Audit Before You Commit: Locating Belief Failures in Active Identification for One-Shot Manipulation

Mohamed Abouagour; Byung-Cheol Min

cs.ROSep 24, 2026

Audit Before You Commit: Locating Belief Failures in Active Identification for One-Shot Manipulation

Authors: Mohamed Abouagour, Byung-Cheol Min

Organizations: SMART Lab, Luddy School of Informatics, Computing, and Engineering, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

Abstract

A robot that probes a few times before one irreversible action, such as tapping a surface before inserting a peg, must decide when the evidence is enough to commit. We argue that this decision rests on two conditions that existing methods do not separate: the belief must still cover the truth in the coordinate that decides the action, and the failure model that scores actions must track realized failure. We audit both conditions separately, offline and with ground truth, on a deployed probe-then-commit pipeline: a particle belief, a scenario failure score, and one commit. On simulated insertion, more taps sharpen the belief while the truth leaves its support on 16.9% of episodes and the failure score turns optimistic by 0.31. Conformal calibration restores coverage but not the decision: confidently wrong instances still pass a confidence gate. The audit's signatures instead point at the observation model, where a hand scan finds a 2.1 mm error in the tap boundary. Correcting that one number cuts failure from 0.354 to 0.112 on untouched instances and transfers unrefitted to a second engine, while in a third engine the same audit suggests an execution-model mismatch instead. Across seven task families in three engines, a few probes at a fixed executor reduce miss or failure. On a physical arm inserting a tool into a rigid pocket by touch, the gain and the audit's two conditions reproduce, and replaying the recorded taps under an injected model error shows the audit's signature on real data. Additional materials are available at https://sites.google.com/view/auditbeforeyoucommit.

Figures & tables

Fig. 1: Probe, believe, commit. One simulated insertion episode: (a) surface-height probes; (b) peak-normalized particle beliefs after taps 1, 3, and 5, with the true hole position and candidate aims; (c) insertion at the fifth aim.

Fig. 2: Probe-then-commit execution and offline audit. Probes update the belief; retained scenarios select an action and failure score. Ground-truth audits assess decision-coordinate coverage and mean score optimism separately. Coverage failures prompt belief-model inspection; optimism prompts score and execution-model validation. Neither uniquely identifies the cause. Corrections apply between deployments, not within an episode.

family	engine	latents	probe / action	$\sigma$	budgets $k$	$n$ ; metric
insertion	all three	$x_{\rm hole},c$	tap / aim	$0.5$ mm	1–8, cover	$96{\times}4$ ; failure
1-D push	analytic	$\mu,m,k_{d}$	pulse / impulse	$5$ cm	0, 2, 5	$81{\times}6$ ; miss
2-D push	MuJoCo	$\mu,m,k_{d}$	pulse / impulse	$5$ cm	0, 2, 5	$18{\times}6$ ; miss
darts	MuJoCo	$k_{d},m,g$	throw / launch	$2$ cm	0, 2, 5	$18{\times}8$ ; miss
hinge	MuJoCo	$f,b,m$	coast / torque	$0.02$ rad	0, 2, 5	$18{\times}16$ ; miss
shuffleboard	SAPIEN	$\mu,m,k_{d}$	strike / strike	$5$ cm	0, 2, 5	$18{\times}6$ ; miss

TABLE I: Experimental setup. Seven task families; simulation engines are MuJoCo, SAPIEN (PhysX), and PyBullet.

\sigma

denotes probe-noise standard deviation;

n

gives instances

\times

seeds or insertion repeats, per method and budget. The 2-D pushing transfer uses PyBullet (

k=5

18{\times}6

Fig. 3: The simulated scenes, with their engines in Table I , and the hardware rig from the front camera: the probe over the machined pocket. The 1-D push is closed form and grasp is a force-balance model with a MuJoCo lift check, so neither has a scene.

family	Blind-Bayes	Blind-Robust	Probe-Robust( $k$ )	paired $\Delta$ [95%]
insertion, A	$0.820$	–	$0.234$	$0.586\,[0.492,0.674]$
1-D push	$0.491$	–	$0.062$	–
2-D push, MJ	$0.252$	$0.307$	$0.221$	$0.031\,[0.007,0.054]$
2-D push, PB	$0.243$	–	$0.141$	–
darts	$0.026$	$0.035$	$0.010$	$0.016\,[0.009,0.024]$
hinge	$0.334$	–	$0.031$	$-91\%$

TABLE II: Every family, blind against probed , uncalibrated, five probes (two for shuffleboard, eight for grasp). Mean miss (m; rad for the hinge; mean / P90 for shuffleboard), failure for insertion on Split A, success for grasp on its feasible subset; MJ and PB are MuJoCo and PyBullet. From Blind-Bayes to Blind-Robust only the risk functional changes, from Blind-Robust to Probe-Robust(k) only the information. Last column: paired reduction against the matched blind baseline, cluster-bootstrap interval. PyBullet uses the MuJoCo-fitted analytic model; a residual model reaches

0.115

	Cluster coverage		$e_{k}$
$k$	original	calibrated	original	calibrated
1	$0.79$	$0.81$	$+0.115$	$\mathbf{-0.003}$
2	$0.69$	$0.82$	$+0.176$	$+0.022$
3	$0.55$	$0.78$	$+0.218$	$+0.078$
5	$0.42$	$0.76$	$+0.263$	$+0.047$
8	$0.46$	$0.77$	$+0.306$	$+0.091$

TABLE III: Insertion audit. Split B, random probes. Cluster coverage requires all

R=4

repeats to be covered;

e_{k}=R_{k}-\widehat{R}_{k}>0

indicates optimism. The bottom row averages

|\mathrm{coverage}-0.80|

and

|e_{k}|

over budgets.

Split	Method	Set cal.	Margin	Failure
A	no probe	–	–	$0.820\,[0.779,0.859]$
A	cover, $k{=}5$	no	no	$0.234\,[0.159,0.312]$
B	Blind-Robust	–	–	$0.870\,[0.836,0.901]$
B	cover, $k{=}5$	no	no	$0.255\,[0.211,0.299]$
B	cover, $k{=}5$	yes	no	$0.260\,[0.182,0.341]$
B	cover, $k{=}5$	yes	yes	$0.302\,[0.221,0.385]$

TABLE IV: Insertion failure by split and calibration setting. Each row uses

n=384

episodes; probed rows use the five-tap cover schedule. Instance sets are defined in Section V . Brackets show truth-cluster bootstrap intervals.

Fig. 4: The failure the audit found. (a) Two taps as scale-accurate sections with the probe’s simulated path. The analytic model reads pocket only inside the dashed edge; the simulator’s finger slides down the chamfer and reads pocket out to the solid one, $2.1$ mm further. (b) After the $+4.5$ mm reading the analytic model’s hypotheses exclude the true hole; the corrected model’s keep it.

	old	corr.	old $-$ corr. [95%]
escape, random $k{=}8$	$0.164$	$0.000$	$+0.164\,[+0.125,+0.203]$
episode cov., random $k{=}8$	$0.768$	$1.000$	$-0.232\,[-0.279,-0.188]$
optimism $e_{8}$ , random	$+0.274$	$-0.015$	$+0.289\,[+0.234,+0.344]$
failure, random $k{=}8$	$0.354$	$0.112$	$+0.242\,[+0.188,+0.297]$
failure, cover $k{=}5$	$0.326$	$0.159$	$+0.167\,[+0.091,+0.247]$
failure, cover $k{=}1$	$0.721$	$0.703$	$+0.018\,[-0.016,+0.052]$

TABLE V: Confirmation on untouched instances (Test C). Drawn after the correction froze (

96

per protocol, four repeats); both models see identical taps, differences paired and cluster-bootstrapped.

	PyBullet			PhysX
	deployed	MJ offset	own scan	deployed	MJ offset	own scan
support escape	$0.167$	$0.023$	$0.031$	$0.039$	$0.065$	$0.000$
episode coverage	$0.763$	$0.951$	$0.948$	$0.914$	$0.872$	$0.995$
optimism $e_{8}$	$+0.232$	$+0.002$	$-0.002$	$+0.369$	$+0.419$	$+0.338$
failure	$0.307$	$0.109$	$0.107$	$0.474$	$0.534$	$0.469$

TABLE VI: The audit across engines , random probes,

k=8

: the analytic model as deployed, with the MuJoCo-fitted offset (not refitted), and with the boundary scanned in that engine.

taps	episodes	in window	entered	predicted	realized	optimism
1	$26$	$6$	$19$	$0.657$	$0.769$	$+0.112$
2	$21$	$13$	$18$	$0.474$	$0.381$	$-0.093$
3	$26$	$19$	$24$	$0.315$	$0.269$	$-0.046$
4	$21$	$15$	$21$	$0.225$	$0.286$	$+0.061$
5	$24$	$22$	$24$	$0.084$	$0.083$	$-0.001$

TABLE VII: The run on the physical arm , by number of taps. Realized failure is the aim outside the model’s

6.57

mm window of the measured centre; optimism is realized minus predicted. Coverage was

118

118

Fig. 5: The run on the physical arm and its replay. (a) The arm at the rig, and one five-tap episode from the front camera, pocket at $-9.8$ mm: hole read at $-23$ and $0$ mm, plate elsewhere; the commit at $-11.6$ mm enters. (b) Aim error against taps, medians joined; filled points entered, open did not; band: the model’s window; dashed: the opening’s half-width. (c) The recorded taps under an injected boundary error: optimism of the faulted model minus the deployed one, paired over positions, $95\%$ band, filled where resolved; dotted: the simulation’s $2.1$ mm error at rig scale. (d) The same taps under a narrowed prior; at $\pm 12$ mm both conditions fire.

Fig. 6: Commit-decision audit on Split B. (a) Cluster coverage versus nominal level under random probing (

k=8

). (b) Failure among committed episodes versus commit rate: cover schedule, budgets

1

–

5

, budget-simultaneous calibration, and first-passage commitment. Curves compare scoring and execution jointly; areas are point estimates over each method’s attainable range. The non-deployable hindsight oracle achieves zero failure at

89\%

commitment. (c) Under the same cover schedule at

60\%

commitment, mean predicted score (pale) versus realized failure (solid); posterior variance makes no probability claim.

fault	fail	surprise	temp. $T{=}4$	known fix
none (baseline)	$0.10$	–	–	–
noise	$0.10$	–	$0.10$	$0.10$
boundary	$0.38$	$0.64$	$0.38$	$0.10$
prior	$0.29$	$0.59$	$0.29$	$0.18$
particles	$0.13$	$0.67$	$0.13$	$0.10$
frame	$0.26$	–	$0.26$	$0.10$

TABLE VIII: Controlled mismatch tests. Random probes,

k=8

, Split B. Fig. 7 shows the corresponding audit metrics. Noise at

4\times

has no observed effect, the two readings being

30\sigma

apart. Surprise is the prequential-surprise AUC for escape; other numeric columns report failure before and after tempering (

T=4

) or known-fault correction. Cluster-bootstrap half-widths reach

0.077

; paired differences are reported in the text.

Fig. 7: The five classes over the probe budget , random probes, corrected model,

n=384

per point. Zero-mean noise matches no fault at every budget, so they share a line; both, and the frame offset, escape on at most one episode in

384

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