In language models, the choice between believing the prompt and believing the weights is made by a handful of identifiable attention heads. Instruction tuning changes how models behave under conflict, but whether it rewires the underlying circuit or merely gates/reweights already present components, remains unknown. We provide the first mechanistic base-vs-instruct comparison of conflict-resolution circuits, across three families (Llama-3.2-3B, Qwen-2.5-3B, Gemma-3-4B). Five independent methods, node and edge attribution, superposition role analysis, causal ablation, and path patching, converge on gating, with the same heads, in the same late-layers, are found to be reweighted rather than replaced with a high node overlap (0.60-0.82). Behaviorally, tuning shifts models toward parametric memory, making instruct models reject a terse counterfactual context far more than base ones, the opposite of a naive user-following expectation. Yet this added skepticism is a factor of framing since it disappears when the same false claim is delivered as a coherent, evidential passage. The robustness that instruction tuning buys against terse injection is therefore real but narrow. More broadly, we believe that because the conflict circuit is preserved rather than rebuilt, interpretability and control tools calibrated on base models should transfer directly to their deployed instruct siblings.
Instruction tuning is meant to make language models follow user requests, yet it is unclear whether small models comply when an instruction conflicts with their usual task behavior. We study this across three tasks - multiple-choice question answering (MCQA), sentiment classification, and mathematical question answering - by pairing a standard instruction with a conflicting non-standard one (select an incorrect option, output the opposite sentiment, or return twice the answer). This cross-task design allows us to test whether resistance to conflicting instructions is tied to specific task characteristics or reflects a broader behavioral tendency. As all predictions are scored against the original ground truth, a model that ignores the non-standard instruction still appears accurate. Using standard accuracy, non-standard accuracy, and an Instruction-Following Failure Rate (IFFR), we evaluate instruction-tuned Qwen models across sizes. Both standard accuracy and instruction following generally improve with scale, although the pattern is not consistent across all tasks and datasets. Small models stay competent yet routinely ignore the non-standard instruction, while larger models show a clear gap between the two settings. These findings suggest that gains in task capability do not automatically provide reliable control over model behavior. Task competence and instruction following are therefore distinct abilities, and reporting only standard accuracy hides instruction-following failures.
Language models are instruction-tuned to refuse harmful requests, but the mechanisms underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. Popular steering methods operate on the residual stream and degrade output coherence at high intervention strengths, limiting their practical use. We introduce contrastive neuron attribution (CNA), which identifies the 0.1% of MLP neurons whose activations most distinguish harmful from benign prompts, requiring only forward passes with no gradients or auxiliary training. In instruct models, ablating the discovered circuit reduces refusal rates by over 50% on a standard jailbreak benchmark while preserving fluency and non-degeneracy across all steering strengths. Applying CNA to matched base and instruct models across Llama and Qwen architectures (from 1B to 72B parameters), we find that base models contain similar late-layer discrimination structures but steering these neurons produces only content shifts, not behavioral change. These results demonstrate that neuron-level intervention enables reliable behavioral steering without the quality tradeoffs of residual-stream methods. More broadly, our findings suggest that alignment fine-tuning transforms pre-existing discrimination structure into a sparse, targetable refusal gate.
Language models are trained to follow instructions, but they are also powerful pattern completers. What happens when these two objectives conflict? We construct conversations in which a user instruction to behave in a target way T (e.g., always output a specific token, answer in a particular language, or adopt a persona) is opposed by N hardcoded assistant turns demonstrating a competing pattern P. We then measure instruction-following (IF) rates in this setting, across 13 models and 16 different instructions, for up to 50 turns. Average instruction-following rates range from 1% to 99% across models, largely uncorrelated with standard capability benchmarks. The transition from instruction-following to pattern-following is universal but highly model-dependent. Robustness is modulated both by instruction content, with models resisting induction longer when instructions align with their trained value priors, and by output format, with diverse multi-token responses proving substantially more resistant than single-token outputs. Chain-of-thought reasoning improves robustness but does not eliminate susceptibility, and can produce dissociation between correct deliberation and incorrect output. When asked to predict their behavior in this setting, models achieve 83.5% accuracy on average but systematically underestimate their own resistance to induction pressure. These results suggest that instruction-following remains brittle under induction pressure even for otherwise capable models, and that output diversity, rather than semantic engagement with the input, is the primary factor predicting robustness.