DP-IPI: A Hybrid Differential Privacy Text Rewriting Mechanism for Indirect Personal Identifiers in Clinical Texts
Authors: Ibrahim Baroud, Stephen Meisenbacher, Sebastian Möller, Florian Matthes, Roland Roller
Organizations: Quality & Usability Lab, Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany · German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), Berlin, Germany · Technical University of Munich, School of CIT, Garching, Germany · Munich Center for Machine Learning, Munich, Germany
Despite the strengths of modern anonymization and de-identification techniques, the risk of re-identification remains significant due to the indirect identifiers remaining in texts. To address this problem, recent works have applied text rewriting under Differential Privacy (DP) to prevent data linkage by perturbing texts via noise addition. Such methods privatize all tokens in a text indiscriminately, diminishing text quality and usability in critical domains such as in clinical settings. Focusing on indirect personal identifiers (IPIs), we introduce a utility-preserving DP text rewriting method that only privatizes spans containing IPIs. We show that our method effectively reduces re-identification risks in clinical texts while being producing more coherent and usable output texts, leading to higher privacy-utility trade-offs. In this, we demonstrate the effectiveness of hybrid text privatization, which leverages the promise of DP in an efficient, usable manner.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: An illustrative example of our proposed DP-IPI compared to the original DP-MLM (at ε=25 ). In the original text, we highlight indirect personal identifiers (IPIs) extracted by our trained IPI model (in blue ). In the two corresponding privatized texts, we highlight aspects which are wrong, misleading, or hallucinated ( red ), borderline acceptable ( orange ), and suitable IPI replacements ( green ). These annotations also include medical aspects (e.g. allergies, medications) that are either improperly privatized ( red ) or correctly left unperturbed ( green ). Note: the example is a synthetically generated patient file (using Google AI Studio), meant to mirror the MIMIC-III dataset.
Category
P
R
F1
Support
details
0.08
0.25
0.12
4
family
0.67
1.00
0.80
73
appearance
0.61
0.69
0.65
29
circumstances
0.20
0.37
0.26
30
sec
0.75
0.86
0.80
14
fclt_personnel
0.82
0.95
0.88
362
Table 1: Evaluation results on the test set for RoBERTa-large in P recision, R ecall, and F1 score. Support shows the number of examples in the test set.
ϵ
Method
Dia ↑
Pro ↑
MP ↑
LoS ↑
S ↑
C ↓
500R ↓
50E ↓
LLM ↓
γ↑
-
De-identification (baseline)
73.87
80.13
76.08
66.75
-
90
99.32%
99.60%
14.29
-
25 / 0.1
DP-MLM (RoBERTa-base)
65.48
66.92
66.83
61.19
0.80
1176
10.00%
26.80%
2.10
0.73
DP-MLM (BioMed-RoBERTa-base)
61.29
66.52
65.06
60.02
0.66
1972
1.28%
10.40%
1.35
0.76
DP-IPI
72.93
80.11
75.35
66.12
0.98
157
8.00%
26.00%
2.95
0.80
SANTEXT
50.76
56.34
52.06
52.66
0.44
2013
0.20%
4.00%
0.01
0.71
SANTEXT IPI
72.61
76.71
71.01
65.79
0.95
4292
16.32%
34.80%
1.65
0.79
Table 2: Full experiment results for MIMIC-III. Scores in bold represent the best scores between all methods for each comparable ε , and the underlined values denote the best scores per metric across all methods and ε budgets. For ε , the left value is that used for DP-MLM (and variants), and the right is that used for SANTEXT (and variants).
Figure 2: Privacy-Utility trade-off Pareto frontier, including all methods tested in the main experiments and the hybrid setup, for each of the four tested ε budgets. Utility is calculated as the average ROC-AUC ( ↑ ) across the four downstream tasks in MIMIC-III. Privacy is calculated as 100− average re-identification accuracy across attack scenarios ( 50_eval and 500_random ).
ϵ
IPI Model
Dia ↑
Pro ↑
MP ↑
LoS ↑
S ↑
C ↓
500R ↓
50E ↓
LLM ↓
γ↑
25
Baseline
72.93
80.11
75.35
66.12
0.98
157
8.00%
26.00%
2.95
0.80
BioMed-RoBERTa-base
73.95
80.35
75.74
65.83
0.98
155
9.72%
23.60%
2.95
0.81
DeBERTa-v3-large
74.17
80.56
76.67
66.17
0.99
114
21.20%
33.20%
1.97
0.79
BERT-Base
73.64
79.75
74.30
65.92
0.98
157
8.16%
21.60%
2.99
0.81
75
Baseline
73.42
81.06
75.81
66.48
0.99
136
14.00%
27.60%
2.78
0.79
BioMed-RoBERTa-base
74.08
80.42
75.89
66.24
0.99
113
13.28%
33.20%
3.14
0.77
Table 3: Empirical utility and privacy results for the IPI model ablation. Underlined values for privacy denote statistically significant difference from the baseline (one-sample t -test, p<0.05 ) across five runs.
Model
P
R
F1
RoBERTa-large (baseline)
0.81
0.94
0.87
BERT-Base
0.78
0.92
0.85
DeBERTa-v3-large
0.83
0.94
0.88
BioMed-RoBERTa-base
0.83
0.93
0.88
Table 4: Ablation results on the test set for RoBERTa-large , DeBERTa-v3-large , BioMed-RoBERTa-base and BERT-Base in P recision, R ecall, and F1 . Support shows the number of examples in the test set.
ϵ
Method
Dia ↑
Pro ↑
MP ↑
LoS ↑
S ↑
C ↓
500R ↓
50E ↓
LLM ↓
γ↑
25
DP-MLM
65.48
66.92
66.83
61.19
0.80
1176
10.00%
26.80%
2.10
0.73
DP-IPI
72.93
80.11
75.35
66.12
0.98
157
8.00%
26.00%
2.95
0.80
Hybrid
69.76
74.20
70.74
62.66
0.84
609
2.48%
11.20%
4.79
0.72
50
DP-MLM
69.84
72.21
71.72
63.05
0.85
815
13.60%
26.80%
4.76
0.66
DP-IPI
74.00
80.53
75.13
66.52
0.99
139
9.20%
26.40%
2.57
0.82
Hybrid
70.03
75.30
70.70
62.60
0.85
540
3.96%
14.80%
4.83
0.71
Table 5: A comparison of DP-MLM (RoBERTa-base), DP-IPI, and risk-aware noise allocation, in which we apply lenient DP perturbation with ε=100 on all non-IPI tokens to provide a minimal privacy guarantee on all tokens.
Appendix figures & tables3 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 3: The prompt used to produce the LLM score for each of the original and private text counterparts.
Figure 4: The prompt used to generate background information for each patient based on their admission note.
Figure 5: An example of a background information text generated using the prompt presented in Figure 4 from a fictitious admission note similar to the ones in MIMIC-III.
Differential Privacy (DP) for text matured from disjointed word-level substitutions to contiguous sentence-level rewriting by leveraging the generative capacity of language models. While this form of text privatization is best suited for balancing formal privacy guarantees with grammatical coherence, its impact on the register identity of text remains largely unexplored. By conducting a multidimensional stylistic profiling of differentially-private rewriting, we demonstrate that the cost of privacy extends far beyond lexical variation. Specifically, we find that rewriting under privacy constraints induces a systematic functional mutation of the text's communicative signature. This shift is characterized by the severe attrition of interactive markers, contextual references, and complex subordination. By comparing autoregressive paraphrasing against bidirectional substitution across a spectrum of privacy budgets, we observe that both architectures force convergence toward a non-involved and non-persuasive register. This register-blind sanitization effectively preserves semantic content but structurally homogenizes the nuanced stylistic markers that define human-authored discourse.
Protecting patient privacy in clinical narratives is essential for enabling secondary use of healthcare data under regulations such as GDPR and HIPAA. While manual de-identification remains the gold standard, it is costly and slow, motivating the need for automated methods that combine privacy guarantees with high utility. Most automated text de-identification pipelines employed named entity recognition (NER) to identify protected entities for redaction. Although methods based on differential privacy (DP) provide formal privacy guarantees, more recently also large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for text de-identification in the clinical domain. In this work, we present the first comparative study of DP, NER, and LLMs for Dutch clinical text de-identification. We investigate these methods separately as well as hybrid strategies that apply NER or LLM preprocessing prior to DP, and assess performance in terms of privacy leakage and extrinsic evaluation (entity and relation classification). We show that DP mechanisms alone degrade utility substantially, but combining them with linguistic preprocessing, especially LLM-based redaction, significantly improves the privacy-utility trade-off.
Michele Miranda, Xinlan Yan, Nishant Mishra +4
Sapienza University of Rome · Amsterdam UMC · University of Amsterdam +1
The growing use of large language models has increased interest in sharing textual data in a privacy-preserving manner. One prominent line of work addresses this challenge through text rewriting under Local Differential Privacy (LDP), where input texts are locally obfuscated before release with formal privacy guarantees. These guarantees are typically expressed by a parameter ε that upper bounds the worst-case privacy loss. However, nominal ε values are often difficult to interpret and compare across mechanisms. In this work, we investigate how to empirically calibrate across text rewriting mechanisms under LDP. We propose TeDA, which formulates calibration via a hypothesis-testing framework that instantiates text distinguishability audits in both surface and embedding spaces, enabling empirical assessment of indistinguishability from privatized texts. Applying this calibration to several representative mechanisms, we demonstrate that similar nominal ε bounds can imply very different levels of distinguishability. Empirical calibration thus provides a more comparable footing for evaluating privacy-utility trade-offs, as well as a practical tool for mechanism comparison and analysis in real-world LDP text rewriting deployments.
Weijun Li, Arnaud Grivet Sébert, Qiongkai Xu +2
School of Computing, FSE, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia