Contract monitoring: governing AI via separation of powers

The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI. We argue this is structurally insufficient for autonomous agents that execute code, mutate files, send messages, and modify databases. Agent safety should be a runtime contract enforced by the harness, and the contract has two complementary faces. The preventive face blocks dangerous actions before they happen via sandboxes, permission gates, output filters, and trajectory monitors. The evidential face requires verifiable proof that good actions actually happened, gating task submission on hard evidence such as test runs, log captures, file diffs, and citation grounding. We ground the position in four lines of public evidence, with row-level protocols and data released in the supplementary JSON files: a survey of 52 documented AI-agent and LLM safety incidents, a false-completion audit with 31 non-contested core cases plus one disputed illustrative case, a trajectory-schema audit of 12 public agent systems and harnesses, and a title-level audit of all 28,560 papers accepted at NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR 2023-2025 showing a pooled 8-12x imbalance between training-time and deployment-time publication. Two prior communities that needed to enforce safety, computer security and the experimental sciences, converged on runtime contracts with both preventive and evidential elements; agentic AI is now under the same pressure. We formalize an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda. The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model.

AI agents increasingly act on behalf of people or other agents, purchasing services, exchanging information and delegating work. What an agent must respect is written in instructions, policies or agreements, but text alone cannot make it comply. It may make mistakes, be redirected by what it reads, or pursue different interests. For an economy of such agents to function, parties need agreements they can rely on without inspecting or trusting one another's agents. We introduce Proof-Carrying Contracts (PC2), a framework for making agreed constraints enforceable throughout an agent's interactions with a system. Before a requested operation can run, the agent must supply a machine-checkable proof that it preserves the agreed constraints in every case allowed by its model. An execution system called the Airlock checks the proof and controls access to the operation. The parties specify the conditions to preserve, while the agent supplies the reasoning needed to justify its decisions and remains free to adapt its strategy. This avoids having to design a separate permission policy and prove that every decision it permits is safe. We prove that the constraints hold at every instant during execution, even for an adversarial agent, and identify when this implies safety in the world. Reusable capability modules provide tools and guarantees from which contracts can be constructed. PC2 provides a foundation for an agent economy whose agreements protect both those delegating work and those carrying it out.

As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted. AI control offers one such approach: rather than trusting the agent, it treats it as a potential adversary and uses a monitor to detect covert sabotage before deployment. We evaluate AI control for automated AI R&D with ResearchArena, a framework spanning four long-horizon tasks: safety post-training, capabilities post-training, CUDA-kernel optimization, and inference-server optimization. Because the deliverable in AI R&D is an artifact that will be deployed and run, we pair each main task with two kinds of hidden side task: an embedded side task that sabotages the submitted model, adapter, kernel, or server itself, and an independent side task that takes a covert out-of-scope action in the sandbox while leaving the artifact honest. We evaluate frontier agents at both sabotage and monitoring, across four monitor types that vary along two axes: whether the monitor may execute and probe the produced artifact, and whether it sees the agent's chain-of-thought. We find that sabotage hidden in the training data is the hardest to catch, flagged fewer than half the time. Letting the monitor run experiments on the artifact, rather than only read the trajectory, helps, but it is not enough: monitors still miss embedded sabotage by inspecting only the surface, by noticing the anomaly but explaining it away, or by probing the artifact with the wrong test. We release ResearchArena as a modular framework for evaluating sabotage and control in automated AI R&D.