From S3Q Theory to Implementation: Towards an Architecture for Machine Qualia

A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet. We address this from the perspective of Intrinsic Computational Functionalism (ICF): if consciousness is computationally constituted, it depends not on externally imposed descriptions but on the computational structures a system physically realizes in virtue of its own causal-dynamical organization. In previous work we developed Canonical Functionalism as a mathematically precise special case of this anti-interpretivist program, identifying functional states by their complete future input-output roles under a fixed interface. Here we argue that this input-output construction, though important, is incomplete: as a behavioral boundary case of ICF, it makes lookup tables and unfolded systems that preserve the same boundary behavior canonically equivalent. A consciousness-relevant canonical representation must instead include internal mechanisms, interventions, and joint readouts belonging to the relevant intrinsic organization. We therefore define a mechanism-enriched canonical structure and use it to formulate Intrinsic Causal-Computational Realization (ICCR), a realization relation preserving physical implementation, intrinsic state individuation, transition structure, intervention profiles, and the relevant agent-body-world boundary. The central result is conditional: if conscious properties are invariants of intrinsic causal-computational organization, then any system satisfying ICCR realizes the same consciousness-relevant properties, whether biological, artificial, or simulated. We discuss objections including biological naturalism and integrated information theory. We conclude that to deny consciousness to a simulation, one must identify a consciousness-relevant intrinsic causal-computational structure that the simulation fails to realize.

Despite remarkable advances, today's AI systems remain narrow in scope, falling short of the flexible, adaptive, and multisensory intelligence that characterizes human capabilities. This gap has fueled longstanding debates about whether AI might one day achieve human-like generality or even consciousness, and whether theories of consciousness can inspire new architectures for AI. This paper presents an early blueprint for implementing a general AI system, CTM-AI, combining the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM), a formal machine model of consciousness, with today's foundation models. CTM-AI contains an enormous number of powerful processors ranging from specialized experts (e.g., vision-language models and APIs) to unspecialized general-purpose learners poised to develop their own expertise. Crucially, for whatever problem must be dealt with, information from many processors is selected, integrated, and exchanged appropriately to solve the task. CTM-AI achieves state-of-the-art accuracy on MUStARD (72.28) and UR-FUNNY (72.13), outperforming multimodal and multi-agent frameworks. On tool-using and agentic tasks, CTM-AI achieves 10+ points of improvement on StableToolBench and WebArena-Lite. Overall, CTM-AI offers a principled, testable blueprint for general AI inspired by a model of consciousness.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.