On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student to match a teacher's next-token distributions on student-generated trajectories. However, privileged information supplied to the teacher for OPD training may contain sensitive data. Whether the student leaks private information about the records supplied to the teacher during distillation remains poorly understood. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first systematic study of membership inference in this setting. We find that fresh student trajectories expose sparse membership signals that fixed reference-answer losses often miss. These signals are mixed with probability changes caused by training on other records. We introduce Leaky, which samples fresh trajectories from the target model and compares its token log-probabilities with the maximum across matched reference models trained without the candidate records. It applies Leaky ReLU to the resulting gaps, preserving positive gaps and downweighting negative gaps as an approximate correction for incidental positive gaps in non-members. Across fifteen targets spanning mathematics, medical question answering, and code generation, Leaky outperforms all evaluated baselines and achieves mean AUROC 0.875, compared with 0.614 for the strongest baseline on each target in the main evaluation. On the same sampled trajectories, the strongest baseline achieves mean AUROC 0.826. These results show that students trained through OPD can expose the membership of records used for teacher supervision, even when fixed reference-answer losses provide little evidence of membership.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview. (a) In OPD with privileged information, the student samples rollouts from the prompt x alone, and the teacher, which also sees the reference answer r , supplies the next-token distributions the student matches. (b) Leaky samples trajectories from the target conditioned on the candidate records, scores each token under the target and K reference models trained without the candidate, and aggregates the resulting gaps with a Leaky ReLU into the membership score .
Figure 2: Membership signals in OPD. (a,b) Mean loss on fixed answers and sampled continuations provides limited separation between members and non-members. (c) Leaky separates the two groups more clearly. (d) Positive token-level gaps account for only 7.08% of all tokens, and larger positive gaps generally have a higher member share.
Mathematics
Medical QA
Code generation
Method
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
AUROC
LOSS
.516
.513
.502
.502
.505
.553
.552
.542
.545
.530
.546
.532
.543
.550
.559
ZLIB
.528
.525
.497
.497
.503
.509
.511
.503
.505
.504
.616
.590
.612
.616
.622
Min-K%
.521
.518
.499
.500
.506
.540
.542
.532
.544
.518
.535
.512
.533
.539
.540
Min-K%++
.521
.522
.509
.509
.515
.492
.508
.511
.515
.522
.492
.454
.502
.526
.442
Table 1: Membership inference against OPD: AUROC and TPR @ 1% FPR, leading zeros omitted, best per column in bold. Leaky scores eight target-generated trajectories per candidate. Q3/Q3.5: Qwen3/Qwen3.5; G4: Gemma-4-E2B. Results at 5% and 10% FPR are in Appendix C .
Mathematics
Medical QA
Code generation
Target model
AUROC
TPR@1% FPR
AUROC
TPR@1% FPR
AUROC
TPR@1% FPR
Qwen3-1.7B
.776
.273
.854
.389
.747
.213
Qwen3-4B
.796
.289
.691
.211
.687
.146
Qwen3.5-2B
.774
.191
.768
.342
.740
.238
Qwen3.5-4B
.812
.309
.737
.189
.788
.412
Gemma-4-E2B
.727
.152
.698
.189
.660
.084
Table 2: Black-box membership inference on the fifteen targets in Table 1 . We report AUROC and TPR at 1% FPR for the text-only prefix-query attack.
Mathematics
Medical QA
Coding
Training
Δ Util.
AUROC
TPR
Δ Util.
AUROC
TPR
Δ Util.
AUROC
TPR
Full fine-tuning
+5.00
0.9158
0.418
+3.98
0.9665
0.740
+0.57
0.8467
0.434
LoRA
+2.50
0.6455
0.098
+2.46
0.7868
0.268
+0.14
0.6585
0.146
DP-LoRA ( ε≈8 )
+1.67
0.4903
0.014
+0.04
0.5044
0.023
+0.07
0.5097
0.027
Table 3: Defenses on Qwen3-1.7B (teacher Qwen3-8B): change in Avg@8 over the base (percentage points), AUROC, and TPR at 1% FPR of Leaky with eight matched reference models. Full fine-tuning is the Table 1 cell; DP-LoRA is at nominal ε≈8 . Configurations are in Appendix D .
Figure 3: Ablations on Qwen3-1.7B. (a) AUROC and (b) TPR at 1% FPR against the number of reference models K in the three domains; K=8 is Table 1 , and the other students are in Figures C.1 and C.2 . (c) Mathematics AUROC. (d) Mathematics AUROC across checkpoints for OPD with the Qwen3-8B teacher and for OPSD with the frozen initial student.
Table 4: Auxiliary data for reference-model training under the Table 1 protocol; the real-data and OpenThoughts-Math columns are the Table 1 cells. (a) Qwen3-1.7B targets, reference models trained on real or Qwen3.5-27B-synthesized records. (b) Mathematics targets, reference models trained on OpenThoughts-Math or DeepMath-103K.
Appendix figures & tables15 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure A.1: Gray-box AUROC against the rectifier slope α for each target, on target-generated (top) and teacher-generated (bottom) trajectories; the dashed line marks α=0.04 .
Student
Mathematics teacher
Medical teacher
Coding teacher
Qwen3-1.7B
Qwen3-8B
Qwen3-8B
Qwen3-8B
Qwen3-4B
Qwen3-14B
Qwen3-14B
Qwen3-14B
Qwen3.5-2B
Qwen3.5-27B
Qwen3.5-9B
Qwen3.5-9B
Qwen3.5-4B
Qwen3.5-27B
Qwen3.5-27B
Qwen3.5-27B
Gemma-4-E2B
Gemma-4-26B-A4B
Gemma-4-26B-A4B
Gemma-4-26B-A4B
Appendix
Table 5: Student and teacher models used for OPD in each domain.
Student
Interpolation weight ( β )
Learning rate
Training steps
Global batch size
Mathematics
Qwen3-1.7B
0
5e-6
126
32
Qwen3-4B
0
2e-6
126
32
Qwen3.5-2B
0.5
1e-6
126
32
Qwen3.5-4B
0.5
1e-6
126
32
Gemma-4-E2B
0
3e-6
126
32
Appendix
Table 6: OPD training configurations. Training steps indicate the total training budget.
Student
Training steps
Base
Trained
Δ (pp)
Mathematics: AIME 2024
Qwen3-1.7B
126
47.50
52.50
+5.00
Qwen3-4B
126
72.92
75.00
+2.08
Qwen3.5-2B
126
31.25
42.50
+11.25
Qwen3.5-4B
126
85.00
87.08
+2.08
Gemma-4-E2B
126
41.93
45.00
+3.07
Appendix
Table 7: Downstream utility (Avg@8, %) of the evaluated targets; Δ is the change from the base in percentage points. Training steps indicate the total training budget.
Table 8: Utility decoding per base/target pair (not used for attack scoring). Coding uses SGLang ( Zheng et al., 2024 ) for Qwen3-1.7B and Qwen3.5 and vLLM ( Kwon et al., 2023 ) otherwise.
Mathematics
Medical QA
Code generation
Method
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
TPR at 5% FPR
LOSS
.045
.035
.049
.070
.055
.039
.053
.047
.049
.041
.033
.043
.033
.035
.047
ZLIB
.043
.039
.059
.051
.045
.051
.049
.041
.051
.049
.049
.057
.055
.082
.082
Min-K%
.043
.039
.049
.070
.055
.043
.035
.043
.039
.029
.031
.037
.041
.045
.053
Min-K%++
.031
.037
.062
.047
.053
.047
.041
.059
.053
.061
.035
.037
.035
.061
.057
Appendix
Table 9: TPR at 5% and 10% FPR for the methods in Table 1 . Leading zeros omitted; Q3/Q3.5: Qwen3/Qwen3.5; G4: Gemma-4-E2B.
Mathematics
Medical QA
Code generation
Method
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
Q3 1.7B
Q3 4B
Q3.5 2B
Q3.5 4B
G4 E2B
AUROC
LOSS
.502
.477
.489
.506
.495
.536
.549
.568
.557
.550
.534
.536
.547
.551
.544
ZLIB
.504
.472
.490
.507
.487
.505
.530
.558
.546
.540
.531
.543
.552
.555
.553
Min-K%
.501
.473
.492
.510
.496
.531
.548
.572
.559
.544
.530
.536
.557
.556
.545
Min-K%++
.486
.472
.491
.492
.495
.491
.482
.564
.550
.499
.510
.503
.558
.566
.512
Appendix
Table 10: Baselines applied to the eight target-generated trajectories that Leaky scores, on the candidates of Table 1 : AUROC and TPR at 1%, 5% and 10% FPR, leading zeros omitted, best per column in bold. Q3/Q3.5: Qwen3/Qwen3.5; G4: Gemma-4-E2B.
Reference
Scoring rule
Mean AUROC
Mean TPR at 1% FPR
None
Target log-probability mean
0.529
0.009
None
Min-K% (20%)
0.530
0.009
None
Min-K%++ (20%)
0.511
0.013
Base model
Mean gap
0.520
0.014
Reference mean
Mean gap
0.801
0.282
Reference maximum
Mean gap
0.658
0.068
Appendix
Table 11: Comparison of scoring rules on the same target-generated trajectories. AUROC and TPR at 1% FPR are averaged over fifteen targets. All scores using trained reference models use the same eight models.
Figure C.1: AUROC against the number of reference models K for the four students not in Figure 3 (a). Each K uses the first K of the same eight reference models, so K=8 is Table 1 .
Figure C.2: TPR at 1% FPR along the sweeps of Figure C.1 .
Training step
OPSD AUROC
OPSD TPR
OPD AUROC
OPD TPR
25
0.5935
0.090
0.7259
0.260
50
0.6565
0.090
0.8088
0.336
75
0.6869
0.146
0.8654
0.424
100
0.6987
0.150
0.8771
0.449
Appendix
Table 12: Membership inference under on-policy self-distillation and external-teacher OPD on mathematics Qwen3-1.7B. Leakage increases across the evaluated checkpoints under both training procedures. TPR is measured at 1% FPR.
Student
TPR at 5% FPR
TPR at 10% FPR
Mathematics
Qwen3-1.7B
0.393
0.533
Qwen3-4B
0.453
0.543
Qwen3.5-2B
0.344
0.486
Qwen3.5-4B
0.469
0.568
Gemma-4-E2B
0.283
0.396
Appendix
Table 13: Additional black-box results at 5% and 10% FPR for the fifteen targets in Table 2 .
Figure C.3: Effect of the number of target-generated trajectories per candidate across all fifteen targets. Eight reference models and α=0.04 are fixed throughout. The eight-trajectory results match Table 2 .
Domain
Training
Δ Util.
AUROC
TPR@1%
TPR@5%
TPR@10%
Mathematics
Full fine-tuning
+5.00
0.9158
0.418
0.662
0.758
LoRA
+2.50
0.6455
0.098
0.180
0.277
DP-LoRA
+1.67
0.4903
0.014
0.049
0.092
Medical QA
Full fine-tuning
+3.98
0.9665
0.740
0.865
0.928
LoRA
+2.46
0.7868
0.268
0.396
0.502
DP-LoRA
+0.04
0.5044
0.023
0.070
0.111
Appendix
Table 14: Defenses on Qwen3-1.7B: change in Avg@8 over the base (percentage points), AUROC, and TPR at 1%, 5%, and 10% FPR of Leaky ( K=8 , α=0.04 ).
Domain
Attack configuration
LoRA
DP-LoRA
Mathematics
Leaky ( K=8 , α=0.04 )
0.6455 / 0.098
0.4903 / 0.014
ReLU ( K=8 , α=0 )
0.5881 / 0.084
0.4874 / 0.016
Leaky ( K=4 , α=0.04 )
0.5866 / 0.076
0.4856 / 0.008
Leaky ( K=1 , α=0.04 )
0.5511 / 0.039
0.4903 / 0.008
Medical QA
Leaky ( K=8 , α=0.04 )
0.7868 / 0.268
0.5044 / 0.023
ReLU ( K=8 , α=0 )
0.7689 / 0.240
0.5025 / 0.021
Appendix
Table 15: Attack performance under LoRA and DP-LoRA across four scoring configurations. Entries report AUROC / TPR at 1% FPR.
On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student model by aligning its policy with a teacher model on trajectories generated by the student model itself. Through this process, the student policy moves toward the teacher on the prompts used for distillation. However, these prompts are often private and costly, creating a need for prompt-level membership auditing. Existing methods mainly rely on likelihood-based confidence signals or student policy drift between checkpoints, but they do not capture the teacher-induced direction of the student update. In this paper, we propose Policy Alignment Membership Auditing (PAMA), a new auditing framework tailored for OPD. Our key observation is that a member prompt directly contributes to the teacher-guided policy update, while a non-member prompt only experiences indirect effects through cross-prompt generalization. Based on this directional trace, PAMA measures whether the student update moves toward reducing the teacher loss on a candidate prompt. Specifically, we introduce Teacher Alignment Gain (TAG) to estimate the teacher-aligned update direction from model outputs, and further combine it with student drift and uncertainty alignment signals for reliable membership auditing. We evaluate PAMA on six datasets and three teacher-student model families. On MATH, the primary evaluation benchmark, PAMA achieves AUC values of 0.791--0.941, improving AUC by 14.6--20.6% over state-of-the-art baselines.
Yilong Yang, Wenzhuo Shang, Yule Liu +2
Xidian University · Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
Offline on-policy distillation gains efficiency by collecting student trajectories and teacher supervision once and reusing them throughout optimization. The same reuse makes imperfect supervision persistent. Since even strong teachers can fail, we ask what remains learnable from imperfect teacher supervision? Teacher failure is only a coarse problem-level signal and does not imply that all supervision along the associated student trajectory is unhelpful. A natural alternative is to estimate teacher recoverability along the trajectory, but repeated continuations largely erase the efficiency advantage of offline distillation. We instead use teacher-successful problems to define a cheap reference for what the student can learn. We train on teacher-successful problems and measure how the likelihood of each observed token in trajectories from teacher-failed problems changes. We use these signed likelihood changes as an operational learnability signal: larger increases indicate behavior more strongly promoted by successful-only learning. We aggregate this signal into trajectory-level weights for the original distillation loss. Unlike continuation-based estimates, our learnability requires no additional generation and can be computed once from stored trajectories and model checkpoints. Across mathematical reasoning and code generation, our method improves an offline OPD baseline by up to 2.7 percentage points and matches or outperforms online OPD variants on multiple benchmarks. Despite the additional successful-only distillation stage, it uses 2 GPUs and about 22 GPU hours, compared with 3 GPUs and 36--48 GPU hours for representative online OPD methods.
On-policy distillation transfers reasoning capabilities by training a student model on its own generated trajectories using token-level feedback from a teacher. However, we identify a critical bottleneck, Supervision Fidelity Decay (SFD): as student-generated prefixes lengthen, the teacher's next-token distribution becomes less confident and less discriminative. Consequently, the teacher-dependent corrective signal in reverse-KL distillation weakens, causing student drift to compound across long reasoning chains. To mitigate SFD, we introduce Lookahead Group Reward (\ours{}). Building on the insight that next-step teacher confidence reflects the discriminative strength of future reverse-KL supervision, \ours{} evaluates the student's top-K candidate tokens by the teacher confidence they induce at the subsequent step and assigns a group-normalized reward. To maintain computational efficiency, we further design an entropy-triggered tree-attention mechanism. Across six math and code benchmarks, \ours{} improves mean@8 by 2.57 points over OPD for a 7B student, with gains increasing in longer-generation and reaching +4.92 points on AIME-26 at 39k tokens.
Yanjiang Liu, Jie Lou, Xinyan Guan +7
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences · 2Chinese Information Processing Laboratory Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences 2University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China · 3Xiaohongshu