers in understanding and addressing the complexities inherent to online coordination. We also provide an interactive companion website for exploring the surveyed literature.

We introduce IO Factory, an AI-driven framework for simulating information and influence campaigns as fully integrated, traceable processes. The threat of digital manipulation now extends beyond persuasive text from individual language models to AI swarms, i.e., persistent groups of coordinated agents that adapt to platform feedback and disguise organized campaigns as ordinary social interaction. Because such campaigns cannot be identified from isolated messages alone, they must be analyzed across a continuous spectrum of planning, platform action, exposure, interpretation, measurement, and adaptation. IO Factory represents this process inside a controlled simulated platform, linking actor roles, platform actions, exposure records, structured model-based evaluations, and configured changes in the simulated population. We implement the architecture and evaluate it across configurations of up to 100,000 agents. The results show that IO Factory executes campaign timelines at scale and produces inspectable evidence of exposure and measured movement in configured belief variables. By recording the actors, objectives, action constraints, exposure paths, and measurement rules used in each run, IO Factory supports reproducible research and red-team analysis of coordinated influence.

We present a forensic analysis of the generation pipeline behind a recent AI-driven influence campaign. We introduce PROPAGIA, a corpus of 2,646 propagandist French articles from the Storm-1516/CopyCop campaign disclosed by VIGINUM and INSIKT GROUP in 2025. For comparison, we rely on SIPA, a corpus of human-written French mainstream press from the same period. Using topic modeling, vagueness and sentiment analysis, we first isolate persuasion techniques characteristic of propaganda, with PROPAGIA far exceeding SIPA in vagueness, subjectivity and negativity, and citing fewer sources. We then find prompt instruction leaks on 50 of the 84 PROPAGIA websites, including a verbatim ten-point editorial specification accounting for several of these differences, together with high cross-article redundancy. Finally, we show that rewriting-based detection supports INSIKT GROUP's attribution to the Llama 3 family, but also suggests the involvement of Mistral-family models.