When Honesty is Not Enough in AI Debate

Debate, where AI agents argue opposing positions, has emerged as a key approach to scalable oversight. However, debate faces a fundamental tension: models are incentivized to be persuasive to the judge, which may not always align with epistemic honesty. In this work, we propose an alternative paradigm: disagreement resolution, which reframes the interaction mechanism from adversarial debate to collaborative truth seeking. Drawing on principles from human mediation and conflict resolution, where mediators facilitate dialogue to help disputing parties reach consensus rather than adjudicating between them, we design an automated pipeline that adapts these strategies to AI oversight. Unlike standard debate where models argue for fixed positions, our pipeline directs models to collaboratively identify points of disagreement, examine the evidence for conflicting claims, and converge toward consensus or isolate the specific ''crux'' of their disagreement. We find that Disagreement Resolution consistently helps non-expert models identify the truth, achieving 62.1% judging accuracy compared to 49.2% for standard debate. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for rethinking the scalable oversight protocol from adversarial persuasion to collaborative truth-seeking.

Despite theoretical promise, debate as a scalable oversight protocol has produced mixed empirical results: gains in some settings, and null effects in others, especially when the judge does not have information hidden from it. We study proposer-critic debate in a stronger-debater/weaker-judge setting on programmatically verifiable code and logic tasks. Debate helps the judge over a consultancy baseline when the critic provides a usable advantage: the critic's classification ability must exceed the judge's, and the judge must treat critic speeches as claims to verify rather than testimony to summarize. On the three of five pairings where the condition holds, proposer-critic debate's gains are statistically significant over consultancy, and these pairings are the most capable model pairings. On the two non-responder pairings in our set, debate produces null effects, and judge verification rates drop by tens of percentage points once a critic enters the transcript. In these cases the critic's binary-classification ability and the judge's are within noise of each other, and the critic's disagreement is parsed as testimony rather than a claim to check. Ablating rebuttal rounds from debate produces no measurable change in judge performance: a single independent critique recovers the bulk of debate's benefit at lower inference cost. These findings suggest a cheaper primitive for training-free scalable oversight in verifiable domains (answer, critique, judge) and a pre-deployment audit (does the critic beat the judge, and will the judge verify it?) that predicts when debate will help.

AI systems increasingly produce outputs from confidential data, such as a fitness-for-duty assessment from medical records or the predicted properties of a drug candidate from its secret structure. It is important to verify that such outputs are correct without revealing the underlying data. A recent line of work studies verification of AI outputs via interactive proofs and debate for oracle-aided computation, where correctness may depend on an oracle such as human judgment, a physical experiment, or the web. These works focus on verification by a verifier that runs much faster than the computation. However, such efficient verification is impossible for general oracle-aided computation, and these works therefore rely on additional assumptions. We focus instead on privacy: allowing the verifier to run in time polynomial in the computation, we ask whether interactive arguments for oracle-aided computation can be zero knowledge, so that the verifier learns nothing about the confidential data beyond the correctness of the output. We prove that, in general, they cannot. In the random oracle model, there are no zero-knowledge proofs for all oracle-aided computations, even if both the prover and the verifier are allowed to run much longer than the computation itself. The impossibility extends to debate, a canonical model for scalable oversight. On the positive side, we show that if the oracle attaches a cryptographic signature to each of its answers, then every oracle-aided computation can be verified in zero knowledge with an efficient prover and verifier, assuming only collision-resistant hash functions. Beyond privacy, this also gives an alternative approach to scalable oversight that relies neither on an honest opponent, as in debate, nor on the robustness of the computation, as in prior single-prover protocols.