Information Design Against Gaming and Learning Adversaries
Organizations: Independent Researcher, Bengaluru, India
Abstract
A principal who deploys a binary classifier with an abstention option must decide which queries the mechanism abstains on. The right choice depends on the adversary. A gaming adversary already knows the classifier and tries to manipulate features across the boundary, so the principal does best by abstaining on queries close to that boundary. The same boundary-localizing rule is the worst possible choice against a learning adversary who does not know the classifier: each abstention now tells the adversary that the boundary is nearby, which is enough to drive a binary search. We analyze this tension. The two natural defenses, abstaining at a fixed rate and abstaining near the boundary, are Blackwell-incomparable: neither can be simulated by post-processing the other's responses. The number of queries needed to reconstruct the boundary to error is under the first defense and under the second, where is the VC dimension of the classifier family and suppresses factors polylogarithmic in and . The first rate is a worst case over query distributions; no reconstruction algorithm can close the gap at the distributions that attain it. We characterize the Pareto frontier between the two defense objectives, and confirm both rates on seven binary-classification tasks spanning tabular, image, and language-model-feature inputs: label-plus-counterfactual access extracts the boundary with up to fewer queries than a published label-only baseline.
Figures & tables
| Dataset | Victim acc. | (A) | (B) | (B) | Gap at | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACSIncome (CA, 2018) | ||||||
| TREC question type | ||||||
| SST-2 sentiment | ||||||
| Civil Comments toxic | ||||||
| AG News Sports | ||||||
| MNIST 1 vs 7 |
| Protocol A (random) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ActiveThief | |||||
| Protocol B (counterfactual) |
Information Design
Information design studies how to choose what signals people or algorithms receive to shape decisions, incentives, and outcomes.
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