AGENTQ: Quantization-Conditioned Backdoor Attacks on LLM Agents

LLM quantization has become essential for memory-efficient deployment. Recent work has shown that quantization schemes can pose critical security risks: an adversary may release a model that appears benign in full precision but exhibits malicious behavior once quantized by users. However, existing quantization-conditioned attacks have been limited to relatively simple quantization methods, where the attacker can estimate weight regions that remain invariant under the target quantization. Notably, prior attacks have consistently failed to compromise more popular and sophisticated schemes, limiting their practical impact. In this work, we introduce the first quantization-conditioned attack that consistently induces malicious behavior that can be triggered by a broad range of advanced quantization techniques, including AWQ, GPTQ, and GGUF I-quants. Our attack exploits a simple property shared by many modern quantization methods: large outliers can cause other weights to be rounded to zero. Consequently, by injecting outliers into specific weight blocks, an adversary can induce a targeted, predictable weight collapse in the model. This effect can be used to craft seemingly benign full-precision models that exhibit a wide range of malicious behaviors after quantization. Through extensive evaluation across three attack scenarios and LLMs, we show that our attack achieves high success rates against a broad range of quantization methods on which prior attacks fail. Our results demonstrate, for the first time, that the security risks of quantization are not restricted to simpler schemes but are broadly relevant across complex, widely-used quantization methods.

Post-training quantization to 4-bit weights is widely reported to be nearly lossless. We test this claim for multi-turn, tool-calling agents, where it now matters most. On $τ^2$-bench, across two open-weight model families in dense and MoE variants and two domains (eight cells, 456 episodes each, at 16-, 8-, and 4-bit weights), quantization indeed looks free on the standard metric. No cell shows a score change that survives multiple-comparison correction, and in the cell that carries the largest process damage, equivalence testing bounds the change within $\pm$7.5 points. The process tells a different story. Quantization amplifies the failure the model already exhibits at full precision (tool-name hallucination in telecom, with the same directional trend in retail entity errors) by up to 2.5$\times$ in volume (+17.6 points per task), while creating essentially no new failures. The failure set is the same at every precision (rank correlation $\geq$ 0.94, 0.18% novel events). The score stays flat because the benchmark's ten-error budget absorbs the extra failures. Shrinking the budget to two errors re-exposes a score gap of 17 points, and it does so only in the one cell where quantization added error volume, exactly as the masking account predicts. A targeted error-repair prompt, run for five telecom models at every precision, removes the damage exactly and only where it lives. Both diagnostics, the per-channel error rate and success under a shrinking budget, come from logs benchmarks already collect; we suggest reporting them alongside task reward.

Model quantization is essential for the efficient deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs), but introduces a critical vulnerability: Quantization-Conditioned Backdoor (QCB) attacks. In these attacks, malicious behaviors remain dormant in full-precision models and activate only after specific quantization distortions, bypassing standard security audits. To mitigate this, we introduce FlipGuard, a proactive defense framework that selectively perturbs model weights prior to quantization. By breaking the adversary's precise alignment between weight patterns and quantization boundaries, FlipGuard suppresses backdoor activation without requiring access to training data or trigger samples. We further propose the Defense Effectiveness Ratio (DER), a unified metric to jointly evaluate security gains, utility preservation, and computational cost. Extensive experiments across seven LLMs (including StarCoder and LLaMA-family models) and three quantization schemes (INT8, FP4, NF4) demonstrate that FlipGuard effectively neutralizes QCBs across three scenarios, i.e., vulnerable code generation, content injection, and over-refusal, achieving high security with negligible performance degradation.