Interest in developing personalised language models is rapidly growing. While personalisation is often viewed as a mechanism to better serve diverse user needs, the effects of sustained interactions with personalised models on people's perception of and behaviour toward AI remain poorly understood. Most critically, downstream consequences outside the immediate human--AI interaction loop, such as effects on users' self-perceptions and interpersonal relationships, remain largely unexamined. In this study, we recruited 992 participants to complete daily advice-seeking interactions with language models over the course of five days, comparing outcomes from a non-personalised baseline against two personalisation approaches: memory-based (conditioned on prior conversational history) and survey-based (conditioned on information collected through a pre-study intake survey). We find that several changes in human-AI interaction over time are driven primarily by repeated exposure rather than personalisation itself. However, participants interacting with personalised models experienced differences in advice-seeking and information-sharing attitudes and behaviours: participants in the memory-based condition engaged in greater self-disclosure and rated the model as less creepy, while participants in the survey-based condition reported higher regret about having shared personal information with the AI. We conclude by highlighting the nuanced effects of different personalisation approaches on interaction outcomes, and discussing the implications of these findings for the responsible design and deployment of personalised AI systems.
Personalisation is a standard feature of conversational AI systems used by millions; yet, the efficacy of personalisation methods is often evaluated in academic research using simulated users rather than real people. This raises questions about how users and their simulated counterparts differ in interaction patterns and judgements, as well as whether personalisation is best achieved through context-based prompting or weight-based fine-tuning. Here, in a large-scale within-subject experiment, we re-recruit 530 participants from 52 countries two years after they gave their preferences in the PRISM dataset (Kirk et al., 2024) to evaluate personalised and non-personalised language models in blinded multi-turn conversations. We find preference fine-tuning (P-DPO, Li et al., 2024) significantly outperforms both a generic model and personalised prompting but adapting to individual preference data yields marginal gains over training on pooled preferences from a diverse population. Beyond length biases, fine-tuning amplifies sycophancy and relationship-seeking behaviours that people reward in short-term evaluations but which may introduce deleterious long-term consequences. Replicating this within-subject experiment with simulated users recovers aggregate model hierarchies but simulators perform far below human self-consistency baselines for individual judgements, discuss different topics, exhibit amplified position biases, and produce feedback dynamics that diverge from humans.
Assistants built on large language models are expected to write in their users' own voice. Most systems summarise the user's preferences and include the summary in the prompt. This is the wrong way round. Preferences are only the surface of a person and change with the task, while the underlying personality stays the same, so storing preferences alone means relearning the user afresh whenever the task changes. This paper makes four contributions. First, we describe an effect we call personality seepage: the wording of a prompt carries traces of the writer's personality, which the assistant copies without knowing the writer. Second, we propose the Atomic User Model (AUM), a readable profile with a stable identity core surrounded by four layers covering psychological, cognitive, experiential, behavioral, and social details, plus notes on inner conflict and authenticity. Third, instead of inserting the entire profile, we use AUM as a searchable index, in which a task classifier, a selection step, and a budgeted retriever pass along only a few relevant fields. Fourth, we test the pipeline with 16 simulated users, 6 style-sensitive tasks, and 3 seeds. Eight retrieved fields matched the writing quality of the whole profile, while using only 23 percent of the context (211 tokens instead of 915). They scored 0.24 points higher than a plain preference note on a five-point scale. Accuracy in picking a user's own writing from four samples rose from 14.9 to 42.7 percent, where guessing gives 25 percent. Four pre-registered controls showed no effect, so the gain comes from the profile's structure rather than the search method. Personalization helps most for the users for whom a generic assistant imitates them the worst.
Language models can fluently describe how they would behave: whether they would cave to pushback, misuse a tool, or lie under pressure. Is that description actually about the model speaking? We turn self-knowledge into a prediction test. Across nine behavioral evaluations, we measure how a model behaves under different conditions, ask it to predict those rates, and compare its predictions with controls that remove the self from the question. We find that: (i) Direct self-report is weak (r = +0.04), and even showing the model the exact items only raises prediction to +0.24. Crucially, the same item-informed question about "capable AI agents in general" does just as well (+0.28), while other models' answers about themselves predict the target model at least as well as its own. (ii) Frontier scale does not detectably change this pattern: any gains in prediction are not self-specific, and are consistent with a better theory of how AI assistants behave rather than better self-knowledge. (iii) First-person framing does have one robust effect: it shifts reports in the flattering direction, understating harmful behavior relative to the same question about a generic agent. (iv) Finetuning on a model's own behavioral record can teach narrow self-predictions, but it also changes the behavior being predicted and the gains do not transfer broadly. The practical implication is simple: asking a model what it would do mostly reveals a theory of AI assistants in general, plus a favorable bias, rather than privileged knowledge of that model.