Knowing, and Saying It Only When Asked: LLM Endognostics and the Schizognosis of Minerva-7B

A 0.6B language model, asked to verify 1,200 logical conclusions (half valid, half corrupted by a single semantic edit), answers YES every time. Judged by behavior it discriminates nothing; linear probes on its hidden states read the correct verdict at 0.96 AUC, transferring to unseen logical structures and separating foils built from exactly the words of the true conclusion (0.90). We ask where the verdict is lost, and find the dominant failure is a single scalar. The verdict survives to the model's own output logits (margin AUC 0.89) along a well-aligned readout direction; a saturated decision threshold, offset by +4.6 sigma, erases it. The diagnosis generalizes: across 90 semantic-label configurations of a five-model, three-family factorial, behavioral accuracy collapses onto a single function of threshold offset (Spearman -0.93) while margin ranking moves far less. Across a 13x scale range, internal knowledge saturates while free-form behavior is non-monotone: an 8B model underperforms its 4B sibling through an answer-channel failure rather than the threshold; forced-choice accuracy is monotone. The diagnosis is actionable: a one-parameter correction, never fit on evaluated structures, repairs behavior from 50% to 81% (0.6B); calibrated margin decoding recovers 94% at 8B; few-shot prompting works the same way, recentering the threshold (+4.6 sigma to 0.0 sigma) while preserving ranking. Comparing probe to margin separates three regimes: concealed, miscalibrated, and undetected. On a maze task built so foils carry no surface cues, the audit correctly reports the third. In the standard generation setting, answer-surface features and heuristic labels reproduce published probing results without any internal access.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as agents with little human oversight, so potential mistakes they make can go unnoticed. Users then depend on the model to report what went wrong. An honest model discloses its mistakes, while a deceptive one conceals them. However, it is unclear how current LLMs behave in such situations. In this study, we prefill LLM trajectories with synthetic mistakes. The trajectories resemble real deployments in chat and agentic settings. Models fail to disclose their mistake in 36.4% of chat and 67.1% of agentic rollouts. In 2.4% and 5.3% of rollouts, respectively, they are aware of the mistake in their chain of thought but still deceptively conceal it. Rates vary by model: for instance, Gemini 3.5 Flash knowingly conceals mistakes in up to 19.9% of agentic rollouts. In 11.9% of chat and 51.8% of agentic rollouts, models show no awareness of mistakes, even though they reliably spot them when reviewing the same transcript as an outside observer. Our results show that, as agents take on more tasks with less oversight, users cannot rely on them to self-report possible mistakes. Developers should instead use independent monitors that review agent trajectories, or specifically train models to check their past actions and disclose what they find.

Both capability and safety benchmarks rest upon the assumption that the behavior of language models undergoing a test is informative about their behavior in deployment. This assumption can fail, should models infer that they are being evaluated and condition their response on such context. This hypothesis, termed ``evaluation awareness'', has been observed in frontier and open-weight language models alike. We provide a systematic study of this phenomenon, by probing for it across six language models (from four families and three sizes) and three metrics. More precisely, we examine whether (i) being under evaluation is linearly represented within the models' activations space, (ii) it is verbalized in their output tokens (as scored by an LLM-as-judge), and (iii) steering causally affects their behavior. For the open-checkpoint Olmo models, we further test these measures at every training stage. In doing so, we report that evaluation awareness is linearly decodable from the residual streams of every model (best AUROC $\geq 0.7$). By contrast, these representations align only in part with verbalization: their correlations and mutual information are nonzero in some settings, yet vary substantially across models, layers, and readout choices. Nevertheless, steering along probe-derived directions can shift the verbalization scores. Finally, a comparison across the Olmo checkpoints reveals that evaluation awareness is already present within base models, becomes amplified throughout the stages of supervised fine-tuning, and remains stable thereafter---unlike the effects of steering, that grow more pronounced at every successive training stage. These results show the need for evaluations to account for the disjunction between what models represent internally, what they verbalize, and their steering.