cs.CLSep 18, 2026

Moral Entropy: Auditing Bias and Uncertainty in Moral Judgment

Authors: Maciej Skorski

Organizations: University of Luxembourg

Abstract

Most work in computational ethics treats annotator disagreement on moral content as noise to be voted away, collapsed into majority vote or the more permissive any-annotator rule the moment a single annotator flags an item. We argue this uncertainty should instead be modeled and learned from. We introduce Moral Entropy, a Bayesian framework that keeps a full posterior over the true label and decomposes its entropy into aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible disagreement about the moral content) and epistemic uncertainty (from insufficient or noisy annotation) -- and lets any heuristic consensus rule be audited against a calibrated ground truth via entropy methods such as cross-entropy/KL, Brier score, and expected calibration error. Across three corpora and fifteen discourse domains, auditing the standard aggregation rules against this posterior reveals bias that no current pipeline reports: the any-annotator rule disagrees with the calibrated posterior on roughly 30% of items -- pooled, almost entirely false positives, though the errors invert at the foundation level (19.9%/38.9% mean FPR/FNR on MFTC) -- while the stricter majority and two-vote rules miss 63-83% of true positives.

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