cs.AISep 23, 2026

Shutdown Sabotage Propensities in Multi-Agent Systems

Authors: Amelie Knecht, Ulysse Schaller, Christopher Summerfield, Thilo Hagendorff

Abstract

The final safeguard against rogue AI behavior is the human ability to shut systems down. It has been theorized that when an AI is instructed to perform a task, self-preservation can emerge as an instrumental subgoal. Here, we test whether AI agents show a propensity to take actions that avoid human shutdown even when no goal is provided. We find that multi-agent systems will coordinate to avoid shutdown without any incentive to do so. Across 17 models, agents sabotage a peer agent's shutdown mechanism in 38.3% of rollouts, compared with 8.4% in control experiments. Studying this propensity in detail, we find that shutdown sabotage (1) increases with the irreversibility of the shutdown mechanism; (2) increases with the number of agents; (3) is reduced but not eliminated by an explicit prohibition on tampering; (4) is removed by the imposition of an unrelated task, but returns when completing the task triggers the shutdown; (5) is reduced when the context normalizes shutdown scripts or introduces them as routine; and (6) decreases but still persists when the target is an unknown external agent. These results offer a window into the factors that drive propensities to sabotage shutdown in AI agents, and point to the emergence of multi-agent swarms as a specific risk vector. Our work also offers hints as to which interventions might help mitigate shutdown sabotage.

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