SyzHarness: Patch-Based Kernel Bug Reproduction with LLM-Synthesized Fuzzing Harnesses

Fuzzing frameworks like syzkaller have uncovered thousands of Linux kernel crashes, many of which are critical and security-sensitive. However, the ability to rapidly repair these crashes has not kept pace, particularly given the complexity and low-level nature of kernel code. Predominantly targeting user-space applications, existing LLM-based program repair techniques are not tailored to the unique challenges posed by kernel fuzz bugs-such as the absence of natural language bug reports, lack of exhaustive test oracles, and highly specialized crash artifacts. Thus, in this work, we first identify the prevalent bottlenecks that generic agents struggle with in complex systems such as the Linux kernel. Guided by these findings, we then build kAgent, a workflow-based agent inspired by how kernel developers diagnose and fix bugs, and kGym++, the co-designed toolstack supporting kAgent's requests. kAgent inspects relevant execution logs, generates execution-grounded natural language hypotheses, synthesizes candidate patches, validates patches through crash reproduction, and iteratively refines its reasoning. We ablate these agentic system features in kAgent and quantitatively analyze their contributions to the overall performance. We also report our experience on building agents for kernel crash repair. Although derived from this work on Linux, we note that our experience applies broadly to fuzzing-discovered bugs in complex systems software. We evaluate kAgent on kBenchSyz and show that it can repair up to 54.5% of crashes without localization and 65% with correct file hints. We also show kAgent's generalization on a few wild Syzkaller bugs, and how different patch types offer varying utility to developers who debug complex system software.

Modern fuzzers increasingly use Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate structured inputs, but LLM-driven fuzzing is sensitive to prompt initialization and sampling variance, which can reduce exploration efficiency and lead to redundant inputs. We present FunFuzz, a multi-island evolutionary fuzzing framework that runs several isolated searches in parallel and periodically migrates high-value candidates to maintain diversity. FunFuzz derives initial generation prompts from documentation and initializes islands with topic-specific instructions, then continuously adapts prompts using feedback-guided selection. During fuzzing, candidates are prioritized by incremental compiler coverage, while compiler-internal failure signals are used to identify crash-inducing inputs. We evaluate FunFuzz on compiler fuzzing, where inputs are source programs and success is measured by compiler coverage and unique compiler-internal failures. Across repeated 24-hour campaigns on GCC and Clang, FunFuzz achieves higher compiler coverage than previous LLM-driven baselines and discovers more unique failure-triggering inputs.

Despite recent advances, frontier large language model (LLM) agents remain limited in discovering and patching complex vulnerabilities in real-world software. Generally available agents can already aid attackers, who only need to find one exploitable weakness, while defenders must continuously identify and patch all vulnerabilities across fast-growing codebases. Stronger defensive agents would help close this gap, yet the scarcity of security training data with reproducible build and execution environments remains a bottleneck. We present CyberForge, a framework that synthesizes executable, repository-level security training data by injecting vulnerabilities into real C/C++ projects. It validates each instance dynamically: the injected build must pass the project's unit tests, and generated proof-of-vulnerability (PoV) must trigger on the injected build and not on the clean one. CyberForge is not limited by the availability of disclosed vulnerabilities, therefore it can scale in comparison to data augmentation techniques which rely on historic CVE data. The resulting corpus holds 1034 validated vulnerabilities across 80 projects and 63 weakness categories, with edit locality similar to real CVE patches under a real-versus-real noise floor. Fine-tuning on trajectories collected over this corpus improves SEC-bench patch repair by +3.3 to +14.7 points, in all six configurations of three model scales and two teachers, with the 31B student reaching its GPT-5.4-mini teacher, 72.7% against 74.0%. These gains generalize out of distribution to PatchEval, a corpus containing other programming languages, where every configuration also improves and the 31B student passes its teacher.