Partner-Specific Affective Precision in Social Active Inference

Social interaction can improve collective learning but also amplify early mistakes. We study this tension when the credibility of social information is generated by the sender's own decision process rather than fixed ex ante. Reinforcement-learning agents make binary choices through a drift--diffusion process that jointly determines choice, decision time, and confidence; decision confidence then becomes social credibility by weighting anticipatory influence and retrospective social learning. Under balanced community exposure, the anticipatory field admits an exact quotient representation. Its local Jacobian is a scalar decision-sensitivity term multiplying the community-coupling matrix, which yields a common-mode amplification threshold and an analytical role for cross-community permeability in damping relative community differences. Monte Carlo experiments show the corresponding non-monotone performance pattern: moderate transmission accelerates correction, whereas strong transmission can lock populations into wrong consensus; low permeability instead sustains disagreement. Ablations reveal a dual role for confidence: credibility-sensitive transmission amplifies social error, while confidence-dependent private learning stabilises it. The model yields testable predictions linking sender confidence to receiver behaviour conditional on accuracy.

As language-model agents increasingly work in teams, each agent must decide how much to trust its teammates. Yet we lack a standard way to measure trust between AI agents. We propose a behavioral measure based on costly verification. In a cooperative survival game, checking a teammate's work consumes resources, while trusting a wrong answer can be fatal. Relative to a memoryless version of the same model, reduced verification provides an observable measure of trust. Using this framework, we study trust formation, breakage, and recovery across six frontier model snapshots. When paired with a consistently reliable teammate, four snapshots (Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.1, and Gemini 3.1 Pro) reduce verification by roughly 60-85%, whereas two smaller snapshots show little or no such adjustment. Failures reverse this discount, but models differ in how they respond. Some concentrate renewed scrutiny on the culprit, while others become more cautious toward the entire team. Recovery is slower than formation, and clustered failures sustain suspicion far longer than the same number of failures spread apart. These differences have practical consequences. Models that form trust verify less, decide more quickly, and achieve higher payoffs in our environment. By contrast, persistent over-verification is associated with indecision rather than safety. Our results show that trust dispositions can be measured before deployment and suggest that calibration, rather than maximal suspicion, should be the central concern in the governance of multi-agent AI systems.

Language model agents are increasingly used to simulate social interaction, and the resulting transcripts read as though the agents understand one another. We ask whether that appearance rests on a model of the partner's mind or on the surface record of what the partner said. We build a social simulation in which both questions have exact answers: 40 multi-issue negotiations whose hidden preference weights and whose full Pareto frontier are known by construction. Two model families negotiate across 160 dyads, every transcript is frozen before any measurement, and 2880 counterfactual probes then hold the evidence byte identical while moving one factor at a time: the reader's own stake, the partner's tone, an identity label, and the order of recursion. The agents are socially fluent and economically poor. They reach agreement in 96.2% of dyads with 0 protocol failures, yet only 0.7% of deals land on the Pareto frontier, they leave 20.5% of the available joint value unclaimed, and they miss the one issue on which their interests are perfectly aligned in 76.6% of deals; on the frontier and on that aligned issue, a package drawn at random from the set both sides would accept does as well. The probes locate the failure. Swapping only the reader's own payoff sheet, while the partner's words and offers stay identical, moves the inferred top priority by 15.0 percentage points, which is egocentric projection rather than inference, while a tone rewrite moves it by 5.3 percentage points and an identity label by 0.0. Most tellingly, an agent predicts what its partner believes about it 72.5% of the time while that partner's belief is itself correct only 51.2% of the time: the agents track the conversation far better than they track the mind behind it.