Symbolic Temporal Supervision of LLM Agents Using Contracts

This position paper argues that enforcing LLM agent safety within a single abstraction layer is not merely suboptimal but categorically insufficient for deployed LLM agents -- a structural consequence of how agent execution works, not a contingent limitation of current systems. The three dimensions that jointly constitute safe operation -- semantic intent and policy compliance, environmental validity, and dynamical feasibility -- each depend on a strictly distinct set of information that becomes available at different stages of execution. No single guardrail can certify all three. We argue that the community must respond with a contract-based architecture in which each safety dimension is enforced by an independently certified layer whose probabilistic guarantee satisfies the next layer's assumption. We sketch such an architecture and derive the compositional system-level safety bounds it admits via the chain rule of probability. Three open problems stand between this and a deployable standard: bound estimation from non-i.i.d.\ traces, graceful degradation of contracts under deployment drift, and extension to multi-agent settings -- the most important unfinished business in LLM agent runtime assurance.

Tool-using LLM agents are usually evaluated by final-answer correctness or LLM judges. Neither captures how an answer was produced. In safety-critical settings, the procedure itself is part of correctness. In this paper, we introduce AgentLTL, a language derived from First-Order Linear Temporal Logic (FO-LTL) that expresses procedural rules over agent traces. It yields a deterministic, judge-free compliance score. In this framework, a single specification drives two usages. The first is harnessing: the constraints score completed traces, or gate tool calls by checking each prefix online, before execution. The second is finetuning: the score serves as a dense reward. On a benchmark spanning ordering, branching, iteration, and grounding, block-and-warn harnessing improves compliance on five of seven models. Finetuning with the same reward yields +38 and +17.5 percentage point gains in accuracy and compliance on held-out patterns, including unseen tool-name aliases. These findings are consistent with the model acquiring procedural structure rather than memorizing surface tool names and procedures.

Tool-augmented LLM agents call APIs whose intermediate outputs, such as presigned URLs, session tokens, and OAuth state parameters, are observation contracts: artifacts whose later use is constrained by the external system that produced them. We show that observation contract compliance (preserving the temporal validity and byte-level integrity) is an emergent, regression-prone capability: it is neither guaranteed by general tool-use ability nor consistently improved by larger or newer models. To measure this, we introduce ContractBench, a benchmark of 33 dual-axis tasks that probe two orthogonal failure modes no existing benchmark evaluates: validity failures (using an artifact after expiry) and integrity failures (corrupting an artifact's bytes through the observation-to-action pipeline). Our evaluation is deterministic and programmatic, with a virtual clock controlling time and SHA-256 hashes verifying byte integrity. We assign each outcome a failure label drawn from real-world API specifications. We evaluate 38 models and report four findings: (i) no evaluated model clears 80%, with Claude-Opus-4.6 leading at 77.8%, revealing that current frontier models still fail to comply with observation contracts; (ii) a sharp within-family capability cliff in Qwen 3.5 between 4B (0%) and 9B (56.6%), smoothing to 70.7% at 397B-A17B: what emerges across the cliff is mid-trajectory restraint, not tool-call competence; (iii) non-monotonic scaling across the GPT-5 family: agentic post-training can erode compliance through sycophancy-driven regression; (iv) our failure taxonomy works as an actionable in-context reward signal, yielding +7.1 pp on 42 paired GPT-5.1 failures.