AI Persuasion as a Threat to Human Control

At present, loss of control risks have gained much prominence in public discussion, particularly in relation to AI, with extensive discourse present among academics, frontier labs, and even governments. However, in the existing literature, the concept seems to rest on surprisingly weak foundations, where even those that discuss loss of control extensively do not first establish what control is and what exactly is being lost. Our paper aims to address these gaps. We establish a working definition of control by anchoring it to the "setting and getting of goals". Then, we discuss various aspects of control, built on foundational concepts from related fields like cybernetics, management control, and control theory. This includes who (or what) can be in control, and the things they require to be in control, such as the ability to set goals, having a functional control loop, having requisite variety, and having sufficient goal alignment. Once a framework for control is established, we then discuss how control can be lost, how AIs can contribute to such loss of control, and offer relevant recommendations for how one can maintain control. One interesting consequence of our work is that humanity, as individuals and as groups, can lose varying degrees of control as a result of AI behaviour that is far below the level of superintelligence; the potential for loss of control scenarios (as we define them) already exist, and have existed for a long time.

Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions. As LLMs increasingly debate, advise, and think collaboratively with humans and each other, resistance to harmful persuasion becomes a core requirement for reliable behavior. Yet we show that this requirement is far from met: a single targeted persuasive argument is enough to collapse model accuracy to near zero, even when the argument is factually false. We formalize this threat as adversarial persuasion and introduce an adversarial reinforcement learning framework that trains persuader agents to change a target model's answer in a single interaction. First, we show that optimizing persuasion strategies through trial and error exposes vulnerabilities that static prompting misses: RL-trained persuaders raise persuasion success from approximately 24% to over 93% against the training-time persuadee. Second, we find that these learned strategies transfer to unseen models, achieving 83% attack success on Qwen-14B, 79% on Llama-3.1-8B, and 25% on GPT-4o-mini. Third, we demonstrate that a curriculum that bootstraps on more persuadable open-weight models before targeting harder models further increases GPT-4o-mini attack success from 25% to 38%. Moreover, our results reveal that optimized persuaders increasingly rely on credibility-based tactics, including fabricated citations and false authoritative evidence. Together, these findings expose a critical weakness in current LLM agents: even when they initially reason correctly, they can be steered toward false conclusions by optimized natural language influence. This positions persuasion robustness as a necessary safety criterion for multi-agent and human-AI decision-making systems.

Language models can be persuaded to abandon factual knowledge. This vulnerability is central to AI safety, but its internal mechanism remains poorly understood. We uncover a compact causal mechanism for persuasion-induced factual errors. A small set of mid-layer attention heads almost entirely determines the model's answer. These heads write answer options into a low-dimensional polyhedron, with options occupying distinct vertices. Persuasion does not blur belief or merely reduce confidence; it causes a discrete latent jump from the correct-answer vertex to the persuasion-target vertex. We show that decision heads are not reasoning over evidence. Instead, they copy whichever option token their attention selects. Persuasion works by redirecting attention. We isolate a rank-one evidence-routing feature that controls the route. Directly modifying this feature steers the model's choice, and removing it blocks persuasion. We then trace the feature back to a band of shallower attention heads that build it from persuasive keywords in the input. Every step is validated by intervention. This mechanism appears across open-source LLMs and realistic poisoning scenarios such as Generative Engine Optimization, revealing persuasion as a narrow, monitorable circuit.