cs.AISep 27, 2026

Audit-First VAPO: Risk-Certified Selective Updates under Imperfect Verification

Authors: Miaobo Hu, Shuhao Hu, Xiaobo Guo, Xin Wang, Bokun Wang, Rui Chen, Daren Zha, Jun Xiao

Organizations: School of Artificial Intelligence, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China · Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

Abstract

Imperfect verifiers can assign a harmful update direction even when clipping and regularization bound its magnitude. We introduce Audit-First VAPO, which separates discrete directional admission from continuous magnitude control. An observation-only accept-appeal-abstain policy uses a finite secondary-verification budget; its action trace is frozen before clean labels are joined. Simultaneous finite-sample bounds then certify selected harmful risk, coverage, and verifier-call rate over a predeclared policy family. Conditional Hoeffding-Azuma bounds account for the dependence induced by shared budgets, and rollout or verifier changes initiate a new certification stage. After admission, a bounded trust-clip-KL actuator controls magnitude. We evaluate two models on two reasoning benchmarks against static RLVR, matched-random selection, confidence thresholding, noise correction, and verifier augmentation. On Qwen3.5-0.8B and GSM8K at target risk ρ=0.08ρ=0.08, RC-VAPO achieves 74.1% accuracy, selected harmful risk 0.0697, coverage 0.4125, and relative verifier cost 1.16×1.16\times. At matched coverage and update magnitude, its selected-risk difference from matched random is -0.0260 with paired 95% interval [−0.0364,−0.0157][-0.0364,-0.0157]. Across asymmetric, confidence-dependent, and correlated-verifier noise, the certificate is satisfied on 57 of 60 independent runs. These comparisons isolate informative directional selection from proposal suppression, update shrinkage, and additional verifier computation.

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