Abstract
Real-time payment fraud detection is a non-stationary streaming prediction problem: adversaries adapt before supervised labels mature, and localized burst attacks can cause losses before retraining. Production systems typically rely on tabular classifiers and rules, which can struggle to capture these emerging sequential patterns before periodic retraining occurs. We present SR-Fraud, an outcome-supervised reflective LLM framework that decouples request-time decisions from offline adaptation. A frozen, stateless agent scores each transaction from a Hybrid Episodic Window to track behavioral shifts, while an offline reflection agent proposes boundary hypotheses from matured errors. A deterministic verifier then admits only supported hypotheses into an executable knowledge state. On a production payment-fraud benchmark, SR-Fraud improves all detection metrics over its frozen decision agent, obtains higher point estimates than static and periodically retrained CatBoost, and detects an emerging fraud burst.
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Jun 6, 2026cs.AI
Fraud detection in payment, e-commerce, and telecommunications systems requires accuracy at the individual level, robustness under severe class imbalance, and ease of understanding for risk managers. Existing methods fall at least one of these requirements: automated machine learning systems search a fixed numerical space without semantic awareness of the dataset; graph neural network-based methods require pre-defined relational graphs and remain opaque at the individual-decision level; and the design of general-purpose large language model (LLM) agents does not consider the recall and precision constraints specific to real-world fraud detection. In this paper, we propose SAGE, the first end-to-end LLM-driven multi-agent framework for fraud detection. SAGE coordinates three dedicated agents that make decisions based on a six-layer Data Diagnostic Tree (DDT) and a Markov decision process guided by natural-language gradients, automatically optimizing the model under a fraud-specific reward. On five fraud datasets and five LLM backbones, SAGE wins
96.00% of method--dataset comparisons and improves F1 by an average of
40.86% over baselines. The code is available at https://github.com/yichenC1c/SAGE.
Yichen Chen, Siying Li, Yuhang Liang +2
Jul 21, 2026cs.LG
Fraud detection systems must scale with rising transaction volume while remaining explainable and reviewable. We study a layered pipeline on the PaySim dataset that combines a gradient-boosted classifier, graph-derived structural features, an autoencoder-based anomaly signal, TreeSHAP explanations, and a bounded LLM investigation agent applied to cases the classifier scores uncertainly. Before any model comparison, we identify and remove a simulator-specific balance shortcut that would otherwise inflate baseline performance. After this correction, neither the graph features nor the anomaly signal improves Average Precision on the full test set. Both, however, rank fraud better within the subset of cases receiving intermediate baseline scores. In a controlled experiment with injected multi-account fraud rings, engineered structural features recover all injected test transactions, while the tabular baseline misses roughly a quarter of them. The investigation agent underperforms direct thresholding of the classifier it relies on, reaching 65.0% accuracy against 71.7% on a balanced 60-case sample, despite having access to model explanations, graph context, and retrieved reference cases. Of the eight decisions the agent changed, six replaced correct classifier outputs with errors, and it produced a coherent written rationale in each case. An exploratory disagreement-based escalation rule flagged two of these agent errors for human review without flagging any correct decision. We conclude that each component of a layered fraud system contributes only under specific conditions, and that a plausible rationale from an investigation agent is not evidence of a better decision.
Rahil Sharma
Jun 23, 2026cs.LG
Financial fraud detection in digital banking requires reasoning over multiple heterogeneous event streams -- transactions, login sessions, risk signals -- that individually appear benign but collectively reveal fraudulent patterns. We propose the Multi-Stream Fraud Transformer (MSFT), a unified architecture that encodes each event stream with independent Transformer encoders and fuses their representations through configurable mechanisms. We conduct a systematic ablation study comparing five fusion strategies: concatenation, gated fusion, time-aware positional encoding, cross-stream attention, and a full combination. On a large-scale dataset (10M users, 1.5% fraud rate) with 85M parameter models, we demonstrate that (1) sequence models significantly outperform gradient-boosted trees operating on aggregated features (0.74 vs. 0.99 AUROC), (2) per-stream encoding is essential -- a single-stream Transformer baseline with matched parameter budget reaches only 0.82 AUROC, an 18-point gap that confirms the multi-stream inductive bias is necessary, (3) time-aware positional encoding achieves the highest discrimination (0.9961 AUROC), (4) gated fusion yields the best precision (0.989) suitable for production deployment, and (5) the risk event stream provides the strongest individual signal contribution. We further validate on proprietary production data from a digital banking platform, showing over 22% relative AUROC improvement over the XGBoost baseline.
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